Whitley R. P. Kaufman

Karma, Rebirth, and the Problem of Evil

The doctrine of karma and rebirth is often praised for its ability to offer a successful solution to the Problem of Evil. This essay evaluates such a claim by considering whether the doctrine can function as a systematic theodicy, as an explanation of all human suffering in terms of wrongs done in either this or past lives. This purported answer to the Problem of Evil must face a series of objections, including the problem of anylackofmemoryofpastlives,the lack of proportionality between wrongdoing and the observed suffering in the world, the problem of infinite regress of explanation, and the problem of compatibility of free will with karmic determinism. These objections, either separately or taken together, provide (it is argued) sufficient reason to doubt whether the doctrine of karma and rebirth can in fact provide a satisfactory theodicy.

Military frameworks: technological know-how and the legitimization of warfare

It is the elusive target of policymakers, ethicists and military strategists: the target of a ‘just war’. Since the advent of precision-guided munitions in the mid-1970s, commentators claimed that surgical-strike technology would advance the cause of jus in bello, ending the longstanding tension between effective military engagement and morality. Today, many policymakers accept that the ethical dilemmas that arise in the ‘fog of war’ can be negotiated by the technical precision of weaponry. This is, at best, only partially accurate. At worst, its misplaced optimism risks numbing the moral sense of strategists and, just as importantly, the sensibilities of the general populace. We argue that the development of precision guided munitions (PGM), stand-off weaponry and military robotics may force policymakers and strategists to experience new ethical tensions with an unprecedented sensitivity and may require them to make specific policy adjustments. In the move toward more quantitative approaches to political science and international affairs it is often forgotten that military ethics, and the ethics of military technologies, turn on the question of human judgment. We argue that the ethical implications of revolution in military affairs (RMA) are best investigated by way of a detailed discussion of the tenuous relationship between ethical decision-making and the workings of military technology.

Honor and revenge : a theory of punishment

Chapter One: The Problem of Punishment.- Chapter Two: Punishment as Crime Prevention.- Chapter Three: Can Retributive Punishment Be Justified?.- Chapter Four: The Mixed Theory of Punishment.- Chapter Five: Retribution and Revenge.- Chapter Six: What Is The Purpose of Retribution?.- Chapter Seven: Making Sense of Honor.- Chapter Eight: Is Punishment Justified?.- Index.

Motive, Intention, and Morality in the Criminal Law

A remarkably persistent dispute in the criminal law concerns the relevance of a defendants motive to his or her criminal liability. Specifically, the issue is whether a good or permissible motive should exculpate someone who has committed a criminal act. According to the orthodox rule, the defendants motive is strictly irrelevant to liability. Recently, though, there has been a barrage of criticism aimed at this doctrine. Critics charge that the doctrine is not only false—judges do regularly consider motive—but also morally inexcusable, because a permissible motive ought to lessen the blameworthiness of the defendant. The present article defends the orthodox doctrine. It is argued both that it is factually accurate as a description of how judges behave but also, more importantly, that there is a sound moral basis for the doctrine that motives are irrelevant with respect to criminal liability. Critics have mischaracterized the role that motive plays in moral theory and practice, and careful attention to the significance of motive demonstrates that the orthodox criminal law doctrine is quite in line with our moral practices.

Introduction: Bridging the Two Cultures

This chapter sets out the basic problematic: can the theory of evolution provide us with a fully scientific theory of human behavior? A subset of this question is whether the fields of the social sciences and the humanities have proven to be failures, and will have to be assimilated into the field of biology or at least be Darwinized, that is, interpreted in terms of evolutionary principles. At the heart of both issues is the question of whether the mechanistic, materialistic model adopted by science is appropriate to understanding human behavior, which unlike particles appears to be rational and goal-directed.

Literary Darwinism: Can Evolution Explain Great Literature?

The most-developed area of evolutionary aesthetics is the field known as Literary Darwinism: the use of evolutionary principles to explain literature. This chapter examines three examples of Literary Darwinism: evolutionary analyses of Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, of Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, and Homer’s Iliad. We demonstrate that an evolutionary approach misses out on everything that is most important about these classic works of literature. A careful analysis of these works shows that in fact each of them endorses the traditional theory of human nature, as both a biological and a spiritual being.

The Traditional Theory of Human Nature

The dominant theory of human nature in the Western tradition is that the human being is a peculiar sort of being, a rational animal. That is, the human is both animal and rational, pulled in two different directions at once. While the animal side of our nature seeks gratification in bodily pleasures or worldly goods, the rational side guides us toward higher values, in particular the famous Platonic triad of Truth, Beauty, and above all, the moral Good. The Darwinian account, in sharp contrast, insists that humans have only one dimension, the animal one. All of the “higher” values are merely indirect means of pursuing animal ends, in particular survival and reproduction. The remainder of this book asks which of these two views is more plausible.

Darwinism and the Meaning of Life

The central question of human life is whether life has a meaning or purpose. On the Darwinian view, there can be no such meaning, as we are merely products of evolution. Nonetheless, the naturalists have tried to create a new science of human meaning based on evolutionary principles. We demonstrate the incoherence of this project and the implausibility of denying the role of meaning in human life, or trying to reduce it to mere happiness.

Reason, Truth, and Evolution

One of the central paradoxes of naturalism is what to make of the ideas of reason and truth within an evolutionary perspective. On the one hand, the impulse toward a “universal Darwinism” make it irresistible to find an evolutionary account of reason, in which reason is merely a biological tool by which we pursue our goals of survival and reproduction. On the other hand, reason and truth would seem to operate as presuppositions of the very naturalist project; for there to be science at all, there must be a prior notion of truth and of our rational capacity to achieve it. In this chapter, we see a number of attempts to come to terms with this dilemma, concluding that even the naturalist needs a robust, objective notion of truth as a fundamental value.

Is Utilitarianism a Scientific Morality

Moral naturalists have also tried a different strategy; rather than debunk objective ethics, some have argued that a utilitarian ethics is the only moral system consistent with a scientific or naturalist worldview. In this chapter, we examine the arguments for this claim and demonstrate why they fail. It is argued that precisely what is missing in the utilitarian theory is a recognition of a transcendental goal of ethics, the idea of an objective moral goal that is the guiding aim of human life.