Wendy Pearlman

Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process

Actors turn to negotiating or spoiling as a means of contesting not only what a proposed peace settlement entails but also who has the power to decide the terms. Conflicts are more likely to witness negotiating and spoiling for purposes of internal contestation to the degree that one or both of the warring parties lack an institutionalized system of legitimate representation. Whether internal contestation leads a group to act as a peace maker or as a peace breaker is conditioned by its position in the internal balance of power. Two eras in the Palestinian national movementthe Palestine Liberation Organizations bid to join the Geneva peace conference in 197374 and its engagement in the Oslo peace process from 1993 to 2000illustrate these propositions. Leaders of national movements and rebel groups, no less than leaders of states, are systematically influenced by domestic politics. As such, sponsors of peace processes should expect spoiler problems unless a movement heals rifts within its ranks.

Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings

In any political setting, a few people will defy political authority. The main challenge for theories of rebellion is to explain when and why others join en masse. Scholarship on social movements typically develops answers to this puzzle on the basis of either of two microfoundations. Explanations that conceptualize individuals as utility-maximizers contend that they protest as a means to other ends. Explanations that see individuals as driven by values and beliefs suggest that people protest for the inherent benefit of voicing dissent. Both perspectives generate compelling explanations. Yet how do purposeful individuals act when utilitarian calculations and cherished values recommend contrary courses of action? Why might an actor prioritize one or the other at different points in time? Taking on these questions, I argue for an approach to microfoundations that focuses on emotions. Emotions such as fear, sadness, and shame promote pessimistic assessments, risk aversion, and a low sense of control. Such dispiriting emotions encourage individuals to prioritize security and resign to political circumstances, even when they contradict values of dignity. By contrast, anger, joy, and pride promote optimistic assessments, risk acceptance, and feelings of personal efficacy. Such emboldening emotions encourage prioritization of dignity and increase willingness to engage in resistance, even when it jeopardizes security. When instrumentality and values offer different answers to the question of whether to resign or rebel, therefore, emotions can shift individuals toward one or the other. I ground this argument in findings from the neurosciences and illustrate it with evidence from the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and the absence of an uprising in Algeria.

Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes

The most prominent form of violent conflict in the world today occurs within states rather than between them. Since 1945, over 75 percent of militarized disputes have been civil conflicts. From the African continent to the Balkans, civil wars have raged and self-determination movements have mobilized for collective violence. Conflict over identity has emerged as a central problem for nations and the internal community as nationalist groups battle the state and each other in places like Iraq and Sudan. The comparative decline of conventional interstate war casts a spotlight on the myriad of conflicts involving nonstate actors, be they in conflict with each other or with existing states. We define a nonstate actor as an organized political actor not directly connected to the state but pursing aims that affect vital state interests. The dominant approach to analysis of conflicts involving nonstate actors views them, like interstate conflicts, as the outcome of bargaining between antagonists (Fearon 1995; for review, see Walter 2009). This bargaining framework entails identifying key players—typically just two—and specifying their preferences, the limits of their capabilities and resolve, and the information they have about each other. Given such information, analysts derive predictions about when their strategic interaction will result in conflict, as well as the characteristics of that conflict.

Out-Group Conflict, In-Group Unity?: Exploring the Effect of Repression on Intramovement Cooperation

Does repression increase or decrease unity within ethnic or nationalist movements? Conventional wisdom lends itself to two contradictory predictions. On one hand, it is said that conflict with an out-group is the surest path to unity in an in-group. On the other hand, repression exaggerates the gap between radicals and moderates in a movement. Challenging both views, this article argues that repression amplifies trends in cooperation or conflict existent in a movement before the onset of repression. All movements have some institutional arrangement, meaning a set of procedures and relationships that structure decision making and behavior. These “rules of the game” distribute power within the movement, and thus favor some actors over others. Repression disrupts the equilibrium of these institutions, after which the members might engage in either more cooperation or more conflict, depending on the level of satisfaction with preexisting institutional arrangements. The authors illustrate these propositions through comparative analysis of four repression shocks from two nationalist movements: the Kurdish movement in Iraq and the Palestinian national movement.

Competing for Lebanon's Diaspora: Transnationalism and Domestic Struggles in a Weak State

Just as state strength influences relationships between state and society and among social forces within a national territory, so does it shape relationships between states and their emigrants and diasporas across territorial borders. Scholars debate how transnational migration affirms or challenges the dominance of the nation-state. When sending states are weak, however, diaspora–homeland linkages can undermine the role of the state in a way that is not transformative, but sustaining of the status quo. Examining Lebanon, this paper explores how domestic actors extend their struggles to vie over and through kin abroad. Three realms of competition are paramount: demography, votes, and money. The resulting transnational outreach reproduces a politics in which both expatriates and the state function as resources as much as actors.

Triadic Deterrence: Coercing Strength, Beaten by Weakness

Triadic deterrence is the situation when one state uses threats and/or punishments against another state to coerce it to prevent non-state actors from conducting attacks from its territory. Under what conditions is triadic deterrence successful? Some attribute outcomes to the balance of power between states. By contrast, we argue that the complex asymmetrical structure of this conflict requires attention to the targeted regimes relationship to its own society. The stronger the targeted regime, the more likely deterrent action will prove effective. Moving against non-state actors requires institutional capacity, domestic legitimacy, and territorial control, which only strong regimes are able to furnish. Whereas strong regimes can act to uphold raison d’état, weak regimes lack the political tools and incentives to undertake controversial decisions and enforce them. We illustrate this argument through analysis of between- and within-case variation in Israels attempts to deter Palestinian groups operating from Egypt between 1949 and 1979, and from Syria since 1963.

Emigration and Power A Study of Sects in Lebanon, 1860–2010

How does emigration affect access to and struggles for power in sending states? For competing groups in the homeland, emigration presents a contradiction: demographic losses but possible economic gains. Wins and losses from this trade-off evolve with shifts in who migrates, to where, and when. I illustrate these relationships in the case of Lebanon since 1860, focusing on the balance of power among sectarian communities. The country’s first migratory wave concentrated material benefits and population deficits in the Christian community. It also encouraged subsequent emigration that, over time, involved more Muslim Lebanese, as well. Such broadening diffused the profits of labor abroad. Due to changes in destinations and historical circumstances, however, many of these migrants remained more connected to their homeland. This aided social mobility for their communities without sapping resident strength. Outmigration thereby helped redistribute human and material resources among sects, and hence created the demographic and material foundations of the competition for power.

History, Rationality, Narrative, Imagery: A Four-Way Conversation on Teaching the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

The Arab-Israeli conflict can be a difficult topic to teach, for a variety of reasons. As such, this article represents a conversation by four scholar-teachers of the Middle East and the conflict about our approaches to teaching it. We discuss our motivations for the manner in which we teach the conflict and some of the specific tools we use to do so, including the use of history, role-playing and simulations, emphasis on narratives, and active learning instruments (such as movies and music). We also engage with each other, interspersing our own suggestions and reactions to each others discussion. By doing so, we aim to provide an open atmosphere for others to consider how we teach the conflict, in the hopes of better understanding it.

Mobilization in Military-Controlled Transitions: Lessons from Turkey, Brazil, and Egypt

How, and under what circumstances, does popular mobilization democratize military rule? Democratization does not always involve grassroots protest, but it is important to understand its role when it does. The authors make two propositions. First, mobilization can aid transitions, and forestall military tutelage regimes, by generating popular demands for democratization, altering politicians’ incentives and capacities to push for democracy, and establishing legacies that preserve and deepen democracy after civilians assume power. Elected civilians do not automatically challenge militaries or replace them with more accountable governance, if not so compelled from below. Second, mobilization is most likely to have a democratizing impact when it crosses social cleavages and develops organizational structures. When it reinforces cleavages, militaries easily denounce dissent as threatening national unity or security. When it lacks organization, it cannot translate disruptive power into transformation of state institutions. Comparative analysis of Brazil (1974-1999), Turkey (1980-2013), and Egypt (2011-2013) demonstrates these relationships.

Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century . By Sharon Erickson Nepstad

Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century . By Sharon Erickson Nepstad. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 200p.