Vincent Pouliot

Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention in Libya

How does power work in practice? Much of the ‘stuff’ that state agents and other international actors do, on an everyday basis, remains impenetrable to existing International Relations theory. This is unfortunate, as the everyday performance of international practices actually helps shape world policy outcomes. In this article, we develop a framework to grasp the concrete workings of power in international politics. The notion of ‘emergent power’ bridges two different understandings of power: as capability or relation. Emergent power refers to the generation and deployment of endogenous resources — social skills and competences — generated in particular practices. The framework is illustrated with an in-depth analysis of the multilateral diplomatic process that led to the 2011 international intervention in Libya. Through a detailed account of the negotiations at the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union, the article demonstrates how, in practice, state representatives translate their skills into actual influence and generate a power politics that eschews structural analysis. We argue that seemingly trivial struggles over diplomatic competence within these three multilateral organizations played a crucial role in the intervention in Libya. A focus on practice resituates existing approaches to power and influence in International Relations, demonstrating that, in practice, power also emerges locally from social contexts.

Practice theory and the study of diplomacy: A research agenda

This introductory article explores the multiple synergies between international practice theory and diplomatic studies. The timing for this cross-fertilizing exchange could not be better, as the study of diplomacy enters a phase of theorization while practice scholars look to confront the approach to new empirical and analytical challenges. The article first defines diplomacy as a historically and culturally contingent bundle of practices that are analytically alike in their claim to represent a given polity to the outside world. Then the key analytical wagers that practice theory makes are introduced, and debates currently raging in the discipline are briefly reviewed. Next, it is suggested what a practice theory of diplomacy may look like, discussing a variety of existing works through their common objective to explain the constitution of world politics in and through practice. Finally, a few research avenues to foster the dialogue between diplomatic studies and practice theory are outlined, centered on the nexuses of transformation and reproduction, rationality and know-how, and the technical vs. social dimensions of practices –diplomatic or otherwise.

The Alive and Well Transatlantic Security Community: A Theoretical Reply to Michael Cox

In a provocative article entitled ‘Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia’ (EJIR 11(2): 203–33), Michael Cox castigates the ‘intellectual complacency’ that has led some scholars, over the last few years, to minimize ‘the seriousness of the challenges that still confront the transatlantic relationship’ (2005: 205, 207). Students of international security must take note, argues Cox, of ‘how deep-rooted’ the current crisis happens to be, and of the ‘turbulent times’ that still lie ahead (2005: 209, 210). There is much to agree with in this bleak diagnostic: Cox is correct that the contemporary crisis has its roots prior to 9/11, in the first post-Cold War decade; it is also true that the 2001 terrorist attacks not only rallied the NATO allies around a common threat but also evidenced new cleavages among them as to how to deal with it; and there is little doubt that the Iraqi crisis gave such a blow to the decades-old transatlantic alliance that ‘a Rubicon of sorts has thus been crossed’ (2005: 208). To be as clear as possible, this reply does not dispute the empirically accurate depiction of the current turmoil over the Atlantic put forward by Cox. Instead, it challenges a key theoretical implication that he draws from it, namely that ‘[t]oday, it is doubtful whether we can talk of [a transatlantic security community] with the same degree of confidence’ (2005: 209). Such an assertion, I first argue, shows a mistaken understanding of the concept of security community. Contrary to Cox, I contend that the recent strains over the Atlantic — all solved peacefully if at times painfully — do not signal the demise of the transatlantic security community but, instead, empirically demonstrate how alive and well it is. Second, I explain what is to be gained

Untimely Russia: Hysteresis in Russian-Western Relations over the Past Millennium

This article draws on Pierre Bourdieus sociology to explain how a lack of fit between a repertoire of bodily practices accumulated through history, on the one hand, (here, Russian habitus) and the field in which it is employed, on the other, (here, diplomacy) can take shape in world politics. Such “hysteresis” provides a longue durée reading that challenges both the realist idea that similar outcomes are due to invariant structures and the constructivist idea that structures “socialize” states. Social stability stems from agency, more specifically, from habitus. Our empirical examples are breaking points in Russian relations with neighbors: the Rus’ and the Eurasian steppe empires (ca. 800–1500), Muscovys diplomatic interactions with Europe, and Russias bid to join European international society and situation during the twentieth century. In each case, Moscows relentless quest for equal status prompted quixotic practices that were often dismissed by Western countries and hampered the security of both parties.

The materials of practice: Nuclear warheads, rhetorical commonplaces and committee meetings in Russian–Atlantic relations

In this article I argue that the Cartesian dualism informing dominant theories of International Relations (IR) has limited analytical purchase at the level of practice. The materials that enable and constrain contemporary diplomatic practices between NATO and Russia seamlessly combine natural, cultural and organizational artefacts: nuclear warheads take on a symbolic life of their own; linguistic formulations transform into ‘things’; and committee meetings inscribe intersubjective dynamics with a new materiality. To materialist theories à la neo-realism, practice theory shows that material objects matter not because they have an immanent meaning, but rather because, in becoming part of social relations, they acquire a form of agency of their own, making people do things they would not have done otherwise. To IR constructivism, this article demonstrates that it is not only people who attach meanings to things; things also attach meanings to people. Enmeshed in social relations, material objects often acquire an epistemic life of their own that may affect, in turn, the very people who constructed them.

Pacification Without Collective Identification: Russia and the Transatlantic Security Community in the Post-Cold War Era

Does the emergence of a security community require a collective identity? This constitutive relationship has been hypothesized by prominent scholars from Deutsch to Adler & Barnett. Yet the Russian—Atlantic case shows that collective identification is not a necessary condition for a nascent security community to emerge. In less than two decades, the relationship between Russia and the transatlantic community has quickly transformed from a deep-seated rivalry structured by the specter of mutual assured destruction to a partnership in which the possibility of military confrontation has undeniably receded. Although bones of contention and power struggles continue to abound, empirical indicators attest to the emergence of a nascent Russian—Atlantic security community. But survey data also show that Russian and Western peoples do not meaningfully identify with one another. While the lack of we-ness certainly helps explain the striking instability of the post-Cold War rapprochement between Russia and the transatlantic community, it also recalls the need for constructivists to pay attention to other variables than mutual representations in the study of international peace. As a way forward, the article advocates a practice turn in the study of security communities: peace exists as a social fact when diplomacy becomes the self-evident practice among security elites to solve interstate disputes.

How much is global governance changing? The G20 as international practice

Is the G20 transforming global governance, or does it reinforce the status quo? In this article we argue that as innovative as some diplomatic practices of the G20 may be, we should not overstate their potential impact. More specifically, we show that G20 diplomacy often reproduces many oligarchic tendencies in global governance, while also relaxing club dynamics in some ways. On the one hand, the G20 has more inductees who operate along new rules of the game and under a new multilateral ethos of difference. But, on the other hand, the G20 still comprises self-appointed rulers, with arbitrary rules of membership and many processes of cooption and discipline. In overall terms, approaching G20 diplomacy from a practice perspective not only provides us with the necessary analytical granularity to tell the old from the new, it also sheds different light on the dialectics of stability and change on the world stage. Practices are processes and as such they are always subject to evolutionary change. However, because of their structuring effects, diplomatic practices also tend to inhibit global transformation and reproduce the existing order.

The politics of inclusion: Changing patterns in the governance of international security

The debate on the reform of the Security Council can be conceptualised as the most recent episode in the evolution of World Governing Councils (WGCs), that is, the highest-level intergovernmental bodies charged with regulating the international use of violence. Building on a historical comparison of key formative and transformative moments – 1815, 1919, 1945, and post-Cold War – we argue that the modern evolution of WGCs is characterised by increasing inclusiveness. More specifically, we show that the number of participants involved in deliberations has constantly risen; that legitimating principles have gradually tilted in favour of ‘input legitimacy’; that the constitutive rules and procedures have steadily gained in transparency; and that the WGCs themselves have comprised an expanding membership with a decreasing number of veto points. At the theoretical level, these converging trends can be explained by the existence of a ‘ratchet effect’ whereby new norms and practices of inclusion accumulate over time. However concrete and long lasting, the democratic gains registered in the process must be cast in terms of historically specific politics and struggles rather than in terms of lofty ideals promoted by altruistic norm entrepreneurs.

Adaptation and Indigenous peoples in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Indigenous peoples are uniquely sensitive to climate change impacts yet have been overlooked in climate policy, including within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). We identify and characterize the discourse around adaptation in the UNFCCC, examining implications for Indigenous peoples based on a critical discourse analysis of the original Convention and decision texts from subsequent Conference of the Parties (CP). CP16 in Cancun (2010) was a critical juncture after which adaptation emerged as a central component of climate policy in the Convention, with a shift from a purely scientific approach to adaptation to one where local, Indigenous, and traditional knowledge are also valued. Since CP16, the discursive space for incorporating the voices, needs, and priorities of Indigenous peoples around adaptation has expanded, reflected in decision texts and engagement with Indigenous issues in the work streams of relevant bodies. We outline opportunities for greater engagement of Indigenous issues in the UNFCCC post-Paris Agreement, noting the underlying State-centric nature of the Convention limits what can ultimately be achieved.

US military diplomacy in practice

Airmen understand Airmen, and thats where the partnership begins. General Mark A. Welsh, Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, speech to the Air Force Association Air Power Working Group, Washington DC, May 20, 2013. Quoted with his permission. In their Introduction to this volume, Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann argue that “if we want to account for changes in diplomatic practices by virtue of the proliferation of actors involved in diplomatic work, the question of how and why different actors do diplomacy must be central.” In this chapter, we discuss US defense diplomacy with the aim of providing answers, however partial, to this question. The significance of studying US military diplomacy should require little elaboration. The United States is currently the dominant military power in the world. Its power projection capabilities are unprecedented in human history. As Barry Posen argues, for the past few decades the US military has possessed “command of the global commons,” that is, it “gets vastly more military use out of the sea, space, and air than do others … it can credibly threaten to deny their use to others … and … others would lose a military confrontation for the commons if they attempted to deny them to the United States.” This condition rests on raw US military might, but “two important Cold War legacies contribute to U.S. command of the commons – bases and command structure.” Indeed, US primacy “is further secured by the world-wide U.S. base structure and the ability of U.S. diplomacy to … secure additional bases and overflight rights.” Bases and overflight rights, though, reflect simply one dimension of the extensive system of alliances and partnerships built by the United States. Indeed, a significant degree of contemporary global security governance operates within and through this US-centered network. Our analysis draws on a variety of sources, including interviews and the personal experiences of the authors. It builds on two basic wagers: first, “routine diplomacy is a matter of network construction and maintenance” and second, the content of those networks – the meanings actors attach to or impose on them – reflects and shapes the conduct of diplomacy. In this sense, an analysis of the meanings that US military and civilian officials attach to their diplomacy provides insight into the practice of US primacy.