Vanda Felbab-Brown

Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism

Paradoxically, counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan frequently complicate counterterrorism and counterinsurgency objectives and can even undermine democratization. Counternarcotics strategy should concentrate instead on strengthening the Afghan states capacity.

Kicking the opium habit?: Afghanistan's drug economy and politics since the 1980s

Four misconceptions plague the efforts of the Afghan government and the international community to succeeding in weaning Afghanistan off its narcotics economy. The first myth is that the explosion of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is a new phenomenon emerging from the fall of the Taliban. The second misconception is that if the Taliban regime had remained in power, given its religious fervour, it would have extirpated the illicit economy. The third misconception is that the warlords sponsoring the illicit economy gain only immense financial profits and weapons from the drug trade, a notion that critically ignores the significant political capital that they also reap from such involvement. The final myth and the most dangerous for efforts to cement progress in Afghanistan is that large-scale eradication of the opium crop is the quickest and most effective way to stabilize the country. Only massive economic investment in Afghanistan and wise patience not to demand immediate visible measures of ‘the success’ of counter-narcotics policies can produce a decrease in Afghanistans illicit economy that it is truly durable and not politically destabilizing.

Political Violence and the Illicit Economies of West Africa

This comparative analysis draws on field research in several West African countries to illustrate the dynamic relationships between political violence and organized crime in this sub-region. These relationships are often transactional, and almost always on a temporary basis. While some alliances of convenience may be forged, in other cases an adversarial relationship exists between organized crime and terrorist networks. In some cases, key actors within West African governments have benefited from these relationships. We then examine recent policies and strategies pursued by the U.S. and the international community that, in the name of combating terrorism, seek to constrain the illicit economies of the region, but in doing so may do more harm than good. The article concludes with some policy recommendations based on this analysis.

UNGASS 2016 in Comparative Perspective: Improving the Prospects for Success

Abstract As the international community prepares for the 2016 United Nations Special Session of the General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 2016), the global counternarcotics regime faces profound challenges. An increasing number of countries now find the regime’s emphasis on punitive approaches to illicit drugs to be problematic and are asking for reform. However, critical players such as Russia and China remain committed to the preservation of the existing approaches. At the global level, much has changed since 1998 that undermines the previous global consensus on punitive counternarcotics strategies: illicit markets and networks have shifted; the harms and costs of drugs are unevenly distributed; and states no longer agree on what drug policies work. This moment of global disagreement, which is reflected at UNGASS 2016, provides an important opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness and problematic side-effects of existing counternarcotics policies and to emphasize evidence-based strategies. This article argues that UNGASS 2016 should inject realism into the global discussion of drug policy objectives, instead of once again setting an unattainable goal of a drug-free world. The overall goal should be to strengthen states as they cope with the costs, harms, and threats posed by drug use and drug trade, and to do so in ways that increase, not erode, their legitimacy through policies that advance human rights and strengthen the bonds between the state and their citizens.

Hurray for militias? Not so fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police experience

Abstract Drawing on my fieldwork on militias in Afghanistan over the past decade, this article explores their security and political effects, with special focus on the Afghan Local Police. It analyzes changes in local security environments, effects on the Taliban insurgency and support for government, and the sustainability of and control over the militias. Key lessons include: Militias have a strong tendency to engage in abusive behavior – itself a new driver of conflict. Militias are least likely to abuse communities when they emerge spontaneously, face an abusive external force, and if major rifts and conflicts are absent from the community. Although militias might be local, their effects are not.

The Threat of Illicit Economies and the Complex Relations with State and Society

The chapter introduces the multifaceted threat posed by illicit economies and repercussions in the political, economic, environmental and security spheres. It also discusses the relationship between the state and criminal entities, highlighting the ways in which this relationship can be far from antagonistic in nature. A number of case studies show the way in which criminal organisations and governing elites often develop a mutually beneficial accommodation.

A State-Building Response to Organized Crime, Illicit Economies, Hybrid Threats, and Hybrid Governance

In the chapter the author highlights the undesirable outcomes of doctrinaire law enforcement approaches and offers recommendations for the adoption of multifaceted policy responses. She argues that in order to design effective policy responses to organized crime and appropriately structure external assistance, it is important to stop thinking about crime solely as aberrant social activity to be suppressed, but instead think of crime as competition in state-making. A recognition that states often directly, not just indirectly foster and use crime, is equally important for devising successful strategies. In strong states that effectively address the needs of their societies, non-state entities cannot outcompete the state on a large scale. But in areas of socio-political marginalisation and poverty, non-state actors do—and they thus gain legitimacy within society.