William B. Stevenson

Agency and social networks: Strategies of action in a social structure of position, opposition, and opportunity

This study uses social movement concepts to explain the success and failure of actors in a network of relationships trying to influence policies on environmental issues in a small city. Results show that strategies to take action and mobilize others in a network of interorganizational relationships can vary depending on the social context, which consists of the political opportunity structure defined by government regulators, whether the actor faces opposition, and the actors position in the network. Decisions to engage in strategies to try to influence government regulators directly, to use a broker to reach agreements with the opposition, or to form a coalition with actors in other organizations to influence government decision makers are affected by this social context. Results also show that even peripheral actors, usually assumed to be powerless in network studies, can influence policy if they use a direct-contact strategy and the political opportunity structure is favorable.

Balancing Ties: Boundary Spanning and Influence in the Organization's Extended Network of Communication

In this study of the business communication that connects an organization with others in its environment, we link boundary spanning with network theory and propose the concept of an extended network of communication. This extended net work is the structure of business communication which flows in work-related ties that organization members maintain both within the organization and across its boundary. We study the relationship between boundary-spanning communication and individual influence in a network with 108 organizational members. We find that boundary spanning correlates with influence, regardless of hierarchical level. There is also a curvilinear relationship between boundary-spanning communication and individual influence. Thus, managers need to balance their communication within and across the organizational boundary.

Power, Interaction, Position, and the Generation of Cultural Agreement in Organizations:

Cultural agreement in organizations can be considered from integration, differentiation, or fragmentation perspectives (Martin, 1992). Underlying these perspectives are differing assumptions about the effects of power, interaction, and position on cultural viewpoints in organizations. This study examines these assumptions by content analyzing the stories organizational members tell about their organization. Differences in formal power, informal influence, and organizational position all led to differences in stories that signified different cultural viewpoints. At the group level, informal interaction between groups did not lead to cultural agreement. However, groups that occupied similar positions or roles created through interaction in the network of influence did share similar cultural viewpoints. The results suggest that the effects predicted from the integration, differentiation, and fragmentation perspectives are likely to be jointly present in organizations. They also suggest that an understanding of formal and informal position in organizations can enhance appreciation of the subtleties of cultural understanding.

Using Event Structure Analysis to Understand Planned Social Change

In this article, the authors explore the application of Event Structure Analysis in understanding the linkages between events in planned social change. An illustrative example from the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders is used to highlight the key features of Event Structure Analysis.

INDIVIDUAL DISCRETION AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: Evaluating the Performance of Public Bureaucrats

Individuals within organizations have to confront the conflict between being accountable for their performance and trying to maintain autonomy and exercise discretion when accomplishing complex tasks. It is usually assumed that individuals, particularly professionals, face complex tasks that are difficult to evaluate and will resist attempts to control their performance through organizational rules. However, routinizing tasks and decentralizing decision-making authority to the individual may clarify rules and give individuals some control over their jobs, making the individual more amenable to the evaluation of performance. Hypotheses concerning the somewhat conflicting demands of job complexity and organizational control were tested by analyzing attitudes towards a performance appraisal system undergoing change in two United States federal agencies. Changes in attitudes were measured by a LISREL panel analysis over five points in time.