Ursula F. Ott

The Menu in Society: Mediating Structures of Power and Enchanting Myths of Individual Sovereignty

We live in curious times. People’s sense of individual autonomy co-exists with structures of power. How do these two phenomena co-exist? An important answer to this lies in the menu. The menu operates as a key form of mediation between people’s sense of individual autonomy and larger structures of power, allowing both to co-exist. This article illustrates the operation of the menu in society within consumption, within production, and within citizenship. The article also considers how far the metaphor of the menu in society is compatible with important contemporary attempts to characterize the macro-nature of society. The conclusion articulates how the metaphor of the menu in society can help open up the nature of society to critical investigation.

Sales Work under Marketization: The Social Relations of the Cash Nexus?

In lightly regulated economies many jobs are becoming subject to a process of ‘marketization’ involving an externalization of the employment relationship in the context of intensified product market competition. At the same time, a number of front-line jobs are becoming redefined to encompass more proactive sales aims. This study examines two sites at an intersection of these trends — sites where financial service jobs have been marketized and redefined to revolve around proactive sales activity. It examines the key social relations of the sales workers — relations with managers, immediate colleagues, back-office staff, customers and referrers — in considering how far marketization leads to the social relations of the cash nexus along bare market principles. It is found that one group of workers is enmeshed in a dehumanized, instrumental and antagonistic set of relations, while another, smaller, group of workers is insulated against such relations by the functioning of tight trust-based referral networks. It is concluded that the texture of the social relations of sales work under marketization is centrally influenced by the social constitution of the specific product market in which sales workers act. In addition, it is argued that the process of marketization tends to corrode the factors that support the functioning of tight trust-based networks.

The influence of cultural activity types on buyer-seller negotiations: a game theoretical framework for intercultural negotiations

This article uses an intercultural bargaining framework to analyze cooperation and conflict between buyers and sellers in intercultural negotiations. On the basis of game theoretical reasoning, culturally embedded bargaining patterns are transformed into culturally determined strategies in intercultural negotiations. The cultural differences of the players can be seen in the initial offer, the strategic approach, the valuation of time, the frequency of rejection and the objectives of the negotiation. In order to provide prescriptions for cross-cultural bargaining, the clash of cultures is dealt with in nine scenarios to show potential conflicts and cooperation between the players.

Games International Joint Ventures Play During Their Life Cycle: Key Factors for Co-Operation and Conflict

The paper reviews what the prior literature has to say about the issues of conflict and cooperation during the life cycle of an international joint venture (IJV). The rules of the game are derived from an overview of the empirical IJVliterature. The timing and the order of the play show the difficulties due to information asymmetries. The paper offers a framework to organize the literature about the games being played in an IJV such as bargaining, common agency and repeated games.

Cheating and Incentive Schemes in International Joint Ventures

This chapter deals with cheating in a cooperative enterprise in an international context. Since an international joint venture (IJV) is a complex organizational form of market entry, the information asymmetries between the parent firms and their cooperative venture may be an important determinant of the success or failure of the endeavour. The problem of cheating may exist between the players in an IJV because of the possibilities for hidden action by the participants. This chapter, therefore, aims to develop a typology to show the likelihood of cheating in this international context. It develops a theoretical model that should help managers to decide on appropriate incentive schemes within the remuneration structure for employees in IJVs, based on cultural and institutional differences, to reduce the likelihood of cheating.

Co-operation and Conflict in International Entrepreneurs When Cultures Collide

This chapter introduces the framework of culturally-rooted ‘co-operative cheating’ for international entrepreneurship which provides different degrees of hierarchy and group behavior in individualistic entrepreneurship and group-centered loyalty. International entrepreneurs are exposed to different cultural behavior and workplace cheating. The typologies of co-operative cheating are used to understand the clashes of cultures and how avoid conflicts by offering incentives to co-operate and to divert culturally-rooted cheating.

Dynamic contracting scenarios in international strategic alliances: inter-temporal culturally sensitive incentive schemes

This chapter studies repeated contracting in international strategic alliances on the basis of information asymmetries owing to different cultural, organizational and/or technological backgrounds. The theoretical underpinning shows that these problems are embedded in the theoretical paradigms of contract theory. In general, the alliance partners have several options to take into account the uncertainty about ability and effort of the other players and the impact on the durability of the alliance. The complexity of multi-person decision-making is reflected in incentive schemes for the stages of an alliance life cycle. This dynamic contracting scenario should avoid cheating and enhance cooperation in terms of contributions and expertise in the stages of the life cycle. The outcome is the design of inter-temporal, culturally sensitive contracts.

The Art and Economics of International Negotiations

This paper offers a new theoretical model which combines game theory and cultural bargaining behavior. It is based on the framework of activity-based cultural types called linear-active (time-is-money approach), multi-active (negotiation-is-an-art approach) and reactive (building-up-trust approach) categories of culture. The complexities of international negotiations can be analyzed by using an activity-based approach with game theoretic bargaining models. In order to come up with useful results, the paper takes on the perspective of multi-active bargaining types as sellers and buyers which shows different outcomes, respectively. The article is structured into the literature review, the description of activity-based bargaining types, the game trees (time lines) and the models of uncertainty. In terms of solution concepts we are dealing with Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) and a new way of solving three-type problems. The results of the games show the equilibrium types and a possibility to circumvent problems in international business negotiations which are related to different time perceptions and strategic behavior in this respect. It is therefore important to anticipate the deadlocks, stalemates and even break-ups when bargaining with culturally programmed types. We are, now, able to show that international negotiations are prone to fail due to incompatibilities and lack of knowledge of different cultural bargaining strategies.