Uri Bar-Joseph

Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise

This paper uses newly available evidence to shed light on the circumstances and causes of the 6 October 1973 Yom Kippur surprise attack of Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israeli positions at the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. The evidence suggests that an important circumstance that accounts for the surprise effect these actions managed to produce, despite ample warning signs, is traceable to a high need for cognitive closure among major figures in the Israeli intelligence establishment. Such a need may have prompted leading intelligence analysts to “freeze” on the conventional wisdom that an attack was unlikely and to become impervious to information suggesting that it was imminent. The discussion considers the psychological forces affecting intelligence operations in predicting the initiation of hostile enemy activities, and it describes possible avenues of dealing with the psychological impediments to open–mindedness that may pervasively characterize such circumstances.

Israel's Intelligence Failure Of 1973: New Evidence, a New Interpretation, and Theoretical Implications

I would like to thank Gabriel Ben-Dor, Richard K. Betts, Alexander L. George, Ben D. Mor, and Yigal Sheffy for their useful comments on this paper.

Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and its Failure

Most studies of the attempts to reach a political solution to the Egyptian–Israeli dispute between the wars of 1967 and 1973 focus predominantly on the Jarring mission (1968–71), the Rogers plan (1969–70) and Sadats plan for a partial agreement in the Canal sector (early 1971). However, as this article shows on the basis of new archival documents, the most important diplomatic initiative during this period was Sadats proposal for a comprehensive settlement of the Egyptian–Israeli dispute, which was secretly submitted to Kissinger in February 1973. Despite the fact that it met most of Israels requirements regarding peace, Sadats proposal was rejected by Golda Meir, who refused to return the territories occupied in 1967. Meirs stand did not change even when, in April 1973, Israels leadership concluded that the only alternative to the diplomatic process was war — which would break out soon. By making this decision, Golda Meir and her colleagues opted for war rather than peace and turned the October 1973 Yom Kippur War into ‘a war of choice’.

Personal Functioning Under Stress

Much work has explored decision making under stress in political leadership. Less work has attempted to link the enormous emotional pressure of crisis with both the heightened sense of political accountability and responsibility and the increased need for social support under such circumstances. The authors examine the impact of political accountability, and the nature and quality of individual social support, on the relative performance of five central Israeli leaders on the second day of the Yom Kippur War. Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and the Commander of the Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Shmuel Gonen, performed very poorly, whereas Prime Minister Golda Meir and Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. David Elazar performed very well. The Commander of the Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Hofi, performed adequately. The authors account for these divergences in performance based on individual differences in personal accountability and available social support networks.

The Professional Ethics of Intelligence Analysis

Intensified public debate over intelligence has taken place in recent years, primarily as the result of the critical role that it has played and continues to play in the war on terrorism. Other fac...

Israel's Military Intelligence Performance in the Second Lebanon War

An analysis of the performance of Israel’s Military Intelligence (AMAN) in the Second Lebanon War (12 July–14 August 2006) shows that while it scored well in the realm of strategic estimates it scored quite poorly at the level of tactical intelligence. The Winograd Commission, the official investigation into the war (which dedicated only two pages to the intelligence issue in its Interim Report), concluded that ‘‘. . . in the years that preceded the war, AMAN provided its political and military consumers with a comprehensive, reliable and a correct picture of Hezbollah.’’ At the same time, the Commission also concluded that: ‘‘At the tactical level the intelligence picture was less clear and exposed significant gaps.’’ This is an exception. Throughout its history AMAN, the largest and most dominant intelligence organization in Israel, had usually failed in estimating the emergence of strategic threats or opportunities, but almost always provided high-level intelligence at the operational and tactical levels. This was the case, for example, in 1966–1967, when AMAN failed to properly estimate the impact that Israel’s increasing military pressure on Syria had on Egypt’s President Gamal Abdul Nasser, and was surprised when Nasser initiated and then escalated the crisis that led to the 1967 War. But, in the war itself, AMAN provided excellent intelligence that enabled the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to defeat the armies of three Arab states within six days. Similarly, before the 1973 Yom Kippur War, AMAN completely

Rotem: The Forgotten Crisis on the Road to the 1967 War

His second in command in 1967 and the chief of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) in 1960, Ezer Weizman, noted that when the 1967 crisis started, the general feeling in the army was that Nasser was merely repeating his moves of 1960. Prime Minister Eshkol’s military secretary also noted that when he first heard about the Egyptian army’s entry into Sinai in 1967, he immediately thought of Rotem.’ The Near East experts in the State Department reacted similarly and predicted, at the beginning of the May 1967 crisis, that it would follow the same course as the 1960 episode.’ The evidence regarding the impact of Rotem on Nasser’s strategic calculations has been, until recently, only circumstantial.’ But in 1992, Major-General (ret.) Jamal Mat’lum, Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies in the Egyptian army, noted:

The "Special Means of Collection": The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War

Israeli narratives of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War highlight the army’s lack of preparedness in the wake of a successful surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, despite assumptions of Israel’s intelligence gathering capabilities. Using recently declassified government documents, this article reveals a communication breakdown among Israel’s leadership over the operational status of a top secret means of surveillance. This intelligence failure provides the missing link between Israel’s wealth of information and the decision to avoid mobilizing the country’s reserve army until it was too late.

Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of the Khomeini Revolution

Abstract The surprising ‘Arab Spring’ raises the question as to what would enable national intelligence to provide high quality warnings prior to the eruption of popular revolutions. This article uses new sources of evidence to trace and explain Israels success in comparison to US failure at correctly estimating the course of the Iranian Revolution in 1977–79. In explaining this variance, the article shows that it was mainly the result of the intimate acquaintance of Israels representatives in Iran with the local language, history and culture, as well as the ability to communicate with locals – tools which the Americans completely lacked.

Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel

Although Israel constitutes an interesting case for the study of civil—military relations, the role played by its Directory of Military Intelligence (AMAN) has rarely been discussed in this context. This role is of special interest, since Israel is the only liberal democracy today in which a military intelligence service functions as the leading national estimator not only in military but also in civilian affairs. The unique Israeli model is usually justified by Israel’s security concerns—primarily the threat of a sudden conventional attack. To test this model’s validity, this article (1) traces and elucidates its historical development; (2) employs five crucial mini case studies to test its practical success or failure; and (3) explains how, in light of the fact that AMAN failed in four of the five cases, its military characteristics create inherent weaknesses that hamper its ability to serve as a high-quality national intelligence estimator.