Vincent Lemieux

L'analyse politique de la décentralisation

There are many works on decentralization, but few of them have studied in a systematic way the power relations that are associated with the transfer of attributions from a superior level to an inferior level of government. In order to compensate for these shortcomings a conceptual framework and two research proposals are formulated about the different components of decentralization and the power relations pertaining to them. The model is then applied to various decentralization policies which were adopted since the 1980s in different countries. Two main conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, in the power relations between the actors of the different levels of government, those of the superior level are maintaining their domination by controlling the more important resources in the new relationships created by the decentralization policies. Second, the actors of the superior level of government are seeking to present their domination as plausible with reference to some values generally associated with centralization or decentralization.

Le jeu de la communication politique

As Levi-Strauss puts it, social facts are primarily communication facts. From this point of view political communication is not characterized by the objects it bears upon, but by its praxeologicial character; it is concerned with the effectiveness of communication, and more precisely with power relations and with strategies. So, political communication is to be analysed as a game structure, and not as a network structure or a code structure. It is shown by an example that political communication really presents a game structure, after which some distinctions are made between mastery and control, and then between material, informational, symbolic, and juridical means of power. Like the other structures, game structures are characterized by the laws which govern them. Three of them are specified: the law of equilibration, the law of connectedness, and the law of communal closure. Finally, after reviewing briefly the different orders (practical, institutional, and ideological) where a structure can be seen in operation, three positive aspects of such a game analysis are noted: it is concerned with the inner part of human action, it is well-suited to overcome the limits of functional and systems analysis, and it has the virtue of isolating a truly political dimension in human action.

La composition des préférences partisanes

Duncan Black has proposed a theory of political choices in which the individual ordering of preferences and voting procedures in committees are the basic elements. This paper shows that the theory must also take into account certain “objective” orders of preferences which affect individual rankings. To this end, the author analyses the results of a pre-1968 election poll in the federal ridings of Langelier and Louis-Hebert. All the respondents do not rank the four parties (Liberal, Progressive Conservative, New Democratic Party, and Social Credit Rally) in the same order; this can be explained in terms of the complexity of political issues, party strategies, or certain social characteristics of the respondents. The ranking by a majority of the respondents seemed related to two sets of criteria. The first, the sociopolitical, corresponds roughly to a left-right axis, on which the parties are aligned as follows: NDP–Liberals–Progressive Conservatives–Creditistes; the second is an ethnic criterion, according to which the parties take this order: Creditistes–Liberals–Progressive Conservatives–NDP. Among the other insights provided by the analysis, two are particularly important: the strong rejection of the Social Credit Rally by those who do not place it first, and the indifference towards the other parties by those who do.

Party Rhetoric and Practice: A Normative Perspective from Political Science

Political parties have most of the time behavior which comply with their discourse, but in some circumstances they cannot avoid to face the problem of gaps between their rhetoric and their practice, which threaten to undermine their credibility. In the first part of the chapter we look at these gaps in focusing on five functions that rhetoric plays in relation to practice: the function of displaying, the function of concealing, the function of justification, the function of contestation and the function of correcting discrepancies. The gaps between rhetoric and practice could have beneficial effects when they are recognized and are subject to a corrective process. In the second part of the chapter some measures of self-correction by parties are proposed that could close the gap associated with each one of the five functions.

L'utilité politique des rivaux

Political coalitions have been studied by many authors, but few of them have shown that the presence or action of rivals or neutrals, outside the coalition, is an important factor in its formation or evolution. A structural approach is proposed, which underlines the cohesion requirements in the coalition formation and evolution. Then five research propositions are formulated, the last three of them bearing upon the political usefulness of rivals. The propositions are applied to the events related to the failure of the electoral system reform in Quebec. This application leads to conclude that the propositions have a certain heuristic capacity but that some of them have to be altered for more appropriateness in future research.

Une évaluation de l'efficience et de l'équité de Communication-Québec

Los autores de este articulo, despues de presentar une resena historica de Communication-Quebec, hacen une evaluacion de la eficiencia y aquidad de este organismo. Para la evaluacion, los autores del articulo se basan en los resultados de los sondeos y en las caracteristicas de los utilizadores. Ellos comprueban que la eficiencia y la equidad han mejorado con el trascurso de los anos, sin embargo, algunos aspectos de base no tienen aun respuesta. Tales son los casos de las funciones de Communication-Quebec, el grado de satisfaccion del personal y las relaciones entre este organismo y los diversos ministerios.

Pour une science politique des partis

Although there are numerous studies of political parties the political science of parties remains underdeveloped. Even if the recent attempts at redefinition are not without interest, most situate themselves outside the mainstream of political theory and do not bear sufficiently on the problematical aspects of power and of government. To develop a true political science of parties one has to be able to respond to three questions which seem central to a political scientists concern with parties: who governs in the parties? do the parties really govern? how do the governmental or non-governmental actions of parties affect the society and the support which they obtain there? From these three questions emerge the notions of the leadership power (or internal power), governmental power, and societal power (electoral or non-electoral) of political parties. After a definition of government based on a cybernetic model and a logical definition of power are presented, the notions of leadership power, governmental power, and societal power are successively analysed for the purpose of making them operational. The last part of the article deals with the interdependence of these three powers. It aims at outlining a political theory of parties by drawing together a number of propositions which have hitherto appeared unrelated.

L'analyse hiérarchique des résultats électoraux

A Scalogram Analysis of Election Returns In this paper the author uses Guttmans technique, which has been called “scalogram analysis,” to show that there is one major dimension in election returns. The data submitted to analysis are Quebec provincial elections returns, by constituencies, from 1936 to 1966. Election years and constituencies are ranked in such a way as to form the best scale, that is to say, the scale where the number of “errors” is minimized. As a matter of fact, this number is small enough, in the present case, to conclude that election returns may be explained by one very major dimension. Moreover, many of the errors are quite significant. But the problem is to determine what is the major dimension in the scale. For that purpose, the author isolates four dimensions: the socio-economic, the partisan, the political, and the personal. After reviewing each of them, he comes to the conclusion that no dimension other than the political one can be the major dimension in the scale. It is to be noted that the late V. O. Key, Jr., came to the same conclusion, by another way, in his The Responsible Electorate. The last part of the paper contains some remarks on the limits of scalogram analysis, as applied to election returns, plus some clues on the practical advantages in such analysis for political parties .