Tuomas Forsberg

Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type

The concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) has become very popular for analysing the foreign policy and external relations of the European Union (EU). There is, however, confusion about what ‘normative power’ actually means, which is why the debate over whether the EU actually is or is not a normative power has not always been as fruitful as it could be. This article proposes two necessary starting points for more constructive discussion: a distinction between ‘normative’ and ‘normal’, and a distinction between ‘power as a powerful actor’ and ‘power as ability to cause effects’. Furthermore, the article distinguishes between ‘normative identity’, ‘normative interests’, ‘normative behaviour’, ‘normative means of power’ and ‘normative outcomes’ as separate features of a normative power. There are also at least four different mechanisms through which normative power is exercised: by persuasion, by invoking norms, by shaping the discourse and by leading through example. The article concludes that normative power is best seen as an ideal type – one which the EU approximates more closely than other great powers.

The Ground without Foundation: Territory as a Social Construct

It has been commonplace to regard territory and boundaries as social constructions. It is, however, often left unclear what the social construction of territory really implies and what it explains. As several meanings can be attached to territory, the key question is not whether territory is socially constructed but how it is constructed. This article tries to systemise and sharpen constructivist claims regarding territory. I will argue that two specific constructions merit special attention and help explain the tendency to defend territory by military means. First, territory is often conceived as a (female) body. Second, it is regarded as private property. Both metaphors are interwoven in normative structures that may explain why people fight over territory although in strategic and economic sense it would not be rational to do so.

Beyond Sovereignty, Within Territoriality Mapping the Space of Late-Modern (Geo) Politics

According to some widespread ideas, the erosion of state sovereignty also implies the vanishing importance of territoriality in global politics. Indeed, at the end of the Cold War, some scholars have been willing to declare not only the end of history but also the end of geography. This kind of view, however, is based on a misreading of the role of territoriality in world politics. The problem is that territoriality is too often discussed only in terms of territorial sovereignty. Drawing on the recent theoretical and empirical literature in international relations and political geography, the article discusses the changing aspects of territoriality in the post-Cold War world. Notwithstanding the changes that challenge the state sovereignty, it is argued that territoriality will be preserved pivotal in world politics. Furthermore, territoriality should not be conceived as something inherently negative, but it can be seen as a positive aspect of ones identity and it can be defended as a means with which to organize power. In short, being more sensitive to different forms of territoriality could help us find better answers to the problems of late-modern world politics.

German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation?

The clash between Berlin and Washington over the war on Iraq in 2002–03 came as a surprise to the community of scholars and analysts watching German foreign policy and transatlantic relations. Attempts to explain German behaviour have mostly focused on either the anti-American or the pacifist nature of German society. There is some relevance in these explanations, but they poorly explain the timing of the change, its sudden emergence and its focus on the Iraq issue. This article argues that the most important driving force behind the change was neither anti-Americanism nor pacifism, but rather Germany’s political emancipation. The Germans had been gradually growing into their role as a leading power in Europe that is willing to take on greater international responsibility. When Berlin felt that it was not consulted in the decisionmaking process, it reacted strongly. The question at stake was the nature of the world order and the relations of the USA to its allies, and no longer the single issue of Iraq.

Inside the EU, outside NATO: Paradoxes of Finland's and Sweden's post‐neutrality

This article examines Finlands and Swedens security policy in order to explain what the ‘post‐neutrality’ of these countries is and what it is not. Why do Finland and Sweden appear to be willing to accept almost everything else in the field of security cooperation except collective defence? We focus on both the similarities and differences between the Swedish and Finnish policy by analysing their policies in general and the attitudes towards NATO and the EU in particular. We argue that geopolitics and historical memories still separate the countries, but they have more in common now than during the Cold War. Despite their participation in the European Security and Defence Policy and cooperation with NATO, neither of them feels any need to give up their policy of military non‐alignment. In the future, changes in policy are more likely to happen because of development within the EU than because of any external threat posed by Russia.

From Ostpolitik to ‘frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German foreign policy towards Russia

Germanys relationship with Russia has historically been one of the most crucial in shaping Europes fate. Despite radical transformation in the nature of European Great Power politics, it continues to be pertinent from the perspective of todays world. Germanys willingness to establish good relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s—its emphasis on economic relations and cooperation instead of political disagreements—prepared the ground for the end of the Cold War and German unification twenty years later. Germanys basic policy towards Russia remained broadly unchanged despite German unification and changes in the domestic political coalitions and leadership, sometimes against political expectations. In the European context, Germanys attitude towards Russia created the backbone of EU–Russia relations. During 2012–13, however, the continuity in Germanys policy towards Russia was seen as having come to an end. Political twists came to the fore and the atmosphere was loaded with tensions, made worse by the Ukrainian crisis. This article reviews the recent, alleged changes in Germanys policy towards Russia during the Merkel era. It asks two basic questions: first, whether Germanys policy really has changed and if it has, what are the theoretical tools that give us the best potential understanding of these changes? The article argues that the policy has changed, but not as dramatically as made out by some headlines. Moreover, the article suggests that a key element in analysing the degree of change in Germanys policy towards Russia is neither the external power relations nor domestic politics and related changes in the prevailing interpretation of national interest, though these are important too, but the interaction between the leaders and foreign policy elites.

POWER WITHOUT INFLUENCE? THE EU AND TRADE DISPUTES WITH RUSSIA

THE EU HAS BEEN VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS A GLOBAL POWER, a superpower, a civilian power, a trade power, a normative power, a realist power and an ethical power, but it remains unclear when and how the EU really can exercise its power effectively. The gap between expectations and capabilities in the EU external relations is well known (Hill 1993). Perhaps it has nowhere manifested itself as clearly as in the EU’s relations with Russia. A recent ‘Power Audit of EU–Russia Relations’ conducted by the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) finds that the EU has hardly been able to influence Russia although it is a far bigger power than Russia in conventional terms (Leonard & Popescu 2007). According to the ECFR report the main explanation for the inability of the EU to influence Russia is its lack of unity. The problem of the insufficient cohesion of the EU is not a novel finding (Allen 1997; Meunier & Nicolaidis 1999; Smith 2001a; Toje 2008). Yet, it has become more common to refer to it for two reasons especially in the context of contemporary EU–Russian relations: firstly, the EU has enlarged to become a community of 27 member states; secondly, Russia has started effectively to use a divide-and-rule strategy vis-à-vis the EU (Haukkala 2006). Yet the lack of unity does not need to be the only explanation for the EU’s poor influence. The ECFR also points out that perhaps, even where it has been united, the EU has not been able to choose the best possible strategy or to implement it properly to achieve its aims. The EU does not often rely on hard military and economic power even if it has such hard power resources available, but tends to prefer inducements, persuasion, invoking norms and acting as on example: power tools that are often associated with the EU’s identity as a normative power (Manners 2002). It may also use its policy instruments in an incoherent way and so fail to achieve optimal effectiveness. Finally, the whole idea that the EU should prevail in trade disputes with Russia just because the EU has more economic leverage might be misleading. It might be unrealistic to expect the EU to be able change the position of Russia on issues where Russia has important defensive stakes, even if the EU were united and had adopted the best possible strategy. This article will focus on the capabilities–expectations gap in the EU’s Russia policy. In order to avoid simplistic conclusions, a distinction will be made between the EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES Vol. 61, No. 10, December 2009, 1805–1823

Power, interests and trust: explaining Gorbachev’s choices at the end of the Cold War

This article argues that the end of the Cold War can be told as a story of the development of trust. Despite its centrality as a political concept, trust has only recently received focused attention in the field of international relations. Development of trust cannot be reduced to changing relationships of power or redefinitions of interests but requires communicative elements. The argument is demonstrated through a comparison of German Soviet and Japanese-Soviet relations at the end of the Cold War. The key point is that trust and the lack of it, respectively, were a major factor in the profound transformation of the former relationship and led to stalemate in the latter.

Russia's relationship with NATO: A qualitative change or old wine in new bottles?

Since the establishment of the NATO–Russia Council in 2002, new opportunities have arisen for developing a different relationship from what existed in the past. Are NATO and Russia now partners in fighting common threats like global terrorism? There is a common view that the relationship has improved but no detailed analysis of how the relationship has changed and no agreement on whether the change is going to be fundamental. Because previous attempts by NATO to engage Russia have failed, scepticism is widespread. In fact, Russias current view of NATO consists of contradictory elements and shows puzzlement about NATOs role and transformation in the post-Cold War world. Although the partnership is not always going to be smooth, Russia will prefer collaboration over confrontation.

The “Finlandisation” of Finland: The Ideal Type, the Historical Model, and the Lessons Learnt

ABSTRACT “Finlandisation” has become a buzzword and suggested solution to the on-going Ukrainian crisis. However, in Finland, Finlandisation tends to be a pejorative term because of its negative effects on Finnish domestic politics. Negative effects notwithstanding, Finland’s Cold War experience often appears as a success: it preserved its democratic system, prospered economically, and strengthened its international status. This analysis examines the historical evidence of what role Finlandisation—understood as a policy of collaboration and friendship with the greatest potential security threat to a country’s sovereignty and as a political culture related to that policy—played during the Cold War era. Did the strategy of accommodation go too far and was it superfluous to Finland’s survival and success? In this context, the article also discusses the “dangers” of Finlandisation and the gradual end of the policy.