Vijayendra Rao

THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION: EVIDENCE FROM INDIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

This paper uses village and household survey data from South India to examine how political geography and politician identity impacts on public good provision. We provide evidence that the nature of this relationship varies by type of public good. For high spillover public goods residential proximity to elected representative matters. In contrast, for low spillover public goods sharing the politicians group identity is what matters. (JEL: D78, H40) Copyright (c) 2004 The European Economic Association.

Sex Workers and the Cost of Safe Sex: The Compensating Differential for Condom Use Among Calcutta Prostitutes

Prostitution is often called the worlds oldest profession, yet economists almost never study it. The practice of safe sex by commercial sex workers is considered central to preventing the transmission of AIDS in developing countries - yet sex workers in Calcutta who regularly use condoms suffer a 79 percent loss in their average earnings per sex act. The practice of safe sex by commercial sex workers is considered central to preventing the transmission of AIDS in developing countries. Rao, Gupta, and Jana estimate the compensating differential for condom use among sex workers in Calcutta, based on results from a survey conducted in 1993. If, as suggested by anecdotal evidence, this loss in income is large, it would indicate the existence of strong disincentives for practicing safe sex. To identify the relationship between condom use and the average price per sex act, they follow an instrumental variable approach, exploiting an intervention program focused on providing information about the AIDS virus and about safe sex practices. The program, instituted in 1992, was not systematically administered. Using this method, they found that sex workers who always use condoms face a loss of 79 percent in the average earnings per sex act. This paper - a product of Poverty and Human Resources, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the behavior underlying HIV/AIDS transmission. Vijayendra Rao may be contacted at vrao@worldbank.org.

Celebrations as Social Investments: Festival Expenditures, Unit Price Variation and Social Status in Rural India

Festival expenditures amount to over 15 per cent of a households annual expenditures in rural India. Yet they have never been studied by economists. This article uses both qualitative and quantitative data from a case study of three South Indian villages to show that festivals are important public goods in the village, but neither a pure entertainment motive nor an altruistic desire to contribute to a public event seems to explain their size. Households which spend money on festivals, everything else held equal, are able, however, to generate tangible rewards - lower prices on food, higher social status and more invitations to meals from other families. This indicates that active participation in festivals generates private economic and social returns which help resolve a potential free-rider problem. The evidence is consistent with the notion that festivals serve as mechanisms by which communities build social networks.

Wedding Celebrations as Conspicuous Consumption Signaling Social Status in Rural India

We examine the determinants of expenditures on wedding celebrations by rural Indian families. We develop a status signaling model of wedding celebrations where the size of the celebration signals the quality of the new grooms family and, thus, the enhanced social status of the brides family. Predictions from the model are tested with survey data from South India using a natural experiment derived from variations in norms of village exogamy—when daughters have to marry grooms from another village—to identify the availability of information on the grooms family to the brides village. The econometric results are consistent with a status signaling interpretation.

Governance in the Gullies: Democratic Responsiveness and Leadership in Delhi's Slums

The authors use detailed ethnographic evidence to design and interpret a broad representative survey of 800 households in Delhis slums, examining the processes by which residents gain access to formal government and develop their own informal modes of leadership. While ethnically homogeneous slums transplant rural institutions to the city, newer and ethnically diverse slums depend on informal leaders who gain their authority through political connections, education, and network entrepreneurship. Education and political affiliation are more important than seniority in determining a leaders influence. Informal leaders are accessible to all slum dwellers, but formal government figures are most accessed by the wealthy and the well-connected.

Tokenism or Agency? The Impact of Women’s Reservations on Village Democracies in South India

There is increasing interest in whether improving the participation of women in government will lead to more gender equality. We test this with data collected from South India, using a natural experiment that randomly reserves one‐third of all presidencies in democratically elected village councils (panchayats) for women candidates. Previous research has found that such “reservations” result in policy decisions that are closer to the preferences of women; qualitative research has argued, conversely, that it results in token appointments in which women are appointed by elites and are poorly educated and aged. We do not find evidence in favor of the tokenism hypothesis, finding that women leaders are drawn from the upper end of the quality distribution of women. However, we find that female leaders perform no differently than male leaders. Our results also indicate that institutional factors matter much more for women than for men: women perform better than men in situations in which they have more political experience and live in villages less dominated by upper castes.

Dignity through Discourse: Poverty and the Culture of Deliberation in Indian Village Democracies

Employing a view of culture as a communicative phenomenon involving discursive engagement, which is deeply influenced by social and economic inequalities, the authors argue that the struggle to break free of poverty is as much a cultural process as it is political and economic. In this paper, they analyze important examples of discursive spaces - public meetings in Indian village democracies (gram sabhas), where villagers make important decisions about budgetary allocations for village development and the selection of beneficiaries for anti-poverty programs. They examine 290 transcripts of gram sabhas from South India to demonstrate how they create a culture of civic/political engagement among poor people, and how definitions of poverty and beneficiary-selection criteria are understood and interrogated within them. Through this examination, they highlight the process by which gram sabhas facilitate the acquisition of crucial cultural capabilities such as discursive skills and civic agency by poor and disadvantaged groups. They illustrate how the poor and socially marginalized deploy these discursive skills in a resource-scarce and socially stratified environment in making material and non-material demands in their search for dignity. The intersection of poverty, culture, and deliberative democracy is a topic of broad relevance because it sheds light on cultural processes that can be influenced by public action in a manner that helps improve the voice and agency of the poor.

Poverty and Public Celebrations in Rural India

This article examines the paradox that very poor households spend large sums of money on celebrations. Using qualitative and quantitative data from South India, it demonstrates that expenditures on weddings and festivals can be explained by integrating an understanding of how identity is shaped in the Indian context with an economic analysis of decision making under conditions of extreme poverty and risk. It argues that publicly observable celebrations have two functions: they provide a space for maintaining social reputations and webs of obligation, and they serve as arenas for status-enhancing competitions. The first role is central to maintaining the networks essential for social relationships and coping with poverty, while the second is a correlate of mobility that may become more prevalent as incomes rise. Development policies that privilege individual over collective action reduce the incentives for the former while increasing them for the latter, thus reducing social cohesion while increasing conspicuous consumption.

Sex workers and the cost of safe sex - the compensating differential for condom use in Calcutta

The practice of safe sex by commercial sex workers is considered central to preventing the transmission of AIDS in developing countries. The authors estimate the compensating differential for condom use among sex workers in Calcutta, based on results from a survey conducted in 1993. If, as suggested by anecdotal evidence, this loss in income is large, it would indicate the existence of strong disincentives for practicing safe sex. To identify the relationship between condom use and the average price per sex act, they follow an instrumental variable approach, exploiting an intervention program focused on providing information about the AIDS virus and about safe sex practices. The program, instituted in 1992, was not systematically administered. Using this method, they found that sex workers who always use condoms face a loss of 79 percent in the average earnings per sex act.

Measurement of deprivation and poverty based on the proportion spent on food: An exploratory exercise

This paper attempts to broaden the scope of poverty measurement. First, a brief review of measurements based on nutritional and monetary norms is presented. Then, it is suggested that data on the proportion spent on food (PSF) by per capita expenditure can be exploited to measure the incidence of deprivation and the incidence of poverty. It is postulated that until the food needs are satisfied, people spend relatively more of their incremental income on food and this behavior reveals itself as increasing or invariant PSF as income increases up to a critical level. The proportion of people up to that critical level is deprived of the required food and the proportion constitutes the incidence of deprivation. The average expenditure at the deprivation point can be used to develop an arbitrary poverty line. Data for rural India are used to illustrate the measurement of deprivation and poverty.