Trygve Wyller

The significance of lifeworld and the case of hospice

Questions on what it means to live and die well are raised and discussed in the hospice movement. A phenomenological lifeworld perspective may help professionals to be aware of meaningful and important dimensions in the lives of persons close to death. Lifeworld is not an abstract philosophical term, but rather the opposite. Lifeworld is about everyday, common life in all its aspects. In the writings of Cicely Saunders, known as the founder of the modern hospice movement, facets of lifeworld are presented as important elements in caring for dying patients. Palliative care and palliative medicine today are, in many ways, replacing hospices. This represents not only a change in name, but also in the main focus. Hospice care was originally very much about providing support and comfort for, and interactions with the patients. Improved medical knowledge today means improved symptomatic palliation, but also time and resources spent in other ways than before. Observations from a Nordic hospice ward indicate that seriously ill and dying persons spend much time on their own. Different aspects of lifeworld and intersubjectivity in the dying persons’ room is presented and discussed.

Reformation Theology for a Post-Secular Age: Løgstrup, Prenter, Wingren, and the Future of Scandinavian Creation Theology

Reformation and Erasmus’s humanism. Finally, in many instances, while the author is to be applauded for introducing so many important primary texts into his work, he allows his over-arching interpretative framework to exaggerate what he reads there. This is true both for his reading of Melanchthon’s contacts at Augsburg with Cardinal Campeggio, Archbishop Albrecht, and others from the Roman party and for his misreading of Melanchthon’s transitional comments between articles twenty-one and twenty-two of the Augsburg Confession (where Master Philip is not minimizing the theological differences but using striking rhetorical irony to make the point that the Evangelicals are the catholic party). He also does not always seem aware of the latest secondary literature (for example, on the relation of Melanchthon and Erasmus by this reviewer or the correspondence between Luther and Melanchthon at Augsburg by Gerhard Ebeling). By contrast, the third, systematic section is far more helpful. Indeed, the author’s description of Melanchthon’s methodus and loci communes (351–64) is worth much broader distribution. Here a better definition of humanism often obtains, and the nuances of Melan chthon’s Reformation thought come into much clearer focus. Thus, the reader discovers just how Melanchthon could combine his commitment to reconciliation and confession. This “coherence” (note the title of the book) represents important initial steps both in leaving behind many unhelpful assumptions about Melanchthon’s thought and in taking Melanchthon’s work seriously as a truly Lutheran theological proposal for his day and ours. Riverton, New Jersey Timothy J. Wengert