W.A. Arts

The social capital of European welfare states: the crowding out hypothesis revisited:

A recurrent critique on the welfare state is that it crowds out social capital (networks, trust and norms). However, the empirical evidence on the crowding out hypothesis is still scarce, findings are sometimes contradictory, and there is variation in the measurement of social capital. In this article we explore the crowding out hypothesis on the basis of data from the European Values Survey wave 1999/2000 for 23 European countries. Compared to (the few) other comparative studies on the hypothesis, our study contains more recent data and for a larger number of countries. Instead of focusing on a single dimension of social capital, we use an eight-scale measurement model of social capital; we explore the relationship between welfare (regime type, social spending) and social capital at both country and individual level, and we control for confounding factors. At the aggregate country level we found no evidence at all in favour of the hypothesis. At the individual level we found that it does matter for people’s social capital in which type and size of welfare state they live. However, there is only evidence for a crowding out effect in case of people’s trustworthiness. With regard to other forms of social capital, there is at best mixed evidence, but mostly our findings contradict the crowding out hypothesis altogether.

Welfare States, Solidarity and Justice Principles: Does the Type Really Matter?

In this article, we investigate whether and, if so, to what extent, people’s notions of solidarity and their choices of justice principles are related to the type of welfare state regime they live under, as well as to individual socio-demographic and ideological factors. We analyse data from the International Social Survey Program 1996 and the European Values Study 1999, which together cover preferences of citizens from 20 welfare states. Hypotheses pertaining to people’s notions of solidarity and preferences for justice principles in the different welfare state regimes are derived from the work of Esping-Andersen and his critics, as well as from sociological and socialpsychological theories of solidarity and distributive justice. We find important, although not decisive, evidence for the thesis that the actual state of affairs with respect to the welfare state regime under which citizens live determines their views about which level of solidarity should be achieved and which justice principles should be emphasized. However, differences found are often not very pronounced, and we argue that this is a consequence of the fact that values of solidarity and justice are matters of priority to all welfare states. Taking into account the differences which exist between welfare state regimes, we also find important differences between individuals and social groups in their preferred level of solidarity and in their choice of justice principles.

Social Capital in Europe Measurement and Social and Regional Distribution of a Multifaceted Phenomenon

This article sorts the various aspects of social capital (networks, trust, civism) theoretically and constructs an instrument for measuring its multifacetedness. The instrument is validated using data from the 1999/2000 wave of the European Values Study survey. Using the same data, the article describes how social capital, by its various aspects, is distributed geographically among European countries and regions (North, West, South, East), and socially among social categories of European citizens. As far as the geographical distribution of social capital is concerned, there are some particular differences, but, on the whole, European countries and regions, with the possible exception of Northern Europe, appear not to be substantially different in aggregate levels of social capital. In Scandinavia, social capital levels tend to be slightly higher, with the exception of family bonding. Some remarkable European patterns are found in regard to the social distribution of social capital. There is evidence of accumulation of human, economic and social capital; social capital is strongly gendered and is related to religious beliefs and behaviour, and to a political left–right stance.

Public health care in the balance: exploring popular support for health care systems in the European Union

Which factors explain intra- and inter-country variations in levels of public support for national health care systems within the European Union, and why? We propose that public opinion towards public health care is dependent on (1) the type of welfare state regime to which the various European welfare states belong, (2) typical features of the national care system and (3) individual social and demographic characteristics, which are related to self-interest or morality oriented motives. To assess the explanatory power of these factors, data from the Eurobarometer survey series are analysed. Support for public health care appears to be particularly positively related to social-democratic attributes of welfare states, whereas support drops with increasing degrees of liberalism and conservatism. Further, support for public health care proves to be associated with wider coverage and public funding of national care services. We also find higher levels of support in countries with scarce social services for children and the elderly, and larger proportions of female (part-time) employment. Lastly, with respect to individual characteristics, we find remarkably little evidence for self-interest oriented motives affecting the preference for solidary health care arrangements.

Welfare state effects on social capital and informal solidarity in the European Union : evidence from the 1999/2000 European Values Study

English This article tests whether state-organised solidarity substitutes social capital and informal solidarity, based on recent data from the European Values Study. At country level, we find that welfare spending has a reinforcing effect on social capital and a negative substitution effect on informal solidarity. At the individual level, there is also evidence for a substitution effect, since informal solidarity is lower among people who live in countries that spend more on social protection. In addition, there is evidence of a ‘national burden’ effect, since informal solidarity is lower among people who live in countries with an older population, with higher unemployment, and with a higher percentage of immigrants.

Toward a unified Europe? Explaining regional differences in value patterns by economic development, cultural heritage and historical shocks

Beugelsdijk S., Van Schaik T. and Arts W. (2006) Toward a unified Europe? Explaining regional differences in value patterns by economic development, cultural heritage and historical shocks, Regional Studies 40, 317–327. The concept of the ‘Europe of the regions’ has given rise to the question of whether there is a process of cultural unification discernible among European regions. The paper reports the results of an empirical analysis of cultural differences among a panel of 55 European regions. Modernization theorists argue that cultural convergence can be expected, whereas culturalist theorists claim there are processes of path dependence. Using existing measures of culture, it is found that economic development is an important driver for value change, but that cultural (religious) heritage leaves a permanent imprint. In addition, the results suggest that historical shocks influence the process of cultural change. Beugelsdijk S., Van Schaik T. and Arts W. (2006) Toward a unified Europe? Explaining regional differences in value patterns by economic development, cultural heritage and historical shocks, Regional Studies 40, 317–327. The concept of the ‘Europe of the regions’ has given rise to the question of whether there is a process of cultural unification discernible among European regions. The paper reports the results of an empirical analysis of cultural differences among a panel of 55 European regions. Modernization theorists argue that cultural convergence can be expected, whereas culturalist theorists claim there are processes of path dependence. Using existing measures of culture, it is found that economic development is an important driver for value change, but that cultural (religious) heritage leaves a permanent imprint. In addition, the results suggest that historical shocks influence the process of cultural change. Culture, Dépendance causale, Europe, Théorie de modernisation, Théorie des apports culturels Beugelsdijk S., Van Schaik T. and Arts W. (2006) Toward a unified Europe? Explaining regional differences in value patterns by economic development, cultural heritage and historical shocks, Regional Studies 40, 317–327. The concept of the ‘Europe of the regions’ has given rise to the question of whether there is a process of cultural unification discernible among European regions. The paper reports the results of an empirical analysis of cultural differences among a panel of 55 European regions. Modernization theorists argue that cultural convergence can be expected, whereas culturalist theorists claim there are processes of path dependence. Using existing measures of culture, it is found that economic development is an important driver for value change, but that cultural (religious) heritage leaves a permanent imprint. In addition, the results suggest that historical shocks influence the process of cultural change. Kultur, Abhängigkeit vom eingeschlagenen Weg, Europa, Theorie der Modernisierung, Theorie des Kulturismus Beugelsdijk S., Van Schaik T. and Arts W. (2006) Toward a unified Europe? Explaining regional differences in value patterns by economic development, cultural heritage and historical shocks, Regional Studies 40, 317–327. The concept of the ‘Europe of the regions’ has given rise to the question of whether there is a process of cultural unification discernible among European regions. The paper reports the results of an empirical analysis of cultural differences among a panel of 55 European regions. Modernization theorists argue that cultural convergence can be expected, whereas culturalist theorists claim there are processes of path dependence. Using existing measures of culture, it is found that economic development is an important driver for value change, but that cultural (religious) heritage leaves a permanent imprint. In addition, the results suggest that historical shocks influence the process of cultural change. Cultura, Dependencia de rutas, Europa, Teoría de la modernización, Teoría culturalista

National Identity in Europe Today What the People Feel and Think

The issue of identity has recently gained cultural and political significance. The demise of communism in the Eastern Europe, the German reunion in Central Europe, and the Maastricht Treaty in Western Europe are said to have awakened nationalistic sentiments and movements, and processes of cultural, economic, and political internationalization and globalization are assumed to have caused not only increasing insecurity about national identity but also a loosening of the bond between collective and personal identity in Europe. The further unification of Europe is regarded by many Europeans as a threat to the survival of national cultures and identities. They fear that the disappearance of the internal borders between the European Union states may ultimately result in a loss of variety in national cultures and of distinct national identities. Further unification may cause problems of national identification and some observers have argued that it will therefore generate a reemphasis on regional and local cultures. This article elaborates on the pivotal notions of nation, nationalism, and national identity, and related issues. From a social-psychological perspective, it describes how national identity relates to personal identity. Data from the European Values Study Eurobarometer surveys are used to demonstrate cross-national differences and similarities in national self-identification and changes over time. The findings reveal a widespread support for the European unification project, but large majorities in Europe do not (yet?) feel strongly attached to Europe. The European Union has yet to emerge as a contender for the loyalties of its citizens.

After the velvet revolutions: Altered life-chances, fragile legitimacy, and split-consciousness in post-communist Eastern Europe

This article deals with (i) changes in the objective and subjective life-chances of people in Eastern Europe as affected by the transformation of their economic and political systems, and (ii) the emergence of a new dominant meritocratic ideology of distributive justice and the survival of a now old subordinate egalitarian one. We investigate whether, and if so, how and to what degree, changes in peoples (perceived) life-chances influence their (de)legitimation of the market economy and the pluralistic system of democracy as well as their (de/re)legitimation of the ancien regime. Especially, the question of whether, and if so, how and under which conditions, a phenomenon that has been called “split-consciousness” will occur with respect to peoples choices between those opposing systems is answered. Several hypotheses are presented that deal with the above mentioned topics. The hypotheses are tested empirically by using cross-national data stemming from the International Social Justice Project.

Solidarity, Health and Social Care in Europe. Introduction to the volume

When people in Europe are interviewed about the values, which they consider fundamental for the design of their health and social care systems, they often refer to the values of equity and solidarity. While equity may be a term for which most people have a quite similar and clear-cut understanding, solidarity is a less familiar notion that is subject to divergent interpretations and reflections. In general, the idea of solidarity is associated with mutual respect, personal support and commitment to a common cause. These interpretations come to the fore when Europeans in large-scale surveys are questioned about their understandings of this idea of solidarity. Their verbal answers to these kind of questions reflect notions as ‘belonging together’, ‘mutual understanding’, ‘support of the weak and needy (benevolence)’, ‘shared responsibility’ and commitment to the common good. To explain these notions, solidarity is often juxtaposed against individualistic and even egoistic behaviour or contrasted with the alleged self-centred individualism that is often superficially associated with the cultural habits, societal norms and liberal values of the United States. For example, the plain evidence that forty-five millions of inhabitants of the United States lack any sort of health care insurance is for many Europeans, especially on the leftist stance, writing on the wall. In contrast to the alleged irresponsibility and lack of concern that is generally associated with this kind of individualism, Europeans proudly refer to the notion of solidarity and how it shaped their national health and social care systems. How ill-defined solidarity often is, the basic understanding is that everyone is assumed to make a fair financial contribution to a collectively organised insurance system that guarantees equal access to health and social care for all members of society. This equally applies to other systems of social protection, which are operating in Europeans welfare states, such as social insurance systems covering the financial risks of unemployment and work related illness and disability, as well as old age insurance systems and pension schemes.

Popular support for health care in Europe. Review of the evidence of cross-national surveys

Health care systems are important elements of Western European welfare states. Earlier research indicates that public health care has always been warmly welcomed and supported by the public, even in periods of retreat of the welfare state due to retrenchment policies. Using data from 1973, Ardigo (1995) reviewed comparative evidence on the public opinion concerning health services in seven European countries and the United States. He found that citizens considered good medical care ‘very important’ and its provision an ‘essential’ responsibility of the government. Even though the welfare state was said to suffer from a legitimacy crisis from the mid-1970s onwards; the results of the survey showed no traces of this crisis. Neither did the results of an in-depth trend-study on welfare attitudes by Coughlin (1980). Despite a considerable ambivalence among the public towards some programmes, his findings clearly showed that some of the most expensive and extensive elements of the welfare state, such as old-age pensions and health care, were invariably popular. Because his findings revealed no evidence of a health care backlash, Coughlin (1980, pp. 74–75) concluded, that even though national approaches to the provision of health care vary in their organisation, coverage, funding and circumstances under which care is provided, public attitudes towards government provision of health care show a surprisingly constant pattern of popularity across nations.