Vasso Kindi

Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Revisited

SummaryThe present paper argues that there is an affinity between KuhnsThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Wittgensteins philosophy. It is maintained, in particular, that Kuhns notion of paradigm draws on such Wittgensteinian concepts as language games, family resemblance, rules, forms of life. It is also claimed that Kuhns incommensurability thesis is a sequel of the theory of meaning supplied by Wittgensteins later philosophy. As such its assessment is not fallacious, since it is not an empirical hypothesis and it does not have the relativistic implications Kuhns critics repeatedly indicated. Although concepts are indeed relative to a language game or paradigm, interparadigmatic intelligibility is preserved through the standard techniques of translation or praxis. The impossibility of radical translation which is captured by the claim of incommensurability lies with that which cannot be said but only shown.

The Relation of History of Science to Philosophy of Science in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Kuhn's later philosophical work

In this essay I argue that Kuhns account of science, as it was articulated in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was mainly defended on philosophical rather than historical grounds. I thus lend support to Kuhns later claim that his model can be derived from first principles. I propose a transcendental reading of his work and I suggest that Kuhn uses historical examples as anti-essentialist Wittgensteinian reminders that expose a variegated landscape in the development of science.

Novelty and Revolution in Art and Science: The Connection between Kuhn and Cavell

In the paper I maintain that there is a connection between Thomas S. Kuhn and Stanley Cavell as regards novelty and revolution in the history of science and in the arts. I argue that the influence is not unidirectional, from Cavell to Kuhn, as it is usually taken to be the case, but, rather, that Kuhns understanding of revolution contributed to a similar understanding of novelty by Cavell in relation to the arts. Novelty, in this latter conception, is tied to tradition and it is brought about to preserve the integrity of the practice to be changed. In this sense, radical novelty or revolution combines the original meaning of revolution as restoration but also the modern meaning of radical break and new beginning. Kuhns contribution to the concept of revolution is that he disassociates it from modernitys idea of progress giving it a postmodern twist. I further examine a possible dissimilarity between Cavell and Kuhn, namely that Cavell, but not Kuhn, in invoking tradition, is in pursuit of essence. I show that neither is involved in an essentialist project and that the alleged dissimilarity is only apparent. Finally, I consider several problems that their common view faces and offer a possible way to address them.

The Challenge of Scientific Revolutions: Van Fraassen's and Friedman's Responses

This article criticizes the attempts by Bas van Fraassen and Michael Friedman to address the challenge to rationality posed by the Kuhnian analysis of scientific revolutions. In the paper, I argue that van Fraassens solution, which invokes a Sartrean theory of emotions to account for radical change, does not amount to justifying rationally the advancement of science but, rather, despite his protestations to the contrary, is an explanation of how change is effected. Friedmans approach, which appeals to philosophical developments at a meta-theoretical level, does not really address the problem of rationality as posed by Kuhns work. Instead of showing how, despite revolutions, scientific development is, indeed, rational, he gives a transcendental account of rational scientific progress.

Kuhn's conservatism

Steve Fuller in his book Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History of Our Times1 attempts to place in historical context Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions2 and provide through and around it what he calls a ‘philosophical history of our times’. By this term Fuller understands a Hegelian kind of endeavour, which lays more emphasis on philosophy rather than history. History, in this context, is used to assist in the promotion of a philosophical agenda, which, in the case that interests Fuller, is that of bringing ‘the politics of knowledge production to the center of public arena’ (p. 11). Kuhn is seen as ‘decisively contribut[ing] to reversing’ such a project, which, according to Fuller, has a history of 150 years and has been carried out by figures like Hegel, Comte, Weber, Peirce, Duhem, Russell, Popper and Feyerabend, among others (ibid.). These figures managed to ‘[weave] their abstract arguments around a historical narrative punctuated by recognisable landmark episodes in “Western civilization,” (. . .) enabl[ing] a relatively large intellectual (. . .) public to find points of contact and contestation with what they had to say’ (p. 12).

Collingwood’s Opposition to Biography

Abstract Biography is usually distinguished from history and, in comparison, looked down upon. R. G. Collingwood’s view of biography seems to fit this statement considering that he says it has only gossip-value and that “history it can never be”. His main concern is that biography exploits and arouses emotions which he excludes from the domain of history. In the paper I will try to show that one can salvage a more positive view of biography from within Collingwood’s work and claim that his explicit attacks against biography target specifically the sensationalist kind. First, I will show that Collingwood, in his later writings, allowed that, not only thought, but also relevant emotions can be the subject matter of history, which means that even if one takes biography to deal with emotions, it can still qualify as history. Second, I will argue, based mainly on Collingwood’s Principles of Art, that biography can be compared to portrait painting, in which case, it can be redeemed as a work of art and not just craft and, thus, have more than entertainment value. It can also be part of history, and more specifically part of the history of art which Collingwood endorses, if one takes the life of an individual, recounted by a biographer, to be an artistic creation, as Collingwood seems to suggest.

Taking a Look at History

AbstractIan Hacking urged that philosophers take a look at history. He called his recommendation the “Lockean imperative”. In the present paper I examine how Hacking understands the relation between philosophy and history by concentrating on his 1990 essay “Two kinds of ‘New Historicism’ for philosophers”. In this particular paper Hacking uses the visual metaphor of ‘taking a look’ which can also be found in the work of two other philosophers, Kuhn and Foucault, who are called by Hacking his mentors. I argue that in the work of these three philosophers, as well as in the work of Wittgenstein who has influenced both Hacking and Kuhn, one can find interest and attention to particulars which can be furnished by history, an approach which cultivates a sensibility for difference. I begin by presenting Hacking’s understanding of the relation of history to philosophy and then discuss what the Lockean imperative is. I concentrate on Locke’s understanding of history which differs considerably from the contemporary and end by focusing on the similarities in the work of the aforementioned thinkers.

A spectre is haunting history – the spectre of science

Alluding to the ghost of Communism which, according to the Communist Manifesto, hovered over Europe as both a threat and a much desired prospect, I contend in the paper that, in like manner, an ideal image of science looms over history as both an enforcer of discipline and a motivational ambition. By revisiting recent writings, mainly by Hayden White, I show that the concern which preoccupied historians and philosophers, at least since modern times, is not only still present, like a ghost, even among scholars who challenge the ubiquitous authority of nineteenth-century science, but also that the image of science they invoke is a rather dated one, at least from the point of view of a historical philosophy of science. I also argue that a number of oppositions, such as the opposition between the literal and metaphorical use of language, between invention and discovery, or between facts and their interpretation, that supposedly mark the difference between history and science collapse once the phantasm of the ideal of scientificity is dissipated.