Valerio Scarani

The security of practical quantum key distribution

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the first quantum information task to reach the level of mature technology, already fit for commercialization. It aims at the creation of a secret key between authorized partners connected by a quantum channel and a classical authenticated channel. The security of the key can in principle be guaranteed without putting any restriction on an eavesdroppers power. This article provides a concise up-to-date review of QKD, biased toward the practical side. Essential theoretical tools that have been developed to assess the security of the main experimental platforms are presented (discrete-variable, continuous-variable, and distributed-phase-reference protocols).

Quantum Cryptography Protocols Robust against Photon Number Splitting Attacks for Weak Laser Pulse Implementations

We introduce a new class of quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these protocols, which differs from the original protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against PNS attacks at zero error.

Information causality as a physical principle

Quantum physics has remarkable distinguishing characteristics. For example, it gives only probabilistic predictions (non-determinism) and does not allow copying of unknown states (no-cloning). Quantum correlations may be stronger than any classical ones, but information cannot be transmitted faster than light (no-signalling). However, these features do not uniquely define quantum physics. A broad class of theories exist that share such traits and allow even stronger (than quantum) correlations. Here we introduce the principle of ‘information causality’ and show that it is respected by classical and quantum physics but violated by all no-signalling theories with stronger than (the strongest) quantum correlations. The principle relates to the amount of information that an observer (Bob) can gain about a data set belonging to another observer (Alice), the contents of which are completely unknown to him. Using all his local resources (which may be correlated with her resources) and allowing classical communication from her, the amount of information that Bob can recover is bounded by the information volume (m) of the communication. Namely, if Alice communicates m bits to Bob, the total information obtainable by Bob cannot be greater than m. For m = 0, information causality reduces to the standard no-signalling principle. However, no-signalling theories with maximally strong correlations would allow Bob access to all the data in any m-bit subset of the whole data set held by Alice. If only one bit is sent by Alice (m = 1), this is tantamount to Bob’s being able to access the value of any single bit of Alice’s data (but not all of them). Information causality may therefore help to distinguish physical theories from non-physical ones. We suggest that information causality—a generalization of the no-signalling condition—might be one of the foundational properties of nature.

Quantum Cryptography with Finite Resources: Unconditional Security Bound for Discrete-Variable Protocols with One-Way Postprocessing

We derive a bound for the security of quantum key distribution with finite resources under one-way postprocessing, based on a definition of security that is composable and has an operational meaning. While our proof relies on the assumption of collective attacks, unconditional security follows immediately for standard protocols such as Bennett-Brassard 1984 and six-states protocol. For single-qubit implementations of such protocols, we find that the secret key rate becomes positive when at least N approximately 10(5) signals are exchanged and processed. For any other discrete-variable protocol, unconditional security can be obtained using the exponential de Finetti theorem, but the additional overhead leads to very pessimistic estimates.

One-sided device-independent quantum key distribution: Security, feasibility, and the connection with steering

We analyze the security and feasibility of a protocol for quantum key distribution (QKD) in a context where only one of the two parties trusts his measurement apparatus. This scenario lies naturally between standard QKD, where both parties trust their measurement apparatuses, and device-independent QKD (DI-QKD), where neither do, and can be a natural assumption in some practical situations. We show that the requirements for obtaining secure keys are much easier to meet than for DI-QKD, which opens promising experimental opportunities. We clarify the link between the security of this one-sided DI-QKD scenario and the demonstration of quantum steering, in analogy to the link between DI-QKD and the violation of Bell inequalities.

Device-independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks

Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) represents a relaxation of the security assumptions made in usual quantum key distribution (QKD). As in usual QKD, the security of DIQKD follows from the laws of quantum physics, but contrary to usual QKD, it does not rely on any assumptions about the internal working of the quantum devices used in the protocol. In this paper, we present in detail the security proof for a DIQKD protocol introduced in Acin et al (2008 Phys. Rev. Lett. 98 230501). This proof exploits the full structure of quantum theory (as opposed to other proofs that exploit only the no-signaling principle), but only holds against collective attacks, where the eavesdropper is assumed to act on the quantum systems of the honest parties independently and identically in each round of the protocol (although she can act coherently on her systems at any time). The security of any DIQKD protocol necessarily relies on the violation of a Bell inequality. We discuss the issue of loopholes in Bell experiments in this context.

Entangling independent photons by time measurement

Entanglement is at the heart of quantum physics, both for its conceptual foundations and for applications in quantum communication. Remarkably, entanglement can be ‘swapped’: if we prepare two independent entangled pairs A1–A2 and B1–B2, a joint measurement on A1 and B1 (called a ‘Bell-state measurement’, BSM) has the effect of projecting A2 and B2 onto an entangled state, although these two particles have never interacted nor share any common past1,2. Entanglement swapping with photon pairs has already been experimentally demonstrated3,4,5,6 using pulsed sources—where the challenge was to achieve sufficiently sharp synchronization of the photons in the BSM—but never with continuous-wave sources, as originally proposed2. Here, we present an experiment where the coherence time of the photons exceeds the temporal resolution of the detectors. Hence, photon timing can be obtained by the detection times, and pulsed sources can be replaced by continuous-wave sources, which do not require any synchronization6,7. This allows for the first time the use of completely autonomous sources, an important step towards real-world quantum networks with truly independent and distant nodes.

Time-bin entangled qubits for quantum communication created by femtosecond pulses

We create pairs of non-degenerate time-bin entangled photons at telecom wavelengths with ultra-short pump pulses. Entanglement is shown by performing Bell kind tests of the Franson type with visibilities of up to 91%. As time-bin entanglement can easily be protected from decoherence as encountered in optical fibers, this experiment opens the road for complex quantum communication protocols over long distances. We also investigate the creation of more than one photon pair in a laser pulse and present a simple tool to quantify the probability of such events to happen.

Fast and simple one-way quantum key distribution

We present and demonstrate a new protocol for practical quantum cryptography, tailored for an implementation with weak coherent pulses to obtain a high key generation rate. The key is obtained by a simple time-of-arrival measurement on the dataline; the presence of an eavesdropper is checked by an interferometer on an additional monitoring line. The setup is experimentally simple; moreover, it is tolerant to reduced interference visibility and to photon number splitting attacks, thus featuring a high efficiency in terms of distilled secret bit per

Testing the Dimension of Hilbert Spaces

Nicolas Brunner, Stefano Pironio, Antonio Acin, 3 Nicolas Gisin, André Allan Méthot, and Valerio Scarani Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland ICFO-Institut de Ciencies Fotoniques, Castelldefels (Barcelona), Spain ICREA-Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats, Barcelona, Spain Centre for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore, Singapore (Dated: May 9, 2008)