V.A. Kremenyuk

Dealing with femtorisks in international relations

The contemporary global community is increasingly interdependent and confronted with systemic risks posed by the actions and interactions of actors existing beneath the level of formal institutions, often operating outside effective governance structures. Frequently, these actors are human agents, such as rogue traders or aggressive financial innovators, terrorists, groups of dissidents, or unauthorized sources of sensitive or secret information about government or private sector activities. In other instances, influential “actors” take the form of climate change, communications technologies, or socioeconomic globalization. Although these individual forces may be small relative to state governments or international institutions, or may operate on long time scales, the changes they catalyze can pose significant challenges to the analysis and practice of international relations through the operation of complex feedbacks and interactions of individual agents and interconnected systems. We call these challenges “femtorisks,” and emphasize their importance for two reasons. First, in isolation, they may be inconsequential and semiautonomous; but when embedded in complex adaptive systems, characterized by individual agents able to change, learn from experience, and pursue their own agendas, the strategic interaction between actors can propel systems down paths of increasing, even global, instability. Second, because their influence stems from complex interactions at interfaces of multiple systems (e.g., social, financial, political, technological, ecological, etc.), femtorisks challenge standard approaches to risk assessment, as higher-order consequences cascade across the boundaries of socially constructed complex systems. We argue that new approaches to assessing and managing systemic risk in international relations are required, inspired by principles of evolutionary theory and development of resilient ecological systems.

Negotiations in the Former Soviet Union: New Structure, New Dimensions

Despite a heritage of suspicion toward negotiation, the new states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have negotiated among themselves (and in Russias case, within itself) to resolve the issues of the Soviet Unions dissolution and to create a new structure of relations and institutions for the future. Special situations have occurred in relations with the Baltic states, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Chechnya, which is a restive part of Russia. Past and future issues need to be distinguished, a new structure for the CIS worked out, and new relations established with the outside world.

Ideal Negotiator: A Personal Formula for the New International System

Since the advent of the notion of “practical negotiator” (Zartman and Berman 1982) the majority of those who work in the field of negotiation analysis have been using this concept as the mainstream of thinking. A “practical negotiator” is not necessarily one who fanatically preaches negotiation; he/she simply understands the importance of an agreement and is ready to undertake necessary steps to achieve a negotiated solution.

Negotiations on National Security Risks: The Case of Us-Soviet Relations

L’auteur illustre la question des negociations de controle des risques en s’appuyant sur les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Union Sovietique. Apres avoir situe les enjeux et le contexte de ces negociations, l’analyse de cas permet d’en cerner les particularites et d’enrichir la theorie de la negociation. Les negociations de controle des risques presentent notamment des caracteristiques de rythme ou de limitation de l’ordre du jour qui les distinguent des negociations de desarmement [1] .

War or terrorism: A search for focus

In understanding and dealing with violent internal conflicts, it is important to begin with a conceptualization of their causal ingredients as a guide to a search for their solutions. While internal wars are often thought to be based on Need, Need alone is not sufficient to cause conflict; conflict occurs when Need is unevenly and unfairly distributed, allowing targeted groups to identify and mobilize (Creed) and then to compete for resources both for the resistance movement and for its political entrepreneurs (Greed).1 Each of the three elements in the conflict in turn requires a different type of justice as a solution. These elements pose complex challenges for mediators, and underscore the importance of prevention over cure. Prevention eliminates the opportunity on which Greed and Creed feed. But once the three combine to nourish conflict, mediation becomes a tough job of uncertain entry and long duration.