Warren Chin

Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine by the American Army in Iraq

This paper examines how and why the American military helped create and exacerbate the current insurgency in Iraq and the actions it has taken since summer 2004 to address perceived operational and tactical errors. Of key importance in this process of reform were the influence of the British and their articulation of a plan which has exerted a strong influence on subsequent political and military operations within Iraq. Whilst the paper generally supports the counterinsurgency plan that is currently being implemented it identifies a series of challenges that could cause this strategic solution to unravel.

British Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan

Since 2001, the international community has struggled to establish Afghanistan as a viable nation state. Among the many challenges facing this mission has been an ongoing insurgency conducted principally by the Taliban. In spite of the continuation of the American-led counter-terrorist campaign, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), it is currently estimated that half the country is now under the physical and psychological control of this insurgent group. A parallel mission, which had little or no bearing on the fortunes of the Taliban insurgency, at least initially, was the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF was created in 2001 and is essentially a peacekeeping operation, which was intended to establish a secure environment behind which political, economic and social reconstruction of the state could commence. ISAF started slowly; its biggest problem at the start was getting states to contribute forces to it. Eventually, NATO assumed control in 2003 and its members make up the lion’s share of troop contributors. Because of these resource problems, ISAF’s initial security footprint was restricted to Kabul. Gradually, however, the force was expanded and its influence was extended to the north of the country with Phase 2 in 2004. Although this was deemed to be a success, the operation was carried out in a benign security environment and the population generally supported the efforts of the international community to help in the reconstruction of the area. More problematic and more dangerous was the proposed expansion of ISAF into the south of the country, which was seen as Taliban country. Phase 3 involved the deployment of 12,000 NATO ISAF troops in the southernmost six provinces: Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Urzugan, and Zabul. After much delay, caused in part by the time taken to raise the necessary forces from NATO, the organization began its deployment in the early summer of 2006. The largest contingent in this force was Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 201–225, June 2007

Colonial Warfare in a Post‐Colonial State: British Military Operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan

The current war in Afghanistan is not going well. There has been a tenfold increase in the number of security incidents since 2004 2 and in the first week of June 2009, there were over 400 insurgent attacks, a level of violence not seen since late 2001. 3 According to one analyst the Taliban are in control or dominant in about 70 per cent of the country. 4 The fighting in Helmand Province is particularly severe and it is estimated that British troops fighting in this province are facing three times as many attacks as other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces in the next most violent province of Kandahar. 5

The United Kingdom and the War on Terror: The Breakdown of National and Military Strategy

The United Kingdom has fought various iterations of terrorism for the better part of 100 years. In the aftermath of 9/11, the British believed that its previous experience provided it with a solid foundation upon which to develop a counterterrorist strategy to tackle this new threat. In spite of this experience, the fortunes of the United Kingdom in the current war on terror have deteriorated. This is most obvious in Iraq, where British efforts to stabilize the southeast of the country proved ineffective. The British are also experiencing significant problems in the second front of the war on terror in Afghanistan. The purpose of this article is to explain why the UKs strategy and operations in the war on terror have so far failed to produce the desired strategic effect. Britains counterterror strategy has been plagued by a five basic challenges: the nature of the enemy and the emergence new terrorism; the inability of the UK to articulate a coordinated counterterrorist/counterinsurgency strategy; the particular goals adopted to fight this war; and the resource challenges created by these operational and strategic objectives. The central argument is that British national and military strategy is fundamentally flawed because the UK has failed to pay sufficient attention to the basic preconditions required to generate a successful strategy. Because of this failure at the highest political level, the armed forces have faced the challenge of trying to reconcile a profound mismatch between resources and commitments.

Operation ‘enduring freedom’: a victory for a conventional force fighting an unconventional war

The track record of the US military in unconventional wars has not been good and there were fears that Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ might suffer the same fate as previous campaigns. This contribution explores why the Taliban were defeated so easily by the US in 2001. It challenges the view that Americas victory was due solely to changes in its modus operandi or that the outcome heralds a change in the fortunes of the US when fighting unconventional war. It also questions the idea that Americas victory was a consequence of Taliban incompetence. Instead, it explains the defeat of the Taliban in terms of the prevailing political conditions within Afghanistan, which made them vulnerable to attack. The essay concludes that current political circumstances could, in the long run, permit the resurrection of the Taliban and undermine the US-led coalitions victory.

British Defense Policy and the War in Iraq 2003–2009

The purpose of this article is to examine the logic of the Labour Government’s defense policy within the context of the war in Iraq (2003–2009).The war and occupation of Iraq is interesting because, unlike campaigns such as Sierra Leone and Kosovo, it challenged the logic of the 1988 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and its evolution between 2002 and 2004.The main argument developed is that one of the principal problems which bedevilled British military operations in Iraq, was that the military capabilities created by this policy proved ineffective in helping the Government achieve its political objectives.This article begins by setting out the salient aspects of the Labour Government’s defense policy.The next section then explores why these capabilities had only a marginal utility during the war and occupation of Iraq. Finally, some conclusions are drawn that reflect on the pertinence of this experience for the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).

Anglo American military cooperation in Afghanistan 2001–2014

This paper explores a paradox. On the one hand it is believed that 9/11 rekindled the UK-US special relationship, but at the same time it has been argued that British mismanagement of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused relations to deteriorate. Whilst I agree with part of this analysis in that Iraq represented a nadir in Anglo American relations I believe Afghanistan did not follow this trajectory. A wide range of factors help to explain this change in fortune, but I focus on the role played by the British military in restoring the trust and confidence of its US counterpart and argue that this institutional relationship was and is a vital component in the Anglo American Alliance.

Land warfare from machiavelli to desert storm

The history of land warfare obviously pre-dates the era of Machiavelli.1 At the same time there is no doubt that Desert Storm in 1991 did not signal the end of this most brutal dimension of conflict. An important question to ask is: why is the timeframe of this chapter confined to a period of little more than five centuries, when the history of land warfare covers a span of some 14,000 years? The simple answer is that this timeframe captures the rise, apotheosis and possible decline of the concept of modern war. According to Charles Townshend, the term modern war was a product of three sources of change: technological, administrative, and ideological.2 The combined effect of these changes was to transform battle, the conduct of operations and strategy. Equally important, it apparently also played an instrumental role in creating a new political structure that came to dominate European politics: the nation state.3 Within the context of war the most important aspect of this development was that the state assumed an unassailable monopoly on the use of force. However, it now seems that this model of war is threatened by technological, economic, political and social forces that are bringing about profound changes in the ownership, organization, and use of force as an instrument of policy.4 The aim of this chapter is to explain the birth, apotheosis and possible decline of modern war.

The Transformation of War in Europe 1945–2000

Over the past four centuries Europe has been at the centre of five fundamental revolutionary changes in the art and conduct of war. This essay examines the latest of these revolutions within the context of the war in Bosnia (1992–5). This war is significant because it is the first major regional conflict to erupt within Europe since the end of the Second World War (1939–45). As such it was an area of concern for all of the major European powers and at certain times threatened to escalate from a local conflict into a general European war. Of equal importance is the fact that Bosnia demonstrates the essential characteristics of an evolution in war that has been described as postmodern war, new war and even neo-medieval war.1 The aim of this analysis is to highlight why and how both the nature and conduct of war has changed. In addition, it also explores the possibility that existing military forces are ill prepared to meet the challenges posed by this new type of conflict and, as a result, are in danger of becoming obsolete.