Wilina Lim

Newly discovered coronavirus as the primary cause of severe acute respiratory syndrome

Summary Background The worldwide outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is associated with a newly discovered coronavirus, SARS-associated coronavirus (SARSCoV). We did clinical and experimental studies to assess the role of this virus in the cause of SARS. Methods We tested clinical and postmortem samples from 436 SARS patients in six countries for infection with SARSCoV, human metapneumovirus, and other respiratory pathogens. We infected four cynomolgus macaques (Macaca fascicularis) with SARS-CoV in an attempt to replicate SARS and did necropsies on day 6 after infection. Findings SARS-CoV infection was diagnosed in 329 (75%) of 436 patients fitting the case definition of SARS; human metapneumovirus was diagnosed in 41 (12%) of 335, and other respiratory pathogens were diagnosed only sporadically. SARS-CoV was, therefore, the most likely causal agent of SARS. The four SARS-CoV-infected macaques excreted SARS-CoV from nose, mouth, and pharynx from 2 days after infection. Three of four macaques developed diffuse alveolar damage, similar to that in SARS patients, and characterised by epithelial necrosis, serosanguineous exudate, formation of hyaline membranes, type 2 pneumocyte hyperplasia, and the presence of syncytia. SARS-CoV was detected in pneumonic areas by virus isolation and RT-PCR, and was localised to alveolar epithelial cells and syncytia by immunohistochemistry and transmission electron microscopy. Interpretation Replication in SARS-CoV-infected macaques of pneumonia similar to that in human beings with SARS, combined with the high prevalence of SARS-CoV infection in SARS patients, fulfill the criteria required to prove that SARS-CoV is the primary cause of SARS. Published online July 22, 2003 http://image.thelancet.com/extras/03art6318web.pdf

Norovirus illness is a global problem: emergence and spread of norovirus GII.4 variants, 2001-2007.

BACKGROUND Noroviruses (NoVs) are the most common cause of viral gastroenteritis. Their high incidence and importance in health care facilities result in a great impact on public health. Studies from around the world describing increasing prevalence have been difficult to compare because of differing nomenclatures for variants of the dominant genotype, GII.4. We studied the global patterns of GII.4 epidemiology in relation to its genetic diversity. METHODS Data from NoV outbreaks with dates of onset from January 2001 through March 2007 were collected from 15 institutions on 5 continents. Partial genome sequences (n=775) were collected, allowing phylogenetic comparison of data from different countries. RESULTS The 15 institutions reported 3098 GII.4 outbreaks, 62% of all reported NoV outbreaks. Eight GII.4 variants were identified. Four had a global distribution--the 1996, 2002, 2004, and 2006b variants. The 2003Asia and 2006a variants caused epidemics, but they were geographically limited. Finally, the 2001 Japan and 2001 Henry variants were found across the world but at low frequencies. CONCLUSIONS NoV epidemics resulted from the global spread of GII.4 strains that evolved under the influence of population immunity. Lineages show notable (and currently unexplained) differences in geographic prevalence. Establishing a global NoV network by which data on strains with the potential to cause pandemics can be rapidly exchanged may lead to improved prevention and intervention strategies.

Avian Influenza (H5N1) Viruses Isolated from Humans in Asia in 2004 Exhibit Increased Virulence in Mammals

ABSTRACT The spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses across Asia in 2003 and 2004 devastated domestic poultry populations and resulted in the largest and most lethal H5N1 virus outbreak in humans to date. To better understand the potential of H5N1 viruses isolated during this epizootic event to cause disease in mammals, we used the mouse and ferret models to evaluate the relative virulence of selected 2003 and 2004 H5N1 viruses representing multiple genetic and geographical groups and compared them to earlier H5N1 strains isolated from humans. Four of five human isolates tested were highly lethal for both mice and ferrets and exhibited a substantially greater level of virulence in ferrets than other H5N1 viruses isolated from humans since 1997. One human isolate and all four avian isolates tested were found to be of low virulence in either animal. The highly virulent viruses replicated to high titers in the mouse and ferret respiratory tracts and spread to multiple organs, including the brain. Rapid disease progression and high lethality rates in ferrets distinguished the highly virulent 2004 H5N1 viruses from the 1997 H5N1 viruses. A pair of viruses isolated from the same patient differed by eight amino acids, including a Lys/Glu disparity at 627 of PB2, previously identified as an H5N1 virulence factor in mice. The virus possessing Glu at 627 of PB2 exhibited only a modest decrease in virulence in mice and was highly virulent in ferrets, indicating that for this virus pair, the K627E PB2 difference did not have a prevailing effect on virulence in mice or ferrets. Our results demonstrate the general equivalence of mouse and ferret models for assessment of the virulence of 2003 and 2004 H5N1 viruses. However, the apparent enhancement of virulence of these viruses in humans in 2004 was better reflected in the ferret.

Lethality to Ferrets of H5N1 Influenza Viruses Isolated from Humans and Poultry in 2004

ABSTRACT The 2004 outbreaks of H5N1 influenza viruses in Vietnam and Thailand were highly lethal to humans and to poultry; therefore, newly emerging avian influenza A viruses pose a continued threat, not only to avian species but also to humans. We studied the pathogenicity of four human and nine avian H5N1/04 influenza viruses in ferrets (an excellent model for influenza studies). All four human isolates were fatal to intranasally inoculated ferrets. The human isolate A/Vietnam/1203/04 (H5N1) was the most pathogenic isolate; the severity of disease was associated with a broad tissue tropism and high virus titers in multiple organs, including the brain. High fever, weight loss, anorexia, extreme lethargy, and diarrhea were observed. Two avian H5N1/04 isolates were as pathogenic as the human viruses, causing lethal systemic infections in ferrets. Seven of nine H5N1/04 viruses isolated from avian species caused mild infections, with virus replication restricted to the upper respiratory tract. All chicken isolates were nonlethal to ferrets. A sequence analysis revealed polybasic amino acids in the hemagglutinin connecting peptides of all H5N1/04 viruses, indicating that multiple molecular differences in other genes are important for a high level of virulence. Interestingly, the human A/Vietnam/1203/04 isolate had a lysine substitution at position 627 of PB2 and had one to eight amino acid changes in all gene products except that of the M1 gene, unlike the A/chicken/Vietnam/C58/04 and A/quail/Vietnam/36/04 viruses. Our results indicate that viruses that are lethal to mammals are circulating among birds in Asia and suggest that pathogenicity in ferrets, and perhaps humans, reflects a complex combination of different residues rather than a single amino acid difference.

Virology: SARS virus infection of cats and ferrets.

The reservoir of the coronavirus isolated from patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is still unknown, but is suspected to have been a wild animal species. Here we show that ferrets (Mustela furo) and domestic cats (Felis domesticus) are susceptible to infection by SARS coronavirus (SCV) and that they can efficiently transmit the virus to previously uninfected animals that are housed with them. The observation that these two distantly related carnivores can so easily be infected with the virus indicates that the reservoir for this pathogen may involve a range of animal species.

Risk of influenza A (H5N1) infection among poultry workers, Hong Kong, 1997-1998

In 1997, outbreaks of highly pathogenic influenza A (H5N1) among poultry coincided with 18 documented human cases of H5N1 illness. Although exposure to live poultry was associated with human illness, no cases were documented among poultry workers (PWs). To evaluate the potential for avian-to-human transmission of H5N1, a cohort study was conducted among 293 Hong Kong government workers (GWs) who participated in a poultry culling operation and among 1525 PWs. Paired serum samples collected from GWs and single serum samples collected from PWs were considered to be anti-H5 antibody positive if they were positive by both microneutralization and Western blot testing. Among GWs, 3% were seropositive, and 1 seroconversion was documented. Among PWs, approximately 10% had anti-H5 antibody. More-intensive poultry exposure, such as butchering and exposure to ill poultry, was associated with having anti-H5 antibody. These findings suggest an increased risk for avian influenza infection from occupational exposure.

Antibody Response in Individuals Infected with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Viruses and Detection of Anti-H5 Antibody among Household and Social Contacts

The first documented outbreak of human respiratory disease caused by avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses occurred in Hong Kong in 1997. The kinetics of the antibody response to the avian virus in H5N1-infected persons was similar to that of a primary response to human influenza A viruses; serum neutralizing antibody was detected, in general, >/=14 days after symptom onset. Cohort studies were conducted to assess the risk of human-to-human transmission of the virus. By use of a combination of serologic assays, 6 of 51 household contacts, 1 of 26 tour group members, and none of 47 coworkers exposed to H5N1-infected persons were positive for H5 antibody. One H5 antibody-positive household contact, with no history of poultry exposure, provided evidence that human-to-human transmission of the avian virus may have occurred through close physical contact with H5N1-infected patients. In contrast, social exposure to case patients was not associated with H5N1 infection.

Risk of Influenza A (H5N1) Infection among Health Care Workers Exposed to Patients with Influenza A (H5N1), Hong Kong

The first outbreak of avian influenza A (H5N1) occurred among humans in Hong Kong in 1997. To estimate the risk of person-to-person transmission, a retrospective cohort study was conducted to compare the prevalence of H5N1 antibody among health care workers (HCWs) exposed to H5N1 case-patients with the prevalence among nonexposed HCWs. Information on H5N1 case-patient and poultry exposures and blood samples for H5N1-specific antibody testing were collected. Eight (3.7%) of 217 exposed and 2 (0.7%) of 309 nonexposed HCWs were H5N1 seropositive (P=.01). The difference remained significant after controlling for poultry exposure (P=.01). This study presents the first epidemiologic evidence that H5N1 viruses were transmitted from patients to HCWs. Human-to-human transmission of avian influenza may increase the chances for the emergence of a novel influenza virus with pandemic potential.

Role of Quail in the Interspecies Transmission of H9 Influenza A Viruses: Molecular Changes on HA That Correspond to Adaptation from Ducks to Chickens

ABSTRACT H9 influenza viruses have become endemic in land-based domestic poultry in Asia and have sporadically crossed to pigs and humans. To understand the molecular determinants of their adaptation to land-based birds, we tested the replication and transmission of several 1970s duck H9 viruses in chickens and quail. Quail were more susceptible than chickens to these viruses, and generation of recombinant H9 viruses by reverse genetics showed that changes in the HA gene are sufficient to initiate efficient replication and transmission in quail. Seven amino acid positions on the HA molecule corresponded to adaptation to land-based birds. In quail H9 viruses, the pattern of amino acids at these seven positions is intermediate between those of duck and chicken viruses; this fact may explain the susceptibility of quail to duck H9 viruses. Our findings suggest that quail provide an environment in which the adaptation of influenza viruses from ducks generates novel variants that can cross the species barrier.

Global Distribution of Measles Genotypes and Measles Molecular Epidemiology

A critical component of laboratory surveillance for measles is the genetic characterization of circulating wild-type viruses. The World Health Organization (WHO) Measles and Rubella Laboratory Network (LabNet), provides for standardized testing in 183 countries and supports genetic characterization of currently circulating strains of measles viruses. The goal of this report is to describe the lessons learned from nearly 20 years of virologic surveillance for measles, to describe the global databases for measles sequences, and to provide regional updates about measles genotypes detected by recent surveillance activities. Virologic surveillance for measles is now well established in all of the WHO regions, and most countries have conducted at least some baseline surveillance. The WHO Global Genotype Database contains >7000 genotype reports, and the Measles Nucleotide Surveillance (MeaNS) contains >4000 entries. This sequence information has proven to be extremely useful for tracking global transmission patterns and for documenting the interruption of transmission in some countries. The future challenges will be to develop quality control programs for molecular methods and to continue to expand virologic surveillance activities in all regions.