Walter Ott

Locke's philosophy of language

Acknowledgements Note on textual references Introduction 1. Signs and signification 2. Particles and propositions 3. Essence and abstraction 4. Locke contra the Aristotelians: signification and definition 5. Beyond the bounds of sense? 6. The reception of Lockes philosophy of language 7. Conclusion Bibliography Index.

What is Locke's Theory of Representation?

On a currently popular reading of Locke, an idea represents its cause, or what God intended to be its cause. Against Martha Bolton and my former self (among others), I argue that Locke cannot hold such a view, since it sins against his epistemology and theory of abstraction. I argue that Locke is committed to a resemblance theory of representation, with the result that ideas of secondary qualities are not representations.

Causation, Intentionality, and the Case for Occasionalism

Abstract Despite their influence on later philosophers such as Hume, Malebranches central arguments for occasionalism remain deeply puzzling. Both the famous ‘no necessary connection’ argument and what I call the epistemic argument include assumptions – e.g., that a true cause is logically necessarily connected to its effect – that seem unmotivated, even in their context. I argue that a proper understanding of late scholastic views lets us see why Malebranche would make this assumption. Both arguments turn on the claim that a volition is the only candidate for a cause, because only a volition can include an effect as its intentional content.

Descartes and Berkeley on mind : The fourth distinction

Historians of philosophy have long since noted the affinity between Berkeley’s concept of mind and that of Descartes. For example, Charles McCracken claims that, although they obviously disagree on the existence of material substance, their views about the mind ‘were virtually the same’: both hold that the mind is an incorporeal, indivisible substance that supports ideas. I think this view elides some of the most interesting departures Berkeley effects from the Cartesian metaphysics of mind. It would be silly to quibble over the precise degree to which their views resemble each other. My point instead is that this Cartesian reading of Berkeley’s concept of mind mischaracterizes his views on such fundamental questions as the relation between a substance and its essence and the relation between an idea and the act of thought in which it figures. The core difference between the two figures can be located in the tripartite taxonomy of distinctions Descartes deploys in the Principles of Philosophy. In both of the above cases, Berkeley requires and makes use of a fourth distinction Descartes would have regarded as unintelligible. Berkeley does not directly address the traditional division of distinctions. My interpretive proposal is that his departure from Descartes is implicit in his claims about the mind and its relation to thought. What is more, my claim that Berkeley invokes a fourth distinction allows us to understand some of his most controversial and seemingly contradictory pronouncements about ideas and mental acts. I shall begin by setting out a fundamental problem in Berkeley’s view of the mind as a substance and offering a solution in terms of the fourth distinction. I shall then apply this solution to the question of ideas and mental acts. If I am right, Berkeley’s position can be seen as a genuinely

‘Archetypes without Patterns’: Locke on Relations and Mixed Modes

Abstract: John Locke’s claims about relations (such as cause and effect) and mixed modes (such as beauty and murder) have been controversial since the publication of the Essay. His earliest critics read him as a thoroughgoing anti-realist who denies that such things exist. More charitable readers have sought to read Locke’s claims away. Against both, I argue that Locke is making ontological claims, but that his views do not have the absurd consequences his defenders fear. By examining Locke’s texts, as well as the intellectual context in which they were written, I show that Locke’s position is at once radical and thoroughly traditional.