Vernon H. Gregg

Recognition memory and awareness: A large effect of study-test modalities on “know” responses following a highly perceptual orienting task

Abstract Two experiments investigated the effects of varying the correspondence between presentation and test modes on states of conscious awareness in recognition memory. Experiment 1 used visual test items and showed that auditory and visual study modes differentially affected recollective experience and feelings of familiarity assessed by “remember” and “know” responses accompanying recognition: “know” responses were slightly enhanced following visual presentation, but this was largely offset by a similarly small increase in “remember” responses. Experiment 2 employed conditions designed to maximise any effect on “know” responses of the correspondence between presentation and test modes by using a highly perceptual orienting task at study. Under these conditions, there was a large mode correspondence effect on “know” responses. The results support the idea that “know” responses are particularly sensitive to perceptual factors.

When auditory memory is not overwritten

The effect of auditory as opposed to visual presentation was explored in a free recall paradigm in which each list word was preceded and followed by a period of oral distractor activity. Contrary to expectations, the modality effect was obtained. That is, there was an auditory advantage confined to recency items. This effect was found in each of a series of experiments designed to test its generality. These results are inconsistent with current theoretical accounts of the modality effect.

Recognition memory with little or no remembering: Implications for a detection model

Remembering and knowing are two states of awareness that reflect autonoetic and noetic consciousness. Recent extensions of signal detection theory have attempted to fitremember andknow responses, which measure these states of awareness, to a continuum of trace strength or familiarity. The model assumes there are two response criteria, a remembering criterion, which is more strict, and a recognition criterion, which is more lenient and leads to any positive recognition response. The most important prediction of this model is that bias-free estimates of memory should be the same whether derived from overall hit and false alarm rates or fromremember hit and false alarm rates. We describe evidence that disconfirms this prediction and discuss other findings that the model cannot accommodate.

Recall of common and uncommon words from pure and mixed lists

Recall of high- and low-frequency words in the conventional free recall paradigm was compared with recall of the same words when subjects were required to count backward before and after the presentation of each word. The addition of this distractor task was associated with a reduction in the high-frequency advantage otherwise found with pure lists containing only high- or low-frequency words. This finding is attributed to the disruption of organizational processes. In contrast, the low-frequency advantage found with conventional presentation of mixed lists, containing high- and low-frequency words, was not reduced by distraction. These findings indicate that the frequency effects obtained with mixed and pure lists have different origins.

Impact of encoding depth on awareness of perceptual effects in recognition memory

Pictorial stimuli are more likely to be recognized if they are the same size, rather than a different size, at study and at test. This size congruency effect was replicated in two experiments in which the encoding variables were respectively undivided versus divided attention and level of processing. In terms of performance, these variables influenced recognition and did not influence size congruency effects. But in terms of awareness, measured by remember and know responses, these variables did influence size congruency effects. With undivided attention and with a deep level of processing, size congruency effects occurred only in remembering. With divided attention and with a shallow level of processing, size congruency effects occurred only in knowing. The results show that effects that occur in remembering may also occur independently in knowing. They support theories in which remembering and knowing reflect different memory processes or systems. They do not support the theory that remembering and knowing reflect differences in trace strength.

Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: Sufferers' Evaluation of Medical Support

In response to reports of negative cooperation between sufferers of chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) and their doctors, semi-structured interviews were conducted with sufferers from two different patient samples. Satisfaction with support received and with medical professionals in general was low. Sufferers complained about insufficient informational as well as emotional support from their doctors, and as a consequence most opted for alternative or complementary forms of treatment. In addition, disagreements over illness aetiology and treatment precluded effective cooperation. If satisfaction and compliance are to improve, sufferers will need more information about CFS and more support.

Word Frequency and Generation Effects

Memory & Cognition Research Group City University, London, England Nairne, Pusen, and Widner (1985) described an experiment in which they found that, like nonwords, low-frequency words were no more likely to be recognized if they had been self- generated at study than if they had been read. These findings led Naime et al. to

What Do People Actually Remember (and Know) in “Remember/Know” Experiments?

In two experiments, participants studied a set of words and at recognition were asked to give “remember” and “know” judgements for each recognised item. In addition, they were asked to describe as many of these experiences as possible during the period of the experiment. They found it easier to describe their remember rather than their know responses, and a selection of each of these is given from one experiment. Experiment 1 gave the participants a free rein at encoding, so that a wide selection of descriptive responses might be obtained. Experiment 2 manipulated levels of processing and showed that only remember responses reflected encoding level. These results offer additional information on phenomenal awareness in an experimental setting.

Modality and phonological similarity effects in serial recall: Does one’s own voice play a role?

Results of two experiments showed that the modality effect in serial recall of word lists is sharply reduced by high interitem phonological similarity and that the extent of this reduction is much the same irrespective of whether the lists are spoken by the subject or the experimenter. These findings contradict an account of the modality effect recently proposed by Richardson (1979), but the data are entirely consistent with the belief that the effect originates in echoic memory.

Further evidence of interference between lipreading and auditory recency.

In both free and backward recall, it is shown that auditory but not visual recency is greatly disrupted when subjects have to lipread, rather than read, a series of numbers in a distractor task interpolated between list presentation and recall. This selective interference effect extends the generality of a finding reported by Spoehr and Corin (1978) and adds to an accumulating body of evidence that seems inconsistent with acoustic or echoic memory interpretations of the enhanced recency recall typically observed in comparing auditory with visual presentation. Alternative interpretations are briefly considered.