Weerachart T. Kilenthong

Information-Constrained Optima with Retrading: An Externality and Its Market-Based Solution.

This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with a moral hazard problem and unobserved states, both with retrading in ex post spot markets. The interaction between private information problems and the possibility of retrade creates an externality, unless preferences have special, restrictive properties. The externality is internalized by allowing agents to contract ex ante on market fundamentals determining the spot price or interest rate, over and above contracting on actions and outputs. Then competitive equilibria are equivalent with the appropriate notion of constrained Pareto optimality. Examples show that it is possible to have multiple market fundamentals or price-islands, created endogenously in equilibrium.

Entrepreneurship and family businesses in Thailand: KILENTHONG AND RUEANTHIP - ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND FAMILY BUSINESSES IN THAILAND

This paper investigates the impact of exposure to a family business and participating in a family business on an individuals decision to start a business and the likelihood of its survival. We find that having a family member doing business increases the probability of starting a business but not its survival. In contrast, working in a family†owned business for a high number of hours increases both the likelihood of entrepreneurship and survival. The impact of working hours in a family†owned business remains significant even if the sample includes only individuals who are the spouses of business owners. Given the evidence, an apprenticeship scheme should be considered as a policy instrument for promoting entrepreneurial success.