Warren E. Miller

Party Identification, Realignment, and Party Voting : back to the Basics

The argument is presented for defining party identification by the root question, « Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what? » With this definitional base, the partisan balance between Democrats and Republicans between 1952 and 1980 shows no evidence of realignment outside the South, belying the implications of the Markus-Converse and Fiorina analyses that suggest volatility in response to short-term influences. It also appears that the correlation between party identification and voter choices for president are very constant over time in the South as well as outside the South. Party line voting by party identifiers varies by region and party but did not decrease between 1952 and 1988

PARTY GOVERNMENT AND THE SALIENCY OF CONGRESS

To what extent do public reactions to the legislative records of the major parties influence voters choices among party candidates at mid-term congressional elections? Here is a study that provides an answer and throws light on some of the unique aspects of the American party system. Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller are members of the staff of the Survey Research Center and Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Mr. Miller is, in addition, Director of the newly organized Interuniversity Consortium for Political Research.

Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election

Without much question, the third-party movement of George C. Wallace constituted the most unusual feature of the 1968 presidential election. While this movement failed by a substantial margin in its audacious attempt to throw the presidential contest into the House of Representatives, in any other terms it was a striking success. It represented the first noteworthy intrusion on a two-party election in twenty years. The Wallace ticket drew a larger proportion of the popular vote than any third presidential slate since 1924, and a greater proportion of electoral votes than any such movement for more than a century, back to the curiously divided election of 1860. Indeed, the spectre of an electoral college stalemate loomed sufficiently large that serious efforts at reform have since taken root. At the same time, the Wallace candidacy was but one more dramatic addition to an unusually crowded rostrum of contenders, who throughout the spring season of primary elections were entering and leaving the lists under circumstances that ranged from the comic through the astonishing to the starkly tragic. Six months before the nominating conventions, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had been the expected 1968 protagonists, with some greater degree of uncertainty, as usual, within the ranks of the party out of power. The nominating process for the Republicans followed the most-probable script rather closely, with the only excitement being provided by the spectacle of Governors Romney and Rockefeller proceeding as through revolving doors in an ineffectual set of moves aimed at providing a Republican alternative to the Nixon candidacy. Where things were supposed to be most routine on the Democratic side, however, surprises were legion, including the early enthusiasm for Eugene McCarthy, President Johnsons shocking announcement that he would not run, the assassination of Robert Kennedy in the flush of his first electoral successes, and the dark turmoil in and around the Chicago nominating convention, with new figures like Senators George McGovern and Edward Kennedy coming into focus as challengers to the heir apparent, Vice President Hubert Humphrey.

American national election studies data sourcebook, 1952-1978

Data on elements influencing voters that will interest political scientists, journalists, and consultants. Major sections include personal characteristics; partisanship; candidate traits; media exposure; and voter turnout and political participation. Spiral bound in a horizontal format. No index or

Policy Directions and Presidential Leadership: Alternative Interpretations of the 1980 Presidential Election

As the Reagan administration neared the end of its first full year in office, interpretations of the meaning of the 1980 presidential election were still as varied as the political positions of analysts and commentators. The politically dominant interpretation, promoted by the new administration and its supporters, was that the election provided a mandate to bring about several fundamental changes in the role of government in American social and economic life. In recommendations whose scope had not been matched since the first days of Franklin Roosevelts New Deal, the Reagan administration set about responding to what it understood to be popular demands for reduced government spending and taxes, expansion of the national defence establishment, limitation of environmental protection in favour of the development of energy resources, and a myriad of other tasks designed to encourage free enterprise by ‘getting government off the backs of the people’. With varying degrees of enthusiasm for the new administrations programmes, scores of Democratic politicians shared the interpretation of Reagans victory as a new electoral mandate which rejected many of the fundamental policies of Democratic administrations from Roosevelt to Carter. This interpretation of the ‘meaning’ of the 1980 election was expressed by Democratic congressmen of many political colours who decried the bankruptcy of their own leadership and affirmed the victors sense of mandate by supporting the Presidents various legislative programmes.

The puzzle transformed: Explaining declining turnout

This analysis of the decline in aggregate voting turnout in the United States between the 1950s and the 1980s attributes the decline to changes in the generational composition of the electorate. In particular, the post-New Deal generation (first presidential vote in 1968 or later), which continues to grow in size, votes at a rate well below that of older generations. A minor part of the generational differences in turnout can be attributed to generational differences in party identification and social connectedness (as measured by such indicators as home ownership and church attendance). The larger portion of generational turnout differences cannot be directly explained with variables contained in the National Election Studies. The generational differences in turnout arenot reflected in preelection participation (informal campaigning, doing party work, etc.) and they cannot be accounted for by a declining sense of political efficacy or citizen duty or by lessened interest in campaigns and election outcomes.

Disinterest, disaffection, and participation in presidential politics

Undue emphasis on the decline of voter turnout in national elections and its interpretation as indicative of political malaise are likely to make for erroneous understanding of the American democracy. Evidence from studies of the national electorate conducted between 1952 and 1978 shows that the explanation for declining turnout is not to be found in commensurate diminution in political interest or involvement, or in a decreasing sense of civic duty, feeling of political efficacy or trust in government. Where patterns of change have coincided, further analysis indicates an absence of possible cause-and-effect relationships. The decline has been chiefly limited to those population sectors characterized by lack of interest or involvement in national partisan politics. The article concludes with a projection of likely developments in political participation, including turnout, in future presidential elections.

Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election

John F. Kennedys narrow popular vote margin in 1960 has already insured this presidential election a classic position in the roll call of close American elections. Whatever more substantial judgments historical perspective may bring, we can be sure that the 1960 election will do heavy duty in demonstrations to a reluctant public that after all is said and done, every vote does count. And the margin translated into “votes per precinct” will become standard fare in exhortations to party workers that no stone be left unturned. The 1960 election is a classic as well in the license it allows for “explanations” of the final outcome. Any event or campaign strategem that might plausibly have changed the thinnest sprinkling of votes across the nation may, more persuasively than is usual, be called “critical.” Viewed in this manner, the 1960 presidential election hung on such a manifold of factors that reasonable men might despair of cataloguing them. Nevertheless, it is possible to put together an account of the election in terms of the broadest currents influencing the American electorate in 1960. We speak of the gross lines of motivation which gave the election its unique shape, motivations involving millions rather than thousands of votes. Analysis of these broad currents is not intended to explain the hairline differences in popular vote, state by state, which edged the balance in favor of Kennedy rather than Nixon. But it can indicate quite clearly the broad forces which reduced the popular vote to a virtual stalemate, rather than any of the other reasonable outcomes between a 60-40 or a 40–60 vote division.

Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 American Presidential Election

American presidential politics in the 1960s and early 1970s was marked by the kinds of forces that characterize a period of electoral instability. These forces affected not only individual voters but also the candidates, parties and issues that interact as part of the electoral system. Among them was an increase in ‘issue voting’ which emphasized intra-party polarization on various non-economic issues. The civil rights movement, the war in Vietnam, riots in the cities, crime in the streets and other issues provided focal points for increased debate among political leaders and for the responses of an electorate newly mobilized by policy concerns. At the same time, the established political parties were faced with increased partisan defection and ticket splitting, by a rise in the number of political Independents and by the appearance of a threatening third-party movement. Even the styles and personalities of the parties’ presidential candidates contributed to the instability. The candidates presented to the electorate ran a gamut of styles and personalities that included the articulate Kennedy, the folksy Johnson, the impulsive Goldwater and the calculating Nixon. Along with the rise in mass interest in matters of policy came a new questioning of the trustworthiness and integrity of political leaders and the government in general. There also appeared in this period a new politics of confrontation, an influx into the electorate of young voters following the lowering of the voting age to 18, and a budding concern with the issues of ‘acid’, amnesty and abortion that the ‘New Politics’ promoted.

The Role of Research in the Unification of a Discipline

Large-scale complex research project designs are providing a new impetus to the elimination of subfield boundaries within political science. Major projects are taking advantage of the methodology and technology of contemporary social research to include comparisons among institutions, across cultural boundaries, and extending through time. As a consequence, traditionally narrow field and subfield concentrations on segments of the political process are giving way to intellectual interests that bring together hitherto separate concerns. The full potential for discipline-unifying research will, however, not be realized until there is a strengthening of the organizational infrastructures for research, a broadening of training in research design and administration, and an increase in fundingfor large-scale projects. The execution and subsequent intellectual exploitation of large research projects will carry additional problems that will be solved only with substantial changes in the workways of the political scientist, but those problems are greatly outweighed by the positive contribution that such research will make to the future of the discipline. The growing capacity of American scholars to study politics and governance systematically rather than segmentally has brought us to the beginning of a new era. We should contemplate the future, understanding that political science can and should become a unified discipline. Methodological differences no longer define nor are defined by substantive interests. Many of the boundaries between traditional subfields are sustained only by the inertia of custom; the boundaries can and should disappear. The intellectual challenges of the discipline are increasingly, and appropriately, centered on complex interrelationships that are being explored in major research endeavors. And, because inexorable trends in all of the social sciences, as well as in national science policy, are fostering large-scale research that purposively brings many interrelated interests together in single projects, I believe political science should prepare for a new era in which large-scale, programmatic research activity will give a new and more coherent shape to the discipline. The historically separate origins of the various subfields of the discipline are now less relevant than the intersections that today connect the subfields. Drawing from my own field of electoral behavior, one can ask how, in a day of presumed single-issue politics, the study of electoral behavior can be intrinsically separated from the study of bureaucratic clienteles that help shape the public policies that are reviewed by citizens engaged in retrospective, issue-oriented voting? How can judicially mandated educational policy be understood or appreciated with no regard for the politically potent demands of affected voters? How can the ebb and flow of foreign policy be comprehended without a basic recognition of the bounds by which public outrage defines the permissible? How can the performance of an office of personnel management be appraised without regard for the electorally inspired concern for civil rights?