Victoria Osuna

Implementing the 35 Hour Workweek by Means of Overtime Taxation

This paper studies the implications of taxing overtime work to reduce the workweek. We study the roles played by team work, commuting costs and idiosyncratic output risk in determining the choice of the workweek. To obtain reliable estimates, we calibrate the model to the substitutability between overtime and employment using business cycle information. We find that a tax-rate of 12% of overtime wages reduces the workweek from 40 to 35 hours. This tax change increases employment by 7% and reduces output and productivity by 10.2% and 4.2%, respectively. Moreover, the welfare costs of this policy seem to be very large. (Copyright: Elsevier)

The Effects of Reducing Firing Costs in Spain: A Lost Opportunity?

In the mid 80s, many European countries liberalized the use of fixed-term (temporary) contracts in order to lower firms non-wage labor costs, instead of reducing firing costs associated with indefinite duration (permanent) contracts. This policy generated segmented labor markets. The Spanish case is the most striking, with a share of temporary employment of 33% by the mid 90s. Since then, several reforms have been suggested and in this paper I quantify some of their effects. First, I build a model of job creation and destruction of the search and matching type that is able to generate the main properties of a segmented labor market like the Spanish one. Then, I use his model to quantify the effects of removing procedural wages, and further reductions in firing costs associated with permanent contracts. The main results are: (i) a small increase in permanent job destruction, (ii) a significant reduction in temporary job destruction, mainly driven by the increase in job conversions from temporary contracts into permanent ones, and (iii) a significant reduction in labor market segmentation measured as the reduction in the wage gap of temporary versus permanent workers.

Taxing Overtime or Subsidizing Employment

This paper compares the macroeconomic implications of overtime taxation and wage and employment subsidies in a dynamic general equilibrium model in which hours and bodies are imperfect substitutes due to team work and externality-based commuting costs. To obtain reliable estimates, I calibrate the model to the substitutability between the workweek and employment using business cycle information. I find that subsidizing employment can achieve the same employment increase as taxing overtime but at a lower cost in terms of output, productivity, wages and welfare. The wage subsidy that achieves the same employment increase turns out to be very costly from a fiscal point of view