Ulf Linderfalk

Who are ‘The Parties’? Article 31, Paragraph 3(C) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the ‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ Revisited

Over the last couple of years, international lawyers have hotly debated the correct way to apply Article 31, paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Discussions have focused on the meaning of ‘the parties’. Traditionally this expression has always been interpreted in the stricter sense of all parties to the interpreted treaty. Voices are now raised suggesting a broader interpretation. According to this view, the correct meaning of ‘the parties’ is the two or more parties to a specific dispute. Given that the two interpretations of Article 31, paragraph 3(c) will often be mutually exclusive, international legal literature provokes a review of the possible reasons that give us ground to adopt them. This article provides such a review. It arrives at the conclusion that only the stricter interpretation can be seriously defended as being correct. First, only the stricter interpretation agrees with the clear ordinary meaning of Article 31, paragraph 3(c). Secondly, even assuming that the ordinary meaning of the provision is ambiguous, a strong case can be made in favour of the stricter interpretation using other data of interpretation, such as the context, the object and purpose of the treaty, and the preparatory work. (Less)

Is the hierarchical structure of articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna convention real or not? Interpreting the rules of interpretation

In the practice of modern international law, if a certain understanding is advanced as the correct interpretation of a treaty provision, the proposition is assessed using the rules of interpretation laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31–33. This article is concerned with the relationship held in such an interpretation process between the preparatory work of a treaty – described as a supplementary means of interpretation in Article 32 – and the three primary means of interpretation that can be used by an interpreter citing Article 31. Judged by the wordings of Articles 31 and 32, the relationship between the primary and the supplementary means of interpretation is hierarchical. As a consequence, preparatory work may be used to determine the correct meaning of a treaty provision, only on the condition that in the earlier stages of the interpretation process, the application of Article 31 has been found to leave the meaning of the interpreted treaty ‘ambiguous or obscure’, or to lead to a result ‘which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. Several scholars in the area have recently argued for granting the preparatory work of a treaty a more prominent role in the interpretation process. As this article will show, such a claim builds on arguments that do not stand up to careful legal analysis. It should, therefore, be discarded as unsound.

State responsibility and the primary-secondary rules terminology: the role of language for an understanding of the international legal system”

In the international legal literature, it is commonplace to talk about the law of state responsibility as secondary rules of law. The terminology emphasises that in some way or another the law of state responsibility is different from other rules of the international legal system – what international legal scholars refer to as primary rules of law. The present essay inquires into the soundness of this language. As argued, the primary-secondary rules terminology builds on two assumptions. First, it assumes that the law of state responsibility can be described as separate from the ordinary (or primary) rules of international law. Secondly, it assumes that the two classes of rules can be described as pertaining to different stages of the judicial decision-making process. As shown in this essay, neither assumption can be defended as correct.

What Is So Special about Jus Cogens: On the Distinction between the Ordinary and the Peremptory International Law

Abstract What, exactly, is it about jus cogens that distinguishes it from ordinary international law? In answering this question, international lawyers usually resort to the “the Legal-Consequences-as-Criterion Theory”: while ordinary international law can be rebutted or modified in accordance with the duly expressed will of states, jus cogens norms permit no derogation and allow modification only by the creation of a new norm having the same character. In the present essay, this theory is subjected to analysis and assessment. Section 2 inquires into the relationship between the Legal-Consequences-as-Criterion Theory and the general definition of jus cogens reflected in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. As argued, Article 53 is entirely reliant upon the validity of the Legal-Consequences-as-Criterion Theory. Sections 3 and 4 inquire into the assumptions underlying this same Theory. As argued, the Theory does not provide good reasons for the distinction between jus cogens and ordinary international law.

The application of international legal norms over time: The second branch of intertemporal law

Intertemporal law governs the applicability of international legal norms ratione temporis. According to often used terminology, intertemporal law has two different branches. This article provides clarification of the so-called ‘second branch of intertemporal law’. It does so by refuting two commonly held assumptions. First, as established in section 2 of the article, the second branch of intertemporal law is not an exception to the first branch of that law. It cannot be, since both branches of intertemporal law centre on the same legal principle: an action or a factual state of affairs must be assessed in the light of the law which is contemporary with it. Secondly, as implicated by the line of reasoning in section 2, and further confirmed by the inferential evidence cited in section 3, the practical relevance of the second branch of intertemporal law is not confined to the application of the law on the acquisition to territory. It pertains to a more widely defined group of norms in international law.

The Source of Jus Cogens Obligations – How Legal Positivism Copes with Peremptory International Law

If legal positivists wish to sustain their account of the international legal system, arguably, they have yet to explain how jus cogens obligations can derive from the usual norm-creating processes recognized by international law. This article provides such an explanation exactly. The explanation builds on the distinction between first order rules of jus cogens (commanding or prohibiting some certain action) and second order rules of the jus cogens regime (specifying the legal consequences ensuing from the postulated superiority of jus cogens over ordinary international law). As argued in this essay, the jus cogens status of a rule of law (R) derives from the existence of the second order rules of the jus cogens regime and from the application of those rules to R. Consequently, the explanation of the source of jus cogens obligations lies in the source of the second order rules, rather than in the source of the first order rules themselves. The second order rules are general customary international law, why this must also be the source of jus cogens obligations. This essay ends by inquiring into the implications of this analysis for the concept of jus cogens and for international legal theory in general.

The Use of OECD Commentaries as Interpretative Aids: The Static/Ambulatory Approaches Debate Considered from the Perspective of International Law

Since many years, international tax law experts debate the relevance of changes to OECD Commentaries for the purpose of the interpretation of previously concluded tax treaties. Although, generally, most experts seem averse to the idea of an ambulatory approach to the usage of OECD Commentaries, they are reluctant to exclude this idea altogether. Such a position raises an important issue of justification: When exactly should the ambulatory approach be taken? As argued in this essay, the proper answer to this question depends on the particular rule of interpretation justifying the usage of OECD Commentaries in particular cases. If Commentaries are used according to Article 32 of the VCLT as part of the circumstances of the conclusion of a tax treaty, then because of the very nature of this means of interpretation, a static approach would have to be taken. If, instead, Commentaries are used to determine the ordinary meaning of the terms of a tax treaty, or its object and purpose; or if Commentaries are used based on Article 31, paragraph 3(b) of the VCLT; then the VCLT confers on interpreters a discretion. This discretion is limited by the principle of good faith, which means that interpreters will have to continue searching for the intention of treaty parties. Although this search can be rationalized as the application of general factors, as argued in this article, no choices between a static or an ambulatory approach can be made other than relative to particular cases, based on an overall assessment taking all applicable factors into account. Readers should contrast this conclusion with the position of many international tax law experts, who argue that such choices can be dealt with conclusively by the adoption of some or other general principle.

Understanding the Jus Cogens Debate: The Pervasive Influence of Legal Positivism and Legal Idealism

Although, today, jus cogens is a recognized element of international law and international legal discourse alike, many issues of vital importance to a well-functioning jus cogens regime remain unsettled. The current debate centres on the following six questions: (1) What is the source of jus cogens obligations? (2) What is the role of consent in the creation and modification of jus cogens norms? (3) How do we identify norms belonging to this category? (4) What does the category comprise? Are there such things, for example, as regional jus cogens or jus cogens principles? Are jus cogens rules necessarily rules of conduct? (5) What are the function and effects of the international jus cogens regime? (6) What is the function of jus cogens in international legal discourse? Overall, the intense scholarly debate had on peremptory international law over the last ten to twenty years has not been terribly productive. One important reason for this would seem to be the general failure of discussants to fully understand the relevance of some basic assumptions that they bring to bear on their respective analysis and consideration of the topic. To facilitate future constructive debate, this essay aims to clarify the relevance for any thoughtful consideration of jus cogens issues of legal positivism and legal idealism. While legal positivism and legal idealism are sets of theories offered to explain the concept of law, it is not surprising that lawyers of different camps will have different answers to questions (1) and (2). As argued in this essay, however, the influence of different theoretical approaches to the concept of law goes further than this—it permeates the entire jus cogens debate. Consequently, depending on whether lawyers take the position of a legal positivist or a legal idealist, they will be inclined to answer differently all questions (1)–(6).

International Legal Hierarchy Revisited: The Status of Obligations Erga Omnes

Increasingly, international legal arguments exploit the peculiar nature of obligations erga omnes. This practice raises questions about the precise legal status of norms expressing such obligations relative to other norms of international law. According to an oft-made suggestion, whether a norm is part of the international jus cogens or not, when it expresses obligations erga omnes it is hierarchically superior to all other norms of non-peremptory international law. This essay inquires into the justification of this theory – throughout the essay referred to as “the Theory on the Superior Status of Erga Omnes Obligations”. As shown in section 2, irrespective of whether inferential legal evidence exists or not, the Theory on the Superior Status of Obligations Erga Omnes can be explained by reference to the non-reciprocal character of such obligations. However, logic requires that the theory be restated to include also interdependent obligations and obligations erga omnes partes. As shown in section 3, although inferential legal evidence provides some support for the Theory on the Superior Status of Obligations Erga Omnes, the evidence is not entirely consistent. As shown in section 4, if the theory on the superior status of obligations erga omnes is adopted and applied on a wide scale, this will have detrimental effects on the overall understanding of international law. Rather than a more properly functioning international legal system, confusion and disorganization will ensue.

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Tribunal, Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, Decision of 7 December 2011

Abstract in Undetermined International lawyers interested in international investment law and treaty interpretation issues should consider the international award recently delivered by an ICSID Tribunal in the case of Spyridon Roussalis v Romania.1 The case arose out of the privatization of a Romanian warehouse company (SC Malimp SA). On 23 October 1998, another Romanian company (Continent SRL) entered into a share purchase agreement with the Romanian authority for state assets recovery (AVAS) to purchase 372,523 shares in SC Malimp SA, or the equivalent of a 70 per cent interest in the company. Following the acquisition of SC Malimp SA, the name of that company was changed to SC Continent Marine Enterprise SA (or ‘Continent SA’ for short). (Less)