Will Jones

Between Pyongyang and Singapore: the Rwandan State, Its Rulers, and the Military

Rwanda has long suffered from outsiders’ projections. Whether as the Belgians’ enfant cheri, the donor darling of the post-genocidal period, or the recent incarnation of the RPF as the African ruling party everybody loves to hate,1 polemical castings of Rwandan politics saturate the discourse. They are ideology dressed as scholarship, and tell more about the authors of these discourses than about Rwanda itself. A more temperate analysis of the prospects for the current Rwandan political dispensation requires us to proceed unencumbered by assumptions about how Rwanda ‘should’ work, or judgments based on its failure to imitate Washington-consensus plati-tudes about what constitutes ‘good governance’. I want to argue that: 1. Both the characterisations of Rwanda as a shining example of the African Renaissance, and as a vicious dictatorship tottering on the brink of collapse overstate the case. Instead: 2. The Rwandan state functions beyond the dreams of most contemporary African state-builders, and success is built on factors which are unlikely to change, but may, under specific circumstances. 3. In spite of the continued functioning of the Rwandan state, the elite’s position is precarious.

Matching Systems for Refugees

Executive Summary1 Design of matching systems between refugees and states or local areas is emerging as one of the most promising solutions to problems in refugee resettlement. We describe the basics of two-sided matching theory used in a number of allocation problems, such as school choice, where both sides need to agree to the match. We then explain how these insights can be applied to international refugee matching in the context of the European Union and examine how refugee matching might work within the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.

Victoire in Kigali, or: why Rwandan elections are not won transnationally

ABSTRACT This article brings together the literature on ‘electoral authoritarian regimes’ with the sub-fields of diaspora studies and transnationalism to evaluate the potential of political parties in exile to be forces for positive change in Rwanda. With this in mind, the article asks one simple question: is the participation of the Rwandan opposition in exile in electoral processes back home likely to be a positive force for change? It concludes that, in Rwanda at least, elections cannot be won transnationally. As such, those hoping for a more democratic Rwanda should look elsewhere. Operating in a transnational space appears to make life harder for the opposition, but not the Rwandan state. Further, the division, inconsistency, sudden shifts, splits, and volte-face of Rwanda’s diasporic opposition is produced, at least in part, by the competitive authoritarian nature of Rwanda. What the Rwandan case reveals, then, is at least one instance where unfair elections do not make future liberalisation more likely.