Wenfeng Wu

Ownership and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence from China

Research has found that political connectedness can have both positive and negative effects on firm value. To resolve these mixed findings, we investigate the impact of political ties conditional on ownership for a sample of Chinese firms over the period 1999–2006. We find that private firms with politically connected managers have a higher value and obtain more government subsidies than those without connected managers, whereas local state-owned enterprises with connected managers have a lower value and employ more surplus labour than those without connected managers. Our results indicate that the effect of political ties is subject to firm ownership.

The Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate Litigation in China

We examine the effects of corporate lawsuits in China and find that litigation announcements depress the stock prices of both defendant and plaintiff firms. Financially distressed defendants suffer lower stock returns. We find that politically connected defendants are favored in the judicial process: they have higher stock returns and are more likely to appeal against adverse outcomes and to obtain a favorable appeal result. State-controlled defendants fare better than privately controlled defendants when it comes to appeals but do not have higher stock returns. The evidence suggests that there is bias in the judicial process.

Institutional Environment, Ownership and Firm Taxation

This paper examines how ownership type and institutional environment affect firm taxation. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2006, we find that private firms enjoy a lower effective tax rate than local state-owned enterprises. In addition, the preferential taxation of private firms is associated with local government’s incentives to promote local economic growth. We find that private firms located in regions with a lower level of privatization receive preferential tax treatment. Our results also suggest that decentralization and interjurisdictional competition lead to financial interdependence between local governments and private firms.

Ownership and the Value of Political Connections

Research has found that political connectedness can have both positive and negative effects on firm value. To resolve these mixed findings, we investigate the impact of political ties conditional on ownership for a sample of Chinese firms over the period 1999 to 2006. We find that private firms with politically connected managers have a higher value and obtain more government subsidies than those without connected managers, whereas local state-owned enterprises with connected managers have a lower value and employ more surplus labor than those without connected managers. Our results indicate that the effect of political ties is subject to firm ownership.

Institutional Investors, Political Connections and Incidence of Corporate Fraud

In this study, we analyze two new potential determinants for mitigating fraud committed by firms: institutional investors and political connection. The role of institutional investors in the effective monitoring of firm management has also been well established and we in turn observe that firms with a large proportion of institutional investors have lower incidences of corporate fraud. The importance of political connection for enterprise in both developed and emerging markets such as the United States and China has also been established by prior studies. We find in this paper that it is possible to identify another positive effect on enterprise in that political connection could reduce incidences of corporate fraud, thus providing value to firms. We further find that political connection plays more pronounced role in reducing the incidence of regulatory enforcement against non-state owned enterprises in weaker legal environments, while institutional ownership plays a more important role in reducing the incidence of regulatory enforcement against state owned enterprises in weaker legal environments.

What drives regional differences in the stock market wealth effect in China

This article investigates the determinants of stock market wealth effect across regions. Using panel data from China, we find that the stock market wealth effect is more prevalent in regions with more stockholders, regions in which households have higher levels of stock ownership and regions in which households have lower incomes.