Valérie Mérindol

Dual-use as Knowledge-Oriented Policy: France during the 1990-2000s

This contribution aims at demonstrating that dual-use policies represent now a dimension central to military R&D policies and should not be understood only as a transfer mechanism between the civilian and the military. The paper investigates the concept of dual-use policies in the framework of Knowledge-Oriented Policies (KOP). Il will elaborate on the conditions of the emergence and development of dual-use policies. From a conceptual perspective, it will point out the difficulty associated with sequential and linear interpretations of innovation processes associated with armaments programmes. The main important critic developed in this contribution relates to the simplistic view associated with armaments life cycle, which hardly accounts for the complexity of exchanges and the reality of decision-making in military R&D.

Knowledge Transfers And R&D Management: An Inquiry Into The Problem Of Transatlantic Complementarities

Innovation is not simply a body of practice but also a body of behaviors, a complex frameset of interactions, learning processes and co‐evolution between actors and institutions. This paper elaborates on the opposition between cooperative‐learning and competitive‐learning situations and on three knowledge levels in technology diffusion: technical, systemic and strategic. It inquires into some aspects of transatlantic cooperation from the perspectives drawn by knowledge‐based analyses of R&D management. Illustrations are drawn from defense aeronautics (the JSF F‐35 fighter jet and the F/A 18 fighter attack jet). The paper stresses the importance of the emergence of a ‘big picture’ in S&T policies and delineates the strategies associated with knowledge transfers in international cooperation among the participants (industry and state) in the programs. *Ideas developed in this article do not commit either the French Ministry of Defence or the French Air Force.

Towards a Reinterpretation of Information Communication Technologies' Impact on Command and Control*

Taylor and Francis LtdFDEF_A_233795.sgm10.1080/14702430701339013Defence Studies1470-2436 (print)/1743-9698 (online)Original Article2007Taylor & Francis72000000June 2007Lieutenant-colonel Dr DavidVersaillesdversailles@cr-ea.netThe implementation of information and communication technologies(ICTs) impacts the distribution of responsibility in the command andcontrol (C2) chain. In some cases the introduction of new technologies mayfavour centralization; in others, they represent the source of new forms ofdelegation and decentralization. The various levels of the hierarchy may ormany not take better decisions because they gain access to detailed dataabout the tactical situation. The introduction of a new ICT-related systemresults in diverse impacts and it turns out that the technologies cannot inthemselves explain the new delegation processes.Command and control systems have become always more complex forthe last 20 years. The distinction between strategic, operational and tacticallevels has been widely considered as an accurate way to analyze delegatedactions because it grounds the relations in the separation political responsi-bilities and military ones. The distinction between each level of thehierarchy has become more complex since the end of the Cold War. Itvaries considerably with the context and the composition of the coalition. Italso depends on the rules of engagement (ROE) which define the degree ofcoercion allowed by governments. The borderlines between the preroga-tives associated with the tactical, operational and strategic levels have nowblurred. The speed of information flow and the mass media coverage ofconflict both increase the strategic effects of each decision made at the