Vera Brenčič

Wage posting: evidence from job ads

English Abstract: Recent studies of search theory examine how employers use a wage�?setting mechanism – either by bargaining or through the posting of a non�?negotiable wage offer in a job ad – to facilitate search. We contribute to this literature by examining wage posting in job ads in the US, the UK, and Slovenia. Despite considerable differences in the incidence of wage posting, employers in all three markets are less likely to post a wage offer when searching for skilled workers. The decision on whether or not to post a wage offer is only weakly related to the outcomes of employers’ search. French Abstract: Des études récentes de la théorie de la recherche d’employés examinent comment les employeurs utilisent le mécanisme de détermination des salaires – soit par marchandage, soit en mentionnant une offre de salaire non�?négociable dans l’annonce de l’offre d’emploi – pour faciliter le processus de recherche. On examine les salaires mentionnés dans les annonces d’offre d’emplois aux États�?Unis, au Royaume�?Uni, et en Slovénie. Malgré des différences considérables dans l’incidence de l’annonce du salaire, les employeurs dans ces trois marchés sont moins susceptibles d’annoncer un salaire quand ils cherchent des travailleurs qualifiés. La décision d’annoncer un salaire ou non est seulement faiblement reliée aux résultats de la recherche des employeurs.

Employers’ Online Search: An Empirical Analysis

Drawing on job postings at an online job board, we find that employers who have to fill their vacancies immediately specify fewer job requirements, provide more details about the job application process, and are quicker to withdraw their vacancies from the job board than employers with job openings that do not have to be filled immediately. These findings offer new insights into the role of vacancy costs in determining how employers search for workers online.

Do Employers Respond to the Costs of Continued Search

An analysis of US and Slovenian vacancy data sets reveals that an employer who is searching to fill a job vacancy is more likely to fill the vacancy by hiring an under-qualified worker when the search costs are higher; when, at the start of the search, the employer has less time to search at low cost; and during the week following an increase in search costs. These are interesting findings not only about the effects of search costs on employers’ hiring decisions, but also because they suggest that search frictions in the two labour markets may be considerable.

Employers' On‐Line Recruitment and Screening Practices

We find that not all employers use on-line search tools when they post their vacancies on-line job boards, even though the tools that are offered by the job boards are free and purportedly facilitate search. Drawing on descriptions of vacancies collected from the on-line job board , we find that the on-line recruitment and screening tools that are offered by are more likely to be used when employers actively engage in search or use the job board frequently. Consistent with a standard search model, both vacancy and employer attributes explain the duration of a vacancys posting on Monster(dot)com.

On-the-Job Tasks and Performance Pay: A Vacancy-Level Analysis

Drawing on a dataset of job openings posted at an online job board, the authors find that employers are less likely to offer performance-based pay when a job entails multitasking, quality control, or team work than when a job does not entail these tasks. This finding is consistent with the notion that when employers have difficulty measuring a workers overall performance at jobs with these dimensions, they offer weaker performance incentives to ensure that workers allocate their efforts to every task they were hired to perform. The observed pattern persists when different forms of performance incentives are considered, such as bonuses and commissions, but is weaker for non-sales jobs or jobs that entail multitasking.

Wage Posting: Evidence from Job Ads (L’Annonce Du Salaire : Résultats À Partir Des Annonces D’Emplois)

English Abstract: Recent studies of search theory examine how employers use a wage�?setting mechanism – either by bargaining or through the posting of a non�?negotiable wage offer in a job ad – to facilitate search. We contribute to this literature by examining wage posting in job ads in the US, the UK, and Slovenia. Despite considerable differences in the incidence of wage posting, employers in all three markets are less likely to post a wage offer when searching for skilled workers. The decision on whether or not to post a wage offer is only weakly related to the outcomes of employers’ search. French Abstract: Des études récentes de la théorie de la recherche d’employés examinent comment les employeurs utilisent le mécanisme de détermination des salaires – soit par marchandage, soit en mentionnant une offre de salaire non�?négociable dans l’annonce de l’offre d’emploi – pour faciliter le processus de recherche. On examine les salaires mentionnés dans les annonces d’offre d’emplois aux États�?Unis, au Royaume�?Uni, et en Slovénie. Malgré des différences considérables dans l’incidence de l’annonce du salaire, les employeurs dans ces trois marchés sont moins susceptibles d’annoncer un salaire quand ils cherchent des travailleurs qualifiés. La décision d’annoncer un salaire ou non est seulement faiblement reliée aux résultats de la recherche des employeurs.

Wage posting: evidence from job ads: Wage posting: evidence from job ads

English Abstract: Recent studies of search theory examine how employers use a wage�?setting mechanism – either by bargaining or through the posting of a non�?negotiable wage offer in a job ad – to facilitate search. We contribute to this literature by examining wage posting in job ads in the US, the UK, and Slovenia. Despite considerable differences in the incidence of wage posting, employers in all three markets are less likely to post a wage offer when searching for skilled workers. The decision on whether or not to post a wage offer is only weakly related to the outcomes of employers’ search. French Abstract: Des études récentes de la théorie de la recherche d’employés examinent comment les employeurs utilisent le mécanisme de détermination des salaires – soit par marchandage, soit en mentionnant une offre de salaire non�?négociable dans l’annonce de l’offre d’emploi – pour faciliter le processus de recherche. On examine les salaires mentionnés dans les annonces d’offre d’emplois aux États�?Unis, au Royaume�?Uni, et en Slovénie. Malgré des différences considérables dans l’incidence de l’annonce du salaire, les employeurs dans ces trois marchés sont moins susceptibles d’annoncer un salaire quand ils cherchent des travailleurs qualifiés. La décision d’annoncer un salaire ou non est seulement faiblement reliée aux résultats de la recherche des employeurs.