W. Howard Wriggins

Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon *

In their search for nationhood since World War II, many peoples of Asia and Africa have discovered that independence from western rule is only the first and perhaps the easiest step. Once the foreigner has gone, the larger problem looms of creating a viable political society. Divisions and competitive strivings held in check when outsiders controlled affairs are suddenly released. Ethnic, religious and regional differences, that seemed less important so long as colonial administrators ruled, boil up after independence and more often than not come to dominate the loyalties and inspire the ambitions that move men in politics. To their dismay, responsible leaders find themselves heading not the homogeneous, modern nation state they dreamed of before independence, but a congeries of separate groups. The simple, unifying purpose of the independence struggle fades away, leaving a host of contradictions and cleavages. Indonesia is wracked by repeated resistance to Jakarta. Burma has been beset by periodic insurrection, supported in part by regional and ethnic hostility to Rangoon. The nightmare of Indias Nehru is the growth of regional and linguistic differences. Imminent disintegration of the ex-Belgan Congo dramatizes the extreme case. Are the difficulties impeding national consolidation mainly the fruit of irresponsible political leadership, as ex-colonial administrators are tempted to allege? Are ill-considered linguistic and educational reforms to blame, reforms that wiser statesmanship could have avoided? What other social and political developments sharpen antagonisms and impede the building of a viable nation state? Would more rapid economic development solve the problems of marked diversity, as the proponents of take-off aid programs often assert?

ROBERT N. KEARNEY. Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon. Pp. 210. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Two retired British army officers have offered a new perspective on Indonesia’s military confrontation against the Federation of Malaysia during the Sukarno period. Departing from the familiar emphasis on elite-level political and diplomatic analysis, the authors expose what confrontation meant to the British forces stationed in Sarawak and Sabah across the border from Indonesian Borneo. Often informative and sometimes colorful, the resulting chronicle of patrols and ambushes is flawed not only by a repetitive style, but also by too narrow a focus and too strong a bias. Throughout the reconstruction of the four-year Borneo campaign, the focus is on the tactical, operational level. The book sometimes even reads like an army operational manual. Each chapter does, however, highlight a major element in the overall counter-insurgency strategy in Bor-