William Baude
University of Chicago
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Supreme Court Review | 2017
William Baude
In Spokeo v Robins, the Supreme Court confronted one of the harder questions of its intricate law of standing to sue. The question is whether Article III of the Constitution limits Congresss ability to create legal rights that can be vindicated in federal court -- and, if so, what those limits are. The Courts cases had provided two contradictory approaches to answering it. Boxed in by these conflicting precedents, Spokeo failed to resolve the problem. The violation of a legal right can support standing, said the Court, only if it represents an injury that is “concrete” -- a term that simultaneously includes some “intangible” injuries, but requires that they be “real.” These terms, and the Courts explanation of them, do little work to answer the core question. And to the extent that they do point to a general approach, that approach is a wrong turn. But Spokeo also produced a glimmer of hope for approaching standing in the future: a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas, building off of an important line of scholarship on the long-standing difference between public rights and private rights. While Justice Thomass proposal is not yet fully developed, it may provide a theoretically satisfying way to make sense of the Courts approach to statutory standing. Even if his answers are not perfect, they are answers to the right questions, which will reframe the problem of standing in a helpful way. Justice Thomass concurrence may be one of the most fruitful things to happen to standing at the Supreme Court in many years. The rest of this article explains the problem of standing in the face of Congresss creation of statutory rights. Part I describes the basic problem and the prior cases that address it. Part II describes the Courts attempted answer in Spokeo. Part III argues that Spokeos answer is unhelpful and even problematic, and could have ominous implications for the law of privacy and other areas of substantive law. Part IV shows why Justice Thomas may have provided a better way forward.
Archive | 2015
Steven Douglas Smith; Michael B. Rappaport; William Baude; Stephen E. Sachs
NYU Journal of Law & Liberty | 2015
William Baude
Yale Law Journal | 2013
William Baude
Harvard Law Review | 2017
William Baude; Stephen E. Sachs
Harvard Law Review Forum | 2014
William Baude
Case Western Reserve law review | 2014
William Baude
Indiana Law Journal | 2011
William Baude
Columbia Law Review | 2015
William Baude
Virginia Law Review | 2017
William Baude