Vincenzo Morabito

Collective forms of consumer redress: Financial ombudsman service case study

In the UK, debate about the appropriate balance between publicly and privately driven forms of collective consumer redress has favoured a regulatory solution exemplified by the FSAs new rule-making powers mandating the establishment of consumer redress schemes. This article examines another solution—a co-regulatory scheme involving Australias Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS). The article compares the costs and benefits of FOS intervention apropos systemic breach with other forms of collective consumer redress, including class actions and public regulator action.

Can class members appeal class action settlements? A study from British Columbia:

It is widely recognized that the review of settlement agreements executed by the formal parties to class action litigation—the representative plaintiff and the defendant—represents the most important and challenging task that judges presiding over such litigation face. In order to facilitate this judicial task the views with respect to proposed class action settlements are sought from those persons who will be bound by such compromises despite having had no involvement in the settlement negotiations and in the conduct of the litigation itself: the class members. If the trial court approves the settlement despite the filing of objections to the settlement (or aspects of the settlement) by one or more of the affected class members, can these dissatisfied class members or objectors seek the intervention of an appellate court? This general question has been considered by American appellate courts on numerous occasions. But in Canada this question has been considered only in Quebec and in a somewhat indirect manner, given that it has been held in that province that settlement approval orders are not appealable regardless of whether the appeal is filed by the representative plaintiff or one of the class members. The aim of this article is to explore the major issues that will need to be grappled with when the intervention of Canadian appellate courts will be sought by dissatisfied class members. This study will be undertaken with respect to British Columbia, which has Canada’s third longest-running class action regime.

Liability for costs when class representatives change in Australia's federal class actions

ABSTRACT Unlike most orthodox litigation, class actions bind persons, generally called class members, who are not formal parties to the proceedings. As a result of this unique or sui generis nature of class action litigation, courts presiding over this type of litigation are frequently required to determine issues or questions (a) with respect to which little or no guidance has been provided by both the class action regime in question and the rules of court governing orthodox litigation and (b) that raise competing interests and values and have a significant impact on the ability of class actions to attain crucial aims, such as access to justice, that they were designed to secure. One of the issues or questions that brings to the fore the scenario depicted above is what impact will a change among the class representatives have on the ability of the defendants to recoup some of their legal costs, incurred before the change among their adversaries, if the outcome of the class action is in their favour. This important dimension of class action litigation will be canvassed with respect to Australias federal class action regime which is one of the worlds oldest and most vibrant class action regimes. This evaluation will be undertaken by employing the findings stemming from the first empirical study of this regime, which the author is currently conducting.

Public V Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: An Australian Empirical Study

Class actions on behalf of aggrieved shareholders and other investors have become the most common form of group litigation filed in the Federal Court of Australia. This increasing importance of investor class actions has raised a number of important practical and conceptual issues. One such issue is how this private enforcement of the laws that are intended to protect investors interacts with the operation of the public enforcement model and their respective abilities to deter illegal conduct and secure compensation for the losses suffered by investors. The aim of this article is to explore this issue by comparing and contrasting the enforcement actions that have been undertaken by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the public regulator, with the federal class actions that have been filed on behalf of investors with respect to the same conduct or legal disputes over a 17 year period. This empirical study focuses on the nature of the relief that was sought, the persons and entities against whom this relief was sought and/or secured, the outcomes of these actions and the problems that may be encountered when the same conduct prompts public and private enforcement activity.