William Bain

Deconfusing Morgenthau: moral inquiry and classical realism reconsidered

This article explores Jim Georges claim that Hans Morgenthaus notion of political realism is founded upon a spectator theory of knowledge and that it discloses no meaningful distinction between theory and practice. An investigation of Morgenthaus understanding of scientific inquiry, the relation of theory and practice, and his views on American foreign policy suggests that both of these claims may be misplaced. Rather Morgenthaus realism is an authentic moral voice in the discourse of world politics which emphasizes the importance of judgment and the need to locate statecraft in historical, social, and political context. It is a realism that is representative of a rich moral tradition, one which orders, arranges, and prioritizes fundamental human values and which is concerned with how these values might be realized. This conclusion not only emancipates a valuable tradition of scholarship, it also raises important question about how we engage and organize the discipline of international relations and it suggests that some critical thinking spaces may provide a rather limited refuge for those wishing to go beyond Morgenthau and realism.

The Tyranny of Benevolence: National Security, Human Security, and the Practice of Statecraft

The promise of a peaceful and prosperous post-Cold War world has collapsed in bitter disappointment as daily life in parts of Africa, Asia, and, indeed, Europe continues to be marked by gross human rights abuses, genocide, civil war, mass starvation, mutilation, and slavery. The destruction that these acts visit on civilian populations in particular has stimulated a vigorous debate about the justi® cation of national security. Advocates of human security have consequently presented a serious challenge to established ways of thinking about security and world affairs. The question I wish to ask is: how do national security and human security shape our understanding of statecraft and our responses to failed and unjust states? I will begin by exploring the moral character of national security and human security. I want to examine their key assumptions, their principal justi® cations, and the quandaries and predicaments to which they give expression. This investigation will lead into a discussion of the idea of responsibility and how I believe it enters into human relations. It will become evident as a result of this investigation that national security and human security express not the objective content of security, but beliefs about how human beings might best achieve a condition of security; and in doing so, they arrange fundamental human values in such a way that some values are subsumed to others. However, national security and human security are by themselves insuf® cient guides for the practice of statecraft. National security may well be morally objectionable because it is sometimes insuf® ciently responsive to the claims of humanity. However, it is possible that human security may be morally objectionable because it is sometimes destructive of liberty. For these doctrines of security to convey substantive meaning, they must be considered along with the circumstances of particular problems and the virtues, such as prudence and responsibility, which are required to answer them.

Responsibility and obligation in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’

This article takes up Louise Arbours claim that the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is grounded in existing obligations of international law, specifically those pertaining to the prevention and punishment of genocide. In doing so, it argues that the aspirations of the R2P project cannot be sustained by the idea of ‘responsibility’ alone. The article proceeds in arguing that the coherence of R2P depends on an unacknowledged and unarticulated theory of obligation that connects notions of culpability, blame, and accountability with the kind of preventive, punitive, and restorative action that Arbour and others advocate. Two theories of obligation are then offered, one natural the other conventional, which make this connection explicit. But the ensuing clarity comes at a cost: the naturalist account escapes the ‘real’ world to redeem the intrinsic dignity of all men and women, while the conventionalist account remains firmly tethered to the ‘real’ world in redeeming whatever dignity can be had by way of an agreement. The article concludes by arguing that the advocate of the responsibility to protect can have one or the other, but not both.

Against crusading: The ethic of human security and Canadian foreign policy

Bain argues that efforts to include the ethic of human security as a core objective in Canadian foreign policy lack the necessary coherence required to be a useful guide for the conduct of statecraft. He examines Ottawas doctrine of human security and how it affects its foreign policy. Bain concludes that Canadas doctrine of human security emphasizes norms which are often at odds with those of international society and Canadas traditional foreign policy objectives. Moreover, he cautions against infecting Canadas foreign policy with excessive moralism. Hence, Canadian foreign policy should not be guided by human security concerns. Rather, Canada should only pursue human security issues when the circumstances permit.

The English School and the Activity of Being an Historian

History enjoys pride of place in English School thought, not only because some of its founding members, Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield in particular, were trained historians. It is also the only kind of knowledge to rival the authority of science in the field of international relations, although the commerce between historians and international relations is often tenuous and sparse.2 It was Wight who looked to history in order to shine light on ‘violets’—the potent principles of Grotius’ thought—which were hidden beneath the ‘gigantic rhododendrons’ of arguments forgotten long ago.3 Wight conceived the good historian as one who possesses the imagination to enter into the past, to understand the minds of individuals and the societies in which they live because ‘events have also their insides, the purposes and passions which shaped them’. He professed agreement with Frederic William Maitland’s view of history as consisting in something more than a rehearsal of the things people have done: ‘history is the history of ideas’.4 Butterfield too stressed the importance of getting inside history—to avoid the fallacy that goes with reading history backwards in order to ratify the glory or righteousness of a present state of things. Failing that, he observed, we shall find ourselves entirely cut off from one another as‘all generations must be regarded as a world and a law unto themselves’.5

Thomas Hobbes as a Theorist of Anarchy: A Theological Interpretation

Summary Scholars of international relations generally invoke Hobbes as the quintessential theorist of international anarchy. David Armitage challenges this characterisation, arguing that Hobbes is regarded as a foundational figure in international relations theory in spite of as much as because of what he wrote on the subject. Thus, for Armitage, Hobbes is not the theorist of anarchy that he is made out to be. This article agrees with the general thrust of Armitages critique while maintaining that it is still possible to imagine Hobbes as a theorist of anarchy. Hobbes is a theorist of anarchy, not in a political sense, but in a metaphysical sense. This conception of anarchy is a reflection of a comprehensive theological account of reality that is grounded in an omnipotent God. Any historical inquiry into the foundations of modern international thought must take account of theology, because theology defines the ultimate coordinates of reality in terms of which the concepts of international thought are intelligible.

Reason, faith and modernity: a response to Pabst

This is a reply to:Pabst, Adrian. 2015. “‘A habitual disposition to the good’: on reason, virtue and realism.” Global Discourse. 5 (2): 261–279. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2015.1013385.

Rival Traditions of Natural Law: Martin Wight and the Theory of International Society

Natural law is integral to Martin Wights conception of international society. It is natural law that grounds the common values, the conditions of co-operation and mutual assistance, and most important of all, the sense of common obligation, which sets international society apart from the precarious, competitive anarchy that is the world of (political) realism. Natural law also holds out an alternative to the revolutionary claims of human solidarity that Wight feared would rend the fabric of the states-system. This article interrogates rival traditions of natural law, implicit in Wights rationalist tradition, which disrupt the coherence of the ‘three traditions’ framework. In doing so, it calls into question Wights hope that natural law could provide the basis of a post-Christian theory of international society. It concludes by arguing that Wight identified the right question: how might international society be grounded in a plural world? The cogency of his question stands, and yet it still begs an answer.

International relations and intellectual history

The history of international thought has traditionally focused on a limited number of canonical texts. Such an approach now seems both naive and parochial. International Relations scholars often read their own ideas into these texts instead of getting ideas from them – ideas that if properly understood have the potential to undermine theirs. By ignoring non-canonical texts, we overlook resources that are not only necessary to establish the historical contexts of canonical writings but that can also help theorists of International Relations to understand their subject better. Judgements of what is and is not canonical are in any case themselves context-bound and contestable. Intellectual history can help us understand how the International Relations canon was constructed and for what purposes. It can also counter the abstractions of theory by reminding us not only that theories are abstractions from the activities of people living in particular times and places but also that our own theories are embedded in historicity. In these and other ways, paying attention to intellectual history expands the repertoire of ideas on which International Relations theorists can draw and against which they can measure their conclusions. The articles in this issue illustrate these points in relation to a wide range of texts and contexts. They suggest that whether one approaches international relations from the angle of description, explanation, policy or ethics, knowing how past thinkers have understood the subject can lead to better informed and more robust scholarship.