Vincent K. Chong

Strategic Choices, Environmental Uncertainty and SBU Performance: A Note on the Intervening Role of Management Accounting Systems

This paper examines the role of management accounting systems (MAS) design on the relationship between: (1) strategic business unit (SBU) strategy and SBU performance and (2) perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) on SBU performance. MAS design was defined in terms of the extent to which managers use broad scope MAS information for managerial decision making. The responses of 62 SBU managers, drawn from a cross-section of manufacturing companies in Western Australia, to a questionnaire survey were analysed by using a path analysis. The results suggest that SBU strategy and PEU are important antecedents of MAS design, and that broad scope MAS information is an important antecedent of SBU performance.

Testing a model of the antecedents and consequences of budgetary participation on job performance

Abstract This paper examines the effect of antecedents (such as task exceptions and task analysability) and consequences (such as job-relevant information, budget goal level, budget goal acceptance and budget goal commitment) of budgetary participation on job performance. The responses of 135 middle-level managers, drawn from a cross- section of manufacturing firms, to a survey questionnaire, were analysed by using a structural equation modelling (SEM) technique. The results of this study suggest that task exceptions and task analysability are important antecedents of budgetary participation. The results further suggest that the cognitive effect of participation in goal- setting allows subordinates to gather, exchange and share job-relevant information. The availability of job-relevant information allows subordinates to develop effective strategies or plans, which will help them to exert effort over time, in an attempt to attain their goals. The results support the proposition that setting difficult but attainable budget goals increases subordinates? budget goal level, acceptance, and commitment to the budget goal, which in turn improves job performance.

The decision-facilitating role of management accounting systems on managerial performance: the influence of locus of control and task uncertainty.

This study examines the three-way interaction between task uncertainty, locus of control and management accounting systems (MAS) affecting managerial performance. MAS was defined in terms of the extent to which managers use broad scope MAS information for managerial decisions. The results of this study support a three-way interaction between task uncertainty, locus of control and management accounting systems affecting managerial performance. Specifically, under low task uncertainty situations, the results reveal that the use of more broad scope MAS information by “internal” managers is detrimental to their performance, while the extent of use of broad scope MAS information has no effect on the performance level of the “external” managers. In addition, the results reveal that “internal” managers who make more use of broad scope MAS information for managerial decisions under low task uncertainty performed less well than their “external” counterparts. In contrast, under high task uncertainty situations, the results suggest that “internal” managers improve their performance when they make more use of broad scope MAS information for managerial decisions, while “external” managers are insensitive to the degree of use of broad scope MAS information for managerial decisions. In addition, the results reveal that “internal” managers who make more use of broad scope MAS information for managerial decisions in high task uncertainty situations only marginally outperform their “external” counterparts. Contrary to our expectations, this difference is not statistically significant. The theoretical and practical contributions of our findings are discussed.

The multiple roles of participative budgeting on job performance

Abstract This paper examines the multiple roles (i.e., cognitive, motivational and value attainment) of participative budgeting and the combined effects of these three roles on subordinates’ job performance. Specifically, this paper proposes that participative budgeting affects job performance via three intervening variables, namely role ambiguity, organizational commitment and job satisfaction. The responses of 74 senior-level managers, drawn from a cross-section of the Australian financial services sector, to a questionnaire survey were analyzed by using a path analytic technique. The results support the multiple roles of participative budgeting and the indirect effect of participative budgeting on subordinates’ job performance through role ambiguity, organizational commitment and job satisfaction.

A note on testing a model of cognitive budgetary participation processes using a structural equation modeling approach

Abstract This paper reports the results of a study which re-examines Chenhall and Brownell ( Accounting, Organizations and Society , pp. 225–233, 1988). In that study, it was hypothesized that role ambiguity acted as an intervening variable in the association between budgetary participation and outcome criteria. Although the results were supportive of the hypotheses, a number of limitations may be observed. This paper incorporates variations in sampling and finds results, which provide strong support for Chenhall and Brownells hypotheses when tested using a structural equation modeling (SEM) technique.

The Effects of Value Attainment and Cognitive Roles of Budgetary Participation on Job Performance

This chapter examines the effects of the value attainment and cognitive roles of budgetary participation on job performance. A structural model consisting of variables such as budgetary participation, job-relevant information, job satisfaction, and job performance is proposed and tested using a survey questionnaire on 70 senior managers, drawn from a cross-section of the financial services sector. Their responses are analyzed using a structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. The results reveal that budgetary participation is positively associated with job-relevant information. These results lend support to the cognitive effect of budgetary participation, which suggests that subordinates participate in the budget setting process to share information. In addition, the results suggest that budgetary participation is positively associated with job satisfaction. These results support the value attainment role of budgetary participation, which increases subordinates’ levels of job satisfaction. Furthermore, the results reveal that there are positive relationships between job-relevant information and job satisfaction, job-relevant information and job performance, and job satisfaction and job performance.

The Effect of a Leader's Reputation on Budgetary Slack

Abstract Purpose This paper examines the effectiveness of the reliance on a leader’s reputation as an informal control tool to mitigate subordinates’ budgetary slack. In addition, it seeks to explain whether this relationship is mediated by subordinates’ truthfulness in revealing their private information. Methodology/approach A laboratory experiment was conducted involving 60 undergraduate business students who participated in the experiment. A 1 × 2 between-subjects design was employed for the experimental study. Each subject assumed the role of a production manager responsible for setting a budget target. The experimental task employed involved a simple decoding task adapted from Chow (1983). Findings The results of this study indicate that budgetary slack is lower when a leader’s reputation is favourable than when it is unfavourable. In addition, it is found that subordinates’ truthfulness in revealing private information fully mediates the relationship between a leader’s reputation and budgetary slack. Originality/value This paper extends the limited literature on the reliance of informal controls in mitigating budgetary slack by examining a leader’s reputation as an informal control. The findings of this study provide important implications for the design of effective management control systems.

Delegation of Decision Rights and Misreporting: The Roles of Incentive-based Compensation Schemes and Responsibility Rationalization

Our paper examines when and how the delegation of decision rights and incentive-based compensation schemes (two organizational-design choices) and responsibility rationalization affect managers’ misreporting behavior. One hundred and twenty-nine managers from manufacturing firms in the US completed an online survey. Our results suggest that managers’ responsibility rationalization moderates the relationships between the delegation of decision rights and misreporting, and incentive-based compensation schemes and misreporting. Despite our results providing no evidence of a simple mediating role of incentive-based compensation schemes on the relationship between the delegation of decision rights and misreporting, we find support for a moderated-mediation effect. Specifically, our results demonstrate that the indirect effect of the delegation of decision rights on misreporting via incentive-based compensation schemes is conditional on managers’ responsibility rationalization. The theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed.

The effect of a budget-based incentive compensation scheme on job performance: The mediating role of trust-in-supervisor and organizational commitment

Purpose This study aims to examine the role of trust-in-supervisor and organizational commitment on the relationship between a budget-based incentive compensation scheme and job performance. Design/methodology/approach A survey was conducted involving 120 managers from Australian manufacturing firms listed in the Who’s Who in Business in Australia electronic database. A partial least squares approach was used to assess the psychometric properties of the theoretical model and proposed hypotheses. Data analysis was conducted using WarpPLS Version 5.0. Findings The results suggest that the reliance on a high budget-based incentive compensation scheme was found to lead to higher trust-in supervisor, which in turn resulted in higher organizational commitment and improved subordinate job performance. Research limitations/implications This study is subject to the limitations of survey-based research. Practical implications This study may assist top management to better understand the importance of designing an effective budget-based incentive compensation scheme to promote high interpersonal trust and organizational commitment among subordinates. Cultivating a climate of trust may help to enhance interpersonal trust between subordinates and their superior, which in turn may lead to higher levels of organizational commitment and improvement in subordinate job performance. Originality/value This paper elucidates and contributes to the existing literature by suggesting that a budget-based incentive compensation scheme can directly affect subordinates’ level of trust in their supervisor, and that trust-in-supervisor can serve as an antecedent to the development and cultivation of subordinates’ commitment to the organization, which in turn improves their job performance.

The Impact of Sole and Joint Responsibility on Managers’ Escalation of Commitment to Unprofitable Projects: An Experimental Investigation

Abstract This chapter addresses the criticisms that escalation of commitment research has focused only on individual (as opposed to team or group) decision-making. It has been suggested that research findings of individual-based decision on managers’ escalation behaviors may not be applicable in today’s business environment which is increasingly dominated by team or group-based decision. Specifically, this chapter examines the effects of information availability (public vs. private information) and type of responsibility (sole and joint responsibility) on managers’ project evaluation decisions. A laboratory experiment was conducted to test the hypotheses developed for this study. The results indicate that, consistent with prior research, project managers exhibited a greater tendency to continue a failing project under private information than public information conditions. In addition, in the private information condition, project managers with joint responsibility for an investment project expressed a greater tendency to continue a failing project than those with sole responsibility. Implications of our results for the design of management control systems are discussed.