Valérie Le Floch

Is the social representation of nanotechnology anchored in that of GMOs

The use of nanotechnology (devices/materials composed of parts less than 10 nanometres) in the development of new products is rapidly expanding. Industrialists and decision-makers consider nanotechnology to be the next industrial revolution, but fear they risk the same resistance to nanotechnology that their counterparts experienced with genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Although risk perception studies have shown that perceived risk of GMOs is quite high compared to that related to nanotechnology, no study to date has explored a potential direct social representation link between the two. The present study aims to fill that gap by comparing the social representations of nanotechnology and GMOs among a population of non-experts. This study was conducted with 282 students in human and social sciences and natural sciences. Using a free association task with the inductive words ‘nanotechnology’ and ‘GMO (genetically modified organism)’, we identified the existing social representations of the two based on a structural approach. While the representation of GMOs is objectified in the field of agriculture, objectification for nanotechnology seems to still be lacking, although its possible objectification likely lies in computing and robotics. Our calculation of the rate of similarity of associative words with nanotechnology and GMOs indicated no present, direct link between their social representations. We discuss the possible evolution of the social representation of nanotechnology over time.

Cognitive Characteristics of Strategic and Non-strategic Gamblers

Participation in strategic and non-strategic games is mostly explained in the literature by gender: men gamble on strategic games, while women gamble on non-strategic games. However, little is known about the underlying cognitive factors that could also distinguish strategic and non-strategic gamblers. We suggest that cognitive style and need for cognition also explain participation in gambling subtypes. From a dual-process perspective, cognitive style is the tendency to reject or accept the fast, automatic answer that comes immediately in response to a problem. Individuals that preferentially reject the automatic response use an analytic style, which suggest processing information in a slow way, with deep treatment. The intuitive style supposes a reliance on fast, automatic answers. The need for cognition provides a motivation to engage in effortful activities. One hundred and forty-nine gamblers (53 strategic and 96 non-strategic) answered the Cognitive Reflection Test, Need For Cognition Scale, and socio-demographic questions. A logistic regression was conducted to evaluate the influence of gender, cognitive style and need for cognition on participation in strategic and non-strategic games. Our results show that a model with both gender and cognitive variables is more accurate than a model with gender alone. Analytic (vs. intuitive) style, high (vs. low) need for cognition and being male (vs. female) are characteristics of strategic gamblers (vs. non-strategic gamblers). This study highlights the importance of considering the cognitive characteristics of strategic and non-strategic gamblers in order to develop preventive campaigns and treatments that fit the best profiles for gamblers.

Promoting responsible gambling via prevention messages: insights from the evaluation of actual European messages

Abstract Prevention messages are short sentences supposed to broadcast preventive intentions. Three types of messages are noticeable: messages correcting erroneous beliefs, messages informing about the risks and messages promoting responsible gambling. While the results in the literature about messages promoting results are alerting, they are frequently used in European prevention campaigns. The present study relied on language and semantics models to evaluate the communicative and preventive values of 14 messages: 7 were actual European prevention messages and 7 messages were created for the study. Overall, 339 participants answered an online questionnaire in which they evaluated the communicative value of one of the messages and then ranked all the messages according to their preventive level. Results showed that messages informing about the risks and messages correcting erroneous beliefs have a higher level of communicative value than messages promoting responsible gambling. Indeed, the latter are judged as more ambiguous and as less preventive than the two other types of messages. As models of conversational pragmatics suggest that ambiguous messages convey at least two interpretations, the article discusses the possibility that individuals comprehend these messages as incentives to control their impulses (prevention) and incentives to control the game (promotion).