Upasak Das

Does Political Connections and Affiliation Affect Allocation of Benefits in the Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: Evidence from West Bengal, India

Decentralization at the local level in developing economies can be seen as a force of social change with the power at the hands of the citizens to influence policies according to their needs. However, the problem of political clientelism may be imminent where public resources are allocated to individuals or specific groups who are members of the political party locally in power. In this context, using survey data for 540 rural households in the Cooch Behar District of the State of West Bengal, this paper investigates the prevalence of political clientelism in allocating works under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), which is implemented and carried out at the local level.It is found that households that are well connected to the political parties have significantly higher chances of getting work, compared to those who are not connected. Similar results are found for households who support the local ruling political party in power. Furthermore, it is found that politically well-connected households and ruling party supporters are associated with a significantly higher number of days of work. Ethnographic evidences collected from the field corroborate with these findings.In further analysis, the paper explores whether or not political clientelism is stronger in left governed villages, and finds that to be the case. The study points to the existence of political clientelism in the implementation of MGNREGA, and lays emphasis on the importance of reducing rationing of labor to curb clientelism.

Accuracy of Targeting and Implications of Rationing in Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: Evidence from West Bengal, India

Taking 66th round data of National Sample Survey (2009-10), this paper examines the implications of type 1 and type 2 rationing of work under Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) in West Bengal for poorer households. Using regression analysis and evidences from field, it attempts to find, if the households, which sought but did not get work, are poorer (by various indicators) than the ones, who got work (type 2) and then explores, if the poor get work for lesser number of days (type 1). The results show that poor households do not have significantly higher probability of getting work compared to non poor. This has left behind a substantial exclusion of poor, without work. It further gives evidence that non poor households get work for more number of days than poor households. The findings also highlight the importance of awareness of its entitlements to realize the desired impact.

Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA

Abstract Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.

Accuracy of Targeting and Rationing Under the Rural Employment Guarantee Programme: A Comparison between West Bengal and Rest of India

One major indicator of success of a social welfare programme is the accuracy of targeting of the benefits to the intended population or groups. Using nationally as well as state representative data for 2009-10 and 2011-12, this paper attempts to assess the Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in terms of accuracy of targeting in West Bengal and compares it with rest of India. Using non-parametric and parametric methodologies, it aims to explore if poorer and deprived households are rationed out more than the non-poor households as far as participation in the programme is concerned. Though implementation of MGNREGA in West Bengal has been largely poor, its targeting performance is found to be fair when compared to other parts of the country. The findings should give impetus for the concerned authorities to improve on other dimensions of the programme and effectively implement it to realize the optimal benefits.

Gender Differences in Mathematics Performance: Evidence from Rural India

Gender has been among the most pervasive forms of inequality across all classes, social groups and communities especially in developing countries. Literature indicates evident gender bias in labor market opportunities including wage gap, which can be partially explained by performance in mathematics. In this context, using nationally representative data from 2011-12, this paper examines gender gap in performance in mathematics among rural children at an all-India level. Our findings from the regressions show significant gender gap in mathematics, controlling for various child, household, school or region level characteristics. This is not largely found to be observable for reading skills or writing skills. We also find the results remaining consistent across various types of households both in terms of financial conditions and demographic composition, social groups, children of different birth orders and even across the type of schools they attend. While exploring the possible reasons behind the gender gap, we fail to find the significance of innate ability. However we find indicative evidences of: worse health outcomes for girls in early childhood, possible higher participation of boys in petty works outside home or in sports, and economic aspirations along with gender role stereotyping emanating from family and society as (one or multiple) possible explanations. The policy recommendations include research in form of systematic evaluations to identify the instruments including the psychological interventions which can help in reducing the gender gap in mathematics. This is especially necessary in states including Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat among others that do not show significant improvement in performance of girls with respect to boys over the years.

The 'Discouraged Worker Effect' in Public Works Programs: Evidence from the MGNREGA in India

This study investigates the consequences of poor implementation in public workfare programs, focusing on the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in India. Using nationally representative data, we test empirically for a discouraged worker effect arising from either of two mechanisms: administrative rationing of jobs among those who seek work and delays in wage payments. We find strong evidence at the household and district levels that administrative rationing discourages subsequent demand for work. Delayed wage payments seem to matter significantly during rainfall shocks. We find further that rationing is strongly associated with indicators of implementation ability such as staff capacity. Politics appears to play only a limited role. The findings suggest that assessments of the relevance of public programs over their lifecycle need to factor in implementation quality.