Valerie Tiberius

Normative theory and psychological research: Hedonism, eudaimonism, and why it matters

This article is a contribution to the debate about eudaimonism started by Kashdan et al. and Waterman in a previous issue of The Journal of Positive Psychology [Kashdan, T.B., Biswas-Diener, R., & King, L.A. (2008). Reconsidering happiness: The costs of distinguishing between hedonics and eudaimonia. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 3(4), 219–233; Waterman, A.S. (2008). Reconsidering happiness: A eudaimonists perspective. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 3(4), 234–252]. We point out that one thing that is missing from this debate is an understanding of the problems with subjective theories of well-being that motivate a turn to objective theories. A better understanding of the rationale for objective theories helps us to see what is needed from a theory of well-being. We then argue that a suitably modified subjective theory can provide what is needed and that this is the theory that ought to be favored by psychologists.

Wisdom revisited: a case study in normative theorizing

Extensive discussions of practical wisdom are relatively rare in the philosophical literature these days. This is strange given the theoretical and practical importance of wisdom and, indeed, the etymology of the word “philosophy”. In this paper, we remedy this inattention by proposing a methodology for developing a theory of wisdom and using this methodology to outline a viable theory. The methodology we favor is a version of wide reflective equilibrium. We begin with psychological research on folk intuitions about wisdom, which helps us to avoid problems caused by reliance on the possibly idiosyncratic intuitions of professional philosophers. The folk theory is then elaborated in light of theoretical desiderata and further empirical research on human cognitive capacities. The resulting view emphasizes policies that the wise person adopts in order to cope with the many obstacles to making good choices.

Humean heroism : Value commitments and the source of normativity

This paper addresses the question In virtue of what do practical reasons have normative force or justificatory power? There seems to be good reason to doubt that desires are the source of normativity. However, I argue that the reasons to be suspicious of desire-based accounts of normativity can be overcome by a sufficiently sophisticated account. The position I defend in this paper is one according to which desires, or more generally, pro-attitudes, do constitute values and provide rational justifications of actions when they are organized in the right way.

Substance and procedure in theories of prudential value

In this paper I argue that the debate between subjective and objective theories of prudential value obscures the way in which elements of both are needed for a comprehensive theory of prudential value. I suggest that we characterize these two types of theory in terms of their different aims: procedural (or subjective) theories give an account of the necessary conditions for something to count as good for a person, while substantive (or objective) theories give an account of what is good for a person, given some set of necessary conditions. Characterizing the theories in this way allows us to see their mutual compatibility. To make this case, I assume that a theory of prudential value ought to be descriptively and normatively adequate. The criterion of descriptive adequacy requires that our theory explain the subject relativity of prudential value. I characterize subject relativity in terms of justifiability to subjects and I argue that certain procedural theories are well suited to meet this criterion. The criterion of normative adequacy requires that our theory be capable of guiding action and I argue that a certain kind of substantive theory is needed to meet this requirement.

Virtue and Practical Deliberation

The question of how to reason well is an important normative question,one which ultimately motivates some of our interest in the more abstracttopic of the principles of practical reason. It is this normative questionthat I propose to address by arguing that given the goal of an importantkind of deliberation, we will deliberate better if we develop certainvirtues. I give an account of the virtue of stability and I argue thatstability makes reasoners (of a certain sort) reason better. Further,I suggest at the end of the paper that an account of virtues thatconduce to good reasoning might go a long way toward answering someof the traditional questions about the principles ofpractical reason.

How to Think About Virtue and Right

Abstract Robert Johnson argues that virtue ethical accounts of right action fail because they cannot take account of the fact that there are things we ought to do precisely because we do not possess virtuous character traits. Self-improving actions are his paradigm case and it would indeed be a problem if virtue ethics could not make sense of the propriety of self-improvement. To solve this serious problem, I propose that virtue ethics ought to define right action in terms of the virtuous agents reasons for action instead of defining right action in terms of the actions that the virtuous agent performs. I argue that this revised definition of right action makes sense of the Tightness of self-improving actions and that it can be given a genuinely virtue ethical interpretation.

Practical Reason and the Stability Standard

Practical reasoning, reasoning about what to do, is a very familiar activity. When we think about whether to cook or to go out for dinner, to buy a house or rent, or to study law or business, we are engaged in practical reasoning. If the kind of reasoning we engage in is truly a rational process, there must be some norms or standards that govern it; the process cannot be arbitrary or random. In this paper I argue that one of the standards that governs practical reasoning is the stability standard. The stability standard, I argue, is a norm that is constitutive of practical reasoning: insofar as we do not take violations of this norm to be relevant considerations, we do not count as engaged in reasoning at all. Furthermore, I argue that it is a standard we can explicitly employ in order to deliberate about our ends or desires themselves. Importantly, this standard will not require that some ends are prescribed or determined by reason alone. The stability standard, therefore, allows us to retain some of the attractive features of instrumentalism without accepting the implication that there is no rational way to evaluate ends.

Maximization and the Good

The idea that we should maximize the good is a compelling one. After all, if you know what is good—that is, what is objectively worth pursuing—it makes sense to say that you should produce as much of it as you can. But the idea that we should maximize happiness is not obviously right; this idea depends on the assumption that happiness is the only thing that is objectively worth pursuing and this assumption is doubtful, particularly if happiness is understood as pleasure. After some consideration of the historical context of the idea that happiness should be maximized, I argue that the good for a person includes more than happiness. The good is more plausibly thought of in pluralistic terms. Finally, I argue that pluralist theories of a person’s good make maximizing problematic because they do not provide a single target and, further, because they include items (such as friendship) that are not appropriately maximized.

Value Commitments and the Balanced Life

According to critics such as Bernard Williams, traditional ethical theories render it impossible to lead good and meaningful lives because they emphasize moral duty or the promotion of external values at the expense of the personal commitments that make our lives worth living from our own perspective. Responses to this criticism have not addressed the fundamental question about the proper relationship between a persons commitments to moral values and her commitments to non-moral or personal values. In this article, I suggest that we think about this relationship by reflecting on the way that a prudentially virtuous person who has commitments to both moral and non-moral values would regard these commitments. I argue that people with the virtue of balance do have reasons to act in accordance with their moral commitments, but that whether or not these reasons are overriding depends on the type of commitment in question.

Maintaining conviction and the humean account of normativity

reasonable, or obligatory – make a claim to authority in a person’s deliberation. It is this claim to authority that distinguishes normative judgments from simple desires, wishes and feelings. Explaining the nature and the sources of this authority is one of the central problems of moral philosophy. The main debate about the source of normative authority has taken place among those who share an internalist assumption, that is, the assumption that judgments must be capable of motivating an agent in some way if they are to count as authoritative. Among those who accept this assumption, there are two camps: The first, following Kant, argue that normative authority derives from principles of reason to which rational beings are committed in such a way that they are, when rational, motivated by them. The second, following Hume, argue that normative authority derives from our passionate nature, our sentiments, emotions and desires. The first option takes on the large burden of proving that there are principles of reason that answer to the needs of an account of normative authority, that is, principles capable of motivating us (at least sometimes) and sufficiently objective to ground the authority of normative claims. Philosophers have been skeptical about both features of the Kantian position. Given this burden, the second option has its advantages. We know that we have passions, sentiments and desires and we know that they can motivate us to action; more argument is required to show that there are principles of practical reason and that these are capable of motivating us. But the Humean position has serious problems of its own. One might think that the claim that normative judgments are authoritative in virtue of our passions or sentiments does not explain why these judgments are authoritative at all. After all, the problem of explaining the authority of normative judgments arises because we are seeking what distinguishes these judgments from expressions of desires and feelings that do not appear to have any authority. The Humean position also invites skepticism, then, because our sentiments seems to require something further to give them normative authority. One aspect of this objection to the Humean position is that the position does not provide an adequate account of the source of normative authority because the answer it gives undermines the conviction we have in our normative judgments. Authority as the Humean understands it, then, cannot do the work we need it to do. We cannot continue to be confident in our own normative judgments if we believe that their authority derives from our passions because we do not think that our passions always give us good reasons for action. For example, consider a person who is committed to the principle of charity because he believes that God prescribes this principle. Upon losing his faith in God, he begins to think that it is only his own desire to help others that provides a basis for his commitment. We can imagine that such a person might become skeptical about the value of his charitable acts because there no longer seems to be any good reason for them. After all, he might think, he has desires to do many things God does not sanction and he does not take these desires to provide him with reasons to act. The convictions he once had about what he thought valuable might weaken considerably in response to his ceasing to believe in what he took to be the basis of these commitments. The main goal of this paper is to defend the Humean position against the charge that its account of normative authority is inadequate because it undermines normative conviction. This defense relies on considerations about the nature of practical deliberation and its implications for our normative commitments. I argue that people who are concerned to engage in reasoning about their commitments ought to develop certain dispositions Maintaining Conviction and the Humean Account of Normativity Valerie Tiberius