Victor S. Maas

Top Management Team Heterogeneity, Strategic Change and Operational Performance

This study examines the role of top management team (TMT) heterogeneity in facilitating strategic change. Based on the upper echelons literature, we argue that heterogeneous management teams are better able to handle the simultaneous and conflicting demands of refocusing the organization strategically and keeping up operational performance. We expect this to be true only for teams that are heterogeneous with respect to factors directly related to job requirements, however. Data were collected from 92 full TMTs of hospitals in Spain that were confronted with institutional pressures that challenged their current strategies. In support of our hypotheses, the results show job-related TMT heterogeneity moderates the relation between strategic change and operational performance. No moderating effect is found for non-job-related TMT heterogeneity.

The Effects of Uncertainty on the Roles of Controllers and Budgets: An Exploratory Study

This paper explores how contextual uncertainty and the use of the budgetary system explain cross-sectional variation in the organisational role of business unit controllers. We argue that there are complementarities between the role of the budgetary control system (i.e. coercive vs. enabling) and the role of the controller (i.e. corporate policeman vs. business partner). Thus, we explore both the direct effect of uncertainty on the role of the controller and the indirect effect through the role of the budgetary control system. Using survey data from 134 business unit controllers, we find that uncertainty provides a partial explanation of the variation in the role of budgetary control systems and in the role of controllers. In particular, our data suggest alignment between the coercive (enabling) use of the budgetary control system and the role of controllers acting as corporate policemen (business partners). These findings add to our understanding of the functioning of business unit controllers within their organisational context.

How Control System Design Influences Performance Misreporting

This paper investigates reporting honesty when managers have monetary incentives to overstate their performance. We argue that managers who report about their performance will take into account how their report affects their peers (i.e., other managers at the same hierarchical level). This effect depends on the design of the organization’s control system, in particular on the reward structure and the information policy regarding individual performance reports. The reward structure determines if peers’ monetary payoff is increased or decreased when managers claim a higher level of performance. The information policy determines if managers will be able to link individual peers to their reports and affects the non-monetary costs of breaking social norms. We present the results of a laboratory experiment. As predicted, we find that participants are more likely to overstate their performance if this increases the monetary payoff of others than if their reported performance decreases others’ monetary gains. In addition, overstatements are lower under an open information policy, where each individual’s reported performance is made public, compared to a closed information policy where participants only learn the average performance of the other participants. Our findings have several important implications for management accounting research and practice.

How Control System Design Influences Performance Misreporting: CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE MISREPORTING

This paper investigates reporting honesty when managers have monetary incentives to overstate their performance. We argue that managers who report about their performance will take into account how their report affects their peers (i.e., other managers at the same hierarchical level). This effect depends on the design of the organizations control system, in particular, on the reward structure and the information policy regarding individual performance reports. The reward structure determines if peers’ monetary payoff is increased or decreased when managers claim a higher level of performance. The information policy determines if managers will be able to link individual peers to their reports and affects the nonmonetary costs of breaking social norms. We present the results of a laboratory experiment. As predicted, we find that participants are more likely to overstate their performance if this increases the monetary payoff of others than if their reported performance decreases others’ monetary gains. In addition, overstatements are lower under an open information policy, where each individuals reported performance is made public, compared to a closed information policy, where participants only learn the average performance of the other participants. Our findings have several important implications for management accounting research and practice.