Vicki L. Smith

The incredible (and sometimes incredulous) child witness : child eyewitnesses' sensitivity to source credibility cues

Witnesses who receive misleading postevent information usually perform more poorly on memory tests than do witnesses who receive only unbiased information. This effect is especially pronounced for young children. For adults, the credibility of the source of the misleading information moderates this effect; misinformation presented by a credible source impairs performance to a greater degree than does misinformation presented by a noncredible source. In the present experiment, preschool children listened to a story accompanied by several illustrations. Later, they watched a videotape ofa child, a credible adult, or a discredited adult answering questions about the story. For some children, the person in the videotape provided misleading information. The childrens memory reports were impaired only when misinformation was presented by the credible adult, indicating that even young children are sensitive to source credibility cues.

Eyewitness accuracy and confidence: within- versus between-subjects correlations.

Previous researchers using between-subjects comparisons have found eyewitness confidence and accuracy to be only negligibly correlated. In this study, we examined the predictive power of confidence in within-subject terms. Ninety-six subjects answered, and made confidence ratings for, a series of questions about a crime they witnessed. The average between-subjects and within-subject accuracy-confidence correlations were comparably low: r = .14 (p less than .001) and r = .17 (p less than .001), respectively. Confidence is neither a useful predictor of the accuracy of a particular witness nor of the accuracy of particular statements made by the same witness. Another possible predictor of accuracy, response latency, correlated only negligibly with accuracy (r = -.09 within subjects), but more strongly with confidence (r = -.27 within subjects). This pattern was obtained for both between-subjects and within-subject comparisons. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.

What Do You Expect?: The Influence of People's Prior Knowledge of Crime Categories on Fact-Finding

Jurors have accumulated prior knowledge of crime categories that influences their verdict choices (V. L. Smith, 1991, 1993). The present research investigates whether this prior knowledge also influences the fact-finding process by operating as an expectancy for information processing. Consistent with the expectancy hypothesis, Study 1 demonstrated that people are more susceptible to misleading information that is perceived to be typical of the crime in question than misleading information that is atypical. Studies 2 and 3 revealed that peoples intrusion errors also contain more typical than atypical information. These results indicate that peoples prior knowledge of crime categories does indeed serve as an expectancy for fact-finding. Thus, prior knowledge plays a broader role than previously appreciated. The implications of this breadth are discussed.

The dynamite charge

When juries report they are deadlocked, judges may deliver a supplemental instruction known as thedynamite charge which urges jurors to reexamine their views in an effort to reach a unamimous verdict. To examine the impact of this instruction, 72 mock jurors were led to believe they were participating in a controlled deliberation by voting and passing notes. Subjects were randomly assigned to the majority or minority faction of a 3-to-1 split. After the third round of deliberation, half the subjects received the dynamite charge, half did not. Results provided support for the hypothesis that the dynamite charge causes jurors in the minority to feel coerced and to change their votes and encourages those in the majority to exert increasing amounts of social pressure. These findings are discussed for their practical implications, limitations, and directions for further research.

Déjà vu all over again: Elliott's critique of eyewitness experts

Echoing McCloskey and Egeth (1983), and motivated by Kassin, Ellsworth, and Smiths (1989) survey of 63 eyewitness experts, Elliott (1993) recently attacked the use of psychological experts on eyewitness testimony. There are two principal shortcomings of this critique. First, it misrepresents the eyewitness literature and the experts who use it. Second, it merely parrots complaints of the past. The same old arguments are made about the lack of sufficient research evidence, the standards by which experts should conduct their affairs, and the impact of it all on the jury. Perhaps the field needs periodic prodding and consciousness-raising on this issue, but there is very little in this critique that is imaginative or new compared to those that preceded it. And what is new is based on an irresponsible review of the literature.

Effects of the dynamite charge on the deliberations of deadlocked mock juries

When juries report that they are deadlocked, judges often deliver the dynamite charge, a supplemental instruction that urges jurors to rethink their views in an effort to reach a unanimous verdict. The present study evaluated the impact of this procedure on 378 subjects who participated in 63 deadlocked mock juries. Results indicated that the dynamite charge caused jurors in the voting minority to feel coerced and change their votes, reduced the pressure felt by those in the majority, and hastened the deliberation process in juries that favored conviction. These findings raise serious questions concerning the use of this controversial charge.