Tziporah Kasachkoff

Haidt's Moral Intuitionist Theory: A Psychological and Philosophical Critique.

Jon Haidts (2001) proposal for a moral intutionist theory of morality is criticized on psychological and philosophical grounds, including (a) the apparent reduction of social influence to one kind, overt compliance, and the virtual ignoring of the role of persuasion in moral and other decision making; (b) the failure to distinguish development of a psychological entity from its deployment or functioning; and (c) the failure to consider, in distinguishing cause and reason as explanatory concepts, the motivating power of reasons. Arguments for an evolutionary approach to morality are also faulted on the grounds that they assume that adaptation is served by nonmoral rather than moral (fairness- and benevolence-based) criteria. Finally, the authors suggest that an intuitionist approach such as that of Haidt may obscure important aspects of moral decision making.

Drug addiction and responsibility for the health care of drug addicts.

Taking care of those who are in need of health care is something that we, as a society, feel ourselves committed to insofar as public funds make that possible. Is this commitment in any way qualified by the fact that a persons medical maladies are the result of that person having voluntarily embarked on activities whose deleterious consequences for health were known and appreciated by that person beforehand? Specifically, is societys obligation to provide health-care services to those who have addicted themselves to illicit drugs attenuated by the fact of that addiction? Some argue that it is, whereas others consider this position morally untenable. This essay explores the question of who is right on this matter and why.

Drones, Distance, and Death

This chapter addresses the topic of drone use via some larger discussions about the moral relevance, if any, of distance. We ask whether the fact of this distance between the agent(s) of harm and the harm(s) caused has any moral relevance, and, if so, what and how? There are two dimensions to this question. One concerns the moral relevance of distance to our actual moral obligations: Does geographical distance per se affect what we are morally obligated or morally permitted to do? The second concerns the effect of distance on the way we perceive our moral obligations and permissions: Does geographical distance, either per se or in conjunction with other factors, affect how we view our moral situation? Does distance influence how we think or feel about what we are morally required and/or permitted to do?