Uri Gneezy

Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All

Economists usually assume that monetary incentives improve performance, and psychologists claim that the opposite may happen. We present and discuss a set of experiments designed to test these contrasting claims. We found that the effect of monetary compensation on performance was not monotonic. In the treatments in which money was offered, a larger amount yielded a higher performance. However, offering money did not always produce an improvement: subjects who were offered monetary incentives performed more poorly than those who were offered no compensation. Several possible interpretations of the results are discussed.

Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences

Even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries, large gender differences prevail in competitive high-ranking positions. Suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital. In this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor: women may be less effective than men in competitive environments, even if they are able to perform similarly in non-competitive environments. In a laboratory experiment we observe, as we increase the competitiveness of the environment, a significant increase in performance for men, but not for women. This results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments, while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate. This effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single-sex competitive environments: this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se.

A fine is a price

The deterrence hypothesis predicts that the introduction of a penalty that leaves everything else unchanged will reduce the occurrence of the behavior subject to the fine. We present the result of a field study in a group of day‐care centers that contradicts this prediction. Parents used to arrive late to collect their children, forcing a teacher to stay after closing time. We introduced a monetary fine for late‐coming parents. As a result, the number of late‐coming parents increased significantly. After the fine was removed no reduction occurred. We argue that penalties are usually introduced into an incomplete contract, social or private. They may change the information that agents have, and therefore the effect on behavior may be opposite of that expected. If this is true, the deterrence hypothesis loses its predictive strength, since the clause “everything else is left unchanged” might be hard to satisfy.

Deception: The Role of Consequences

Deception is part of many economic interactions. Business people, politicians, diplomats, lawyers, and students in the experimental laboratory who make use of private information do not always do so honestly. This observation indicates that behavior often rejects the moral approach to deception. As St. Augustine wrote, “To me, however, it seems certain that every lie is a sin. . . ” (St. Augustine, 421). Later, philosophers like Immanuel Kant (1787) again adopted this uncompromising moral stance when arguing against lying. At the other extreme, economic theory is built on the assumption of “homo economicus,” a figure who acts selfishly and is unconcerned about the well-being of others. An implication of this assumption is that lies will be told whenever it is beneficial for the liar, regardless of their effect on the other party. Another implication is that there is no negative outcome associated with lying per se. This assumption is very useful in many economic models. Consider contract theory, where it is assumed that without an explicit contract, neither side will fulfill its respective obligations. For example, George Akerlof’s (1970) paper on asymmetric information and the market for lemons assumes that sellers of used cars will always lie if it is in their benefit to do so. In the mechanism design literature (e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, 1979), the standard assumption is that people will tell the truth only if this is incentive-compatible given material outcomes. In the literature on tax evasion, the choice of whether to avoid paying taxes is considered a decision under uncertainty; cost is treated as a product of the probability of being caught and the cost of punishment, whereas benefit is simply the money saved by avoiding payment. However, there is no cost associated with the very act of lying (Michael Alingham and Agnar Sandmo, 1972). Another example is the game theoretic treatment of “cheap talk” (Crawford and Joel Sobel, 1982). An intermediate approach is taken by utilitarian philosophers (e.g., Jeremy Bentham, 1789). Utilitarianism prescribes that, when choosing whether to lie, one should weigh benefits against harm, and happiness against unhappiness. As Martin Luther stated, “What harm would it do, if a man told a good strong lie for the sake of the good and for the Christian church. . . a lie out of necessity, a useful lie, a helpful lie, such lies would not be against God, he would accept them.” Similarly to the economic theory approach, this type of calculation implies that lies, apart from their resultant harm and benefit, are in themselves neutral. A lie and a truthful statement that achieve the same monetary payoffs (for both sides) are considered * Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: uri.gneezy.gsb.uchicago.edu). I thank Douglas Bernheim and two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments that considerably improved the paper. I also thank Andreas Blume, Gary Charness, Rachel Croson, Martin Dufwenberg, Georg Kirchsteiger, David Levine, Muriel Niederle, Yuval Rottenstreich, Maurice Schweitzer, Richard Thaler, George Wu, and seminar participants at numerous universities for their comments and suggestions. Ira Leybman provided valuable help in running the experiment. I became interested in deception when my father was terminally ill and his physicians created in him a belief that they considered to be untrue. I dedicate this paper to his memory. 1 Important deviations from this assumption in economic modeling are found in Kenneth Arrow’s (1972) discussion of trust, Gary Becker’s (1976) modeling of altruistic preferences, and Akerlof’s (1982) study of the fair-wage hypothesis. For a general discussion, see Becker (1993): “The economic approach I refer to does not assume that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or material gain. It is a method of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations. Along with others, I have tried to pry economists away from narrow assumptions about self-interest. Behavior is driven by a much richer set of values and preferences” (p. 385). 2 Note that this does not mean that a completely selfish person will always lie. There may be strategic reasons not to lie. For example, see the David Kreps and Robert Wilson (1982) discussion of reputation and imperfect information; see also Vincent P. Crawford (2003). 3 Cited by his secretary, in a letter in Max Lenz, ed., Briefwechsel Landgraf Phillips des Grossmuthigen von Hessen mit Bucer, Vol. 1.

Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach

An experimental approach is used to study ethnic discrimination within the Israeli Jewish society. Our experiment indicates that the segmented structure of Israeli society manifests itself in a consistent pattern of mistrust. In a trust game that we studied, money transferred to players of Eastern ethnic origin (Sephardic Jew) was significantly less than that transferred to players of Western origin (Ashkenazic Jew).

Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence from a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society

This study uses a controlled experiment to explore whether there are gender differences in selecting into competitive environments across two distinct societies: the Maasai in Tanzania and the Khasi in India. One unique aspect of these societies is that the Maasai represent a textbook example of a patriarchal society whereas the Khasi are matrilineal. Similar to the extant evidence drawn from experiments executed in Western cultures, Maasai men opt to compete at roughly twice the rate as Maasai women. Interestingly, this result is reversed amongst the Khasi, where women choose the competitive environment more often than Khasi men, and even choose to compete weakly more often than Maasai men. We view these results as potentially providing insights into the underpinnings of the factors hypothesized to be determinants of the observed gender differences in selecting into competitive environments.

Gender and competition at a young age

Gender gaps may be observed in a variety of economic and social environments. One of the possible determining factors is that men are more competitive than women and so, when the competitiveness of the environment increases, the performance of men increases relative to that of women. We test this hypothesis in a field study conducted with 9-year old children, running on a track. They first run alone and then in pairs over a short distance with different gender composition of the pairs. The results support the hypothesis that performance in competition varies according to gender. When children ran alone, there was no difference in performance. In competition boys, but not girls, improved their performance. This finding relates to the discussion regarding single sex schools: the outcomes of examinations in a mixed sex school can show a gender gap in favor of boys, even when this gap does not reflect actual abilities. Girls who are as talented as boys will end up performing worse just because they are not as competitive, and will not achieve as high scores in examinations as boys.

White Lies

In this paper we distinguish between two types of white lies: those that help others at the expense of the person telling the lie, which we term altruistic white lies, and those that help both others and the liar, which we term Pareto white lies. We find that a large fraction of participants are reluctant to tell even a Pareto white lie, demonstrating a pure lie aversion independent of any social preferences for outcomes. In contrast, a nonnegligible fraction of participants are willing to tell an altruistic white lie that hurts them a bit but significantly helps others. Comparing white lies to those where lying increases the liars payoff at the expense of another reveals important insights into the interaction of incentives, lying aversion, and preferences for payoff distributions. Finally, in line with previous findings, women are less likely to lie when it is costly to the other side. Interestingly though, we find that women are more likely to tell an altruistic lie. This paper was accepted by Teck Ho, decision analysis.

Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment

We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change the portfolio influence her risk attitude in markets. In line with the prediction of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)), we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking. Market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced. This result supports the findings from individual decision making, and shows that market interactions do not eliminate such behavior or its consequences for prices.

The Effect of Intergroup Competition on Group Coordination: An Experimental Study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game?s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.