Ulrich Petersohn

Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes

This article addresses the empirical puzzle as to why some formerly deeply embedded international norms either incrementally or rapidly lose their prescriptive status and, in the extreme, can even cease to exist. Why is it that some norms are replaced while others simply disappear? The IR literature has rich explanations for norm creation, diffusion and socialization, yet there is a theoretical and empirical gap on both the dynamics and scope conditions for the degeneration of international norms. Thus, we develop hypotheses on processes and outcomes of norm disappearances that are tested with a series of qualitative studies. Norm degenerations require the presence of actors who challenge the norm and the absence of central enforcement authorities or individual states that are willing and capable of punishing norm violations. Moreover, our study shows that norms are likely to be abolished swiftly if the environment is unstable and rapidly changing and if norms are highly precise. In contrast, norms are likely to become incrementally degenerated if the environment is relatively stable and if norms are imprecise. Both processes lead to norm substitutions, provided that competing norms are present. If rival norms are absent, norms simply disappear without being replaced.

The Effectiveness of Contracted Coalitions Private Security Contractors in Iraq

The debate on the effectiveness of Private Security Contractors (PSCs) in Iraq has been waged ever since their first appearance. Statists have argued that they are much less effective than regular troops, while neoliberals consider them an effective supplement to regular troops. However, so far, both schools alike have drawn on anecdotal evidence only; yet, such evidence is prone to a high margin of error and does not allow a comparison of different actors. This article addresses these shortfalls by providing hard data, drawn from the Wikileaks “Iraq War logs” data set, on the conduct of PSCs in Iraq and comparing their performance to that of regular troops, that is, the US and Iraqi armed forces. In general, if PSCs are co-deployed alongside regular troops and oversight is institutionalized, their performance supersedes that of poorly trained military personnel, such as the Iraqi military, and in many cases even that of the highly capable US military.

The Other Side of the COIN: Private Security Companies and Counterinsurgency Operations

The Iraq War was a watershed regarding the scope of battlefield support by Private Security Companies (PSC). Skeptics soon raised concerns about these new actors being an impediment to the success of the very same operations they are meant to support. According to the critics, PSCs are grist to the mill for insurgents as they employ aggressive tactics and thereby alienate the population, cause credibility problems because they enjoy impunity, and increase coordination problems since they are not subordinated under the military chain of command. This article argues that this is not a necessary result of their employment, but rather the consequence of a lack of preparedness to operate alongside PSCs. However, the military is accustomed to adapting to new unexpected circumstances. Hence, when problems occurred, the armed forces underwent a trial and error learning process that improved PSC employment. The empirical picture supports this view. Initially, the counterinsurgency effort did indeed suffer from the actions, lack of oversight, and lack of coordination of PSCs. However, over the course of the Iraq War, most of the shortfalls were either improved significantly or even resolved.

Sovereignty and Privatizing the Military: An Institutional Explanation

Since the mid-1990s, almost all Western states have privatized military tasks, albeit to varying extents. The article addresses both aspects of the phenomenon: Why did Western states privatize military tasks, and why did they do so to varying extents? The neorealist argument of the market providing a competitive edge for the armed forces and liberalist ‘casualty aversion’ and ‘cost-effectiveness’ explanation both equally fail to provide a comprehensive answer for the privatization of military tasks. Alternatively, the article employs sociological institutionalism, arguing that transnational norms on conventional warfare prescribe the structure and organization of armed forces. If the content of these norms changes, states will adjust their force structure accordingly. Consequentially, states started to privatize military tasks when the requirements changed from self-sufficiency to more market reliance. However, transnational norms have to work their way through domestic norms resulting in variations. The more consistent transnational normative demands are with the domestic structure, the more extensive the former demands are implemented. The crucial domestic variable is the notion of sovereignty. If sovereignty is defined minimally market solutions are embraced and military activities are outsourced extensively. If states hold a broader understanding of sovereignty, they are reluctant to hand over military tasks to the market.

Norm challenges and norm death: The inexplicable?:

The subject of a formerly strong norm’s death is not often in the limelight of political science research. This paper investigates successful norm challenges and analyses the conditions that lead to the abolition of norms rather than to limitations of the norms. It presents a theoretical account of norm challenges and develops hypotheses on mechanisms, success and outcomes. Six illustrative case studies show that norm contestations take place through non-compliance when norms are not embedded in international negotiation systems, while norm contestations through negotiation are frequently the case if norms are embedded in international regimes or organizations. Irrespective of the institutional context, the strength of norm challengers relative to norm proponents impacts the prospects for successful normative change. If norm challengers are stronger than the actors defending the status quo, the outcome of norm challenges is influenced by the combination of norm precision and the stability of the normative environment. If the broader context undergoes change while the contested norm is precise, norms cannot be reinterpreted to accommodate norm change. As a result, in such instances, norms die. By contrast, vague norms in combination with stable environments are not abolished after being subject to strong challenges, but are merely reinterpreted in a manner delimiting their applicatory scope.

The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002

Research has long abandoned the view that only states wage war. On the contrary, civil war research has produced an impressive body of literature on violent non-state actors. Still, a particular group of actors—mercenaries—has been widely neglected so far, although they have participated in numerous conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century. Whether their presence aggravated or improved the situation is a matter of dispute. Some believe that the additional military capabilities provided by mercenaries help to end civil wars quickly without increased bloodshed, while others deem mercenaries greedy and bloodthirsty combatants who contribute to making civil wars more brutal, while a third opinion differentiates between different types of mercenaries. This article tests the impact of mercenaries on civil war severity. The evidence indicates that the presence of both mercenaries and private military and security contractors increases its severity.

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Military Effectiveness, and Conflict Severity in Weak States, 1990–2007

For more than two decades, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have become increasingly involved in armed conflicts. A common view is that PMSCs are menaces who simply take economic advantage of—and thereby aggravate—already bad situations. Yet, empirical research has rarely investigated these claims or the impact of commercial actors’ selling force-related services. This article investigates how PMSCs impact the severity of armed conflict in weak states and advances the argument that PMSC services increase the client’s military effectiveness. In turn, increased military effectiveness translates into increased conflict severity, the extent of which depends on type of service provided by the PMSC, the level of competition on the market, and oversight.

The social structure of the market for force

Over the past two decades, governments have increasingly contracted private military and security companies (PMSCs) to support military operations in conflicts. However, many observers have argued that such companies are ‘greedy market actors’ or ‘reckless mercenaries’ and their level of performance very poor. A minority has defended them as security professionals. If market competition is present, the level of performance is high and positive contributions to the client’s military operation can be expected. However, neither PMSC opponents nor proponents can account for the variance in the level of performance in three crucial cases – Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This article argues that different market structures explain this variance. At least three ideal configurations exist: collaborative, competitive, and rival structures. These structures influence the level of performance. PMSC performance levels are expected to decrease from the first configuration, being positive, to the last, being negative.

The force of relationships: the influence of personal networks on the market for force

ABSTRACT Since the 1990s, military support and security services in hostile environments have been increasingly traded on the market for force. Surprisingly, how exchange is organised on the market for force remains predominantly focused on the neoclassical model, which assumes anonymous exchange, and sellers compete through price and quality of product for customers. However, the model seems to be incomplete as it describes some empirical patterns, yet not others. Why are service backgrounds clustered together and why do specific nationalities dominate the market in the Iraq and Afghanistan war? Why are they not distributed evenly as price and quality competition would suggest? The argument here is that social factors need to be taken in to account, i.e. personal relationships. The logic being that sellers and customers trade through existing relationships, and familiarity is the dealmaker, rather than price. The article takes on the challenge to develop a sociological conceptualisation of the market able to integrate both logics. Finally, the approach is put to the test on the labour market for Western security operators. The results demonstrate that personal relationships play a significant role to explain exchange on the market for force, yet co-existence with the neoclassical logic.

President Donald J. Trump: An agent of norm death?

Since his inauguration, US President Donald Trump has made news by violating international and domestic norms, such as norms of diplomatic communication or the non-discrimination norm. This paper uses theoretical approaches to norm eradication in order to examine whether President Trump has turned into an effective agent of norm death leading to the abolition of domestic and international standards of appropriateness. It discusses how the precision of the respective norms, the stability of their contexts, and the actions of norm proponents have played out. This reveals that President Trump’s actions have so far lacked effectiveness, and have not led to norm death. The longevity of challenged norms cannot be taken for granted, however—especially if the challenger is a powerful actor. In order to avoid norm death under this circumstance, it is essential that norm proponents possess capacities and competencies to act, and employ them to defend challenged norms.