William F. Brewer

Theories of Knowledge Restructuring in Development

This paper reviews recent work on knowledge acquisition with a focus on knowledge restructuring. This work suggests that it may be possible to replace Piagetian theories of global restructuring with a more domain-specific approach. Some forms of learning may give rise to a weak restructuring involving the accumulation of new facts and the formation of new relations between existing concepts. Other forms of learning may involve a radical restructuring that includes a change in core concepts, a change in structure, and a change in the phenomena to be explained. The restructuring view raises important questions about the similarities and differences in the child’s and the scientist’s acquisition of knowledge, and about the role of prior knowledge in instruction. The domain of observational astronomy is used as an example of how these issues can be applied to study the child’s development of knowledge. Several mechanisms for knowledge restructuring are discussed and it is argued that these issues are crucial for a theory-based approach to the study of instruction.

Memory for goal-directed events.

Abstract A series of experiments on comprehension and memory of common goal-directed events was carried out. Empirically based Plan schemata for two videotaped events were derived by asking subjects which actions were done “in order to” do other actions. An experiment on memory for videotaped events found a hierarchical pattern of recall and that the recall of goal-directed actions was superior to that of non-goal-directed actions, supporting the hypothesis that Plan schemata are used in the recall of events. An additional experiment showed that the temporal order of actions in observed events is reconstructed from the underlying Plan schema. A parallel series of recall experiments was carried out using prose descriptions of the videotaped events. Results replicated the earlier studies, suggesting that the recall of narrative prose is largely determined by the Plan schema of the underlying events.

An Empirical Test of a Taxonomy of Responses to Anomalous Data in Science

The purpose of this study was to test a taxonomy of seven proposed responses to anomalous data. Our results generally supported the taxonomy but indicated that one additional type of response should be added to the taxonomy. We conclude that there are eight possible responses to anomalous data: (a) ignoring the data, (b) rejecting the data, (c) professing uncertainty about the validity of the data, (d) excluding the data from the domain of the current theory, (e) holding the data in abeyance, (f) reinter- preting the data, (g) accepting the data and making peripheral changes to the current theory, and (h) ac- cepting the data and changing theories. We suggest that this taxonomy could help science teachers in two ways. First, science teachers could use the taxonomy to try to anticipate how students might react to anom- alous data so as to make theory change more likely. Second, science teachers could use the taxonomy as a framework to guide classroom discussion about the nature of scientific rationality. In addition, the tax- onomy suggests directions for future research.

Memory for the pragmatic implications of sentences

A sentence pragmatically implies another sentence when information in the first sentence leads the hearer to expect something that is neither explicitly stated nor necessarily implied by the original sentence. Thus,The safe-cracker put the match to the fuse pragmatically impliesThe safe-cracker lit the fuse. In a cued recall task with sentences containing pragmatic implications, 19% of the items were recalled correctly while 26% of the responses consisted of the pragmatic implications of the original sentences. The data were interpreted as demonstrating the strong interaction of the subjects’ long-term knowledge with the episodic memory for sentences task.

Mental Models of the Earth, Sun, and Moon: Indian Children's Cosmologies.

Abstract This study reports data on the acquisition of knowledge about astronomy in children from India. Based on prior research, we hypothesized that the cosmological models that children construct are influenced by both first-order and second-order constraints on knowledge acquisition. First-order constraints are the implicit assumptions that govern the construction of initial cosmological models. Examples of such constraints include the assumptions that the earth is flat and supported. Such first-order constraints are presumed to be universal. Second-order constraints arise from the specific properties ascribed to cosmological objects. For example, representations of the earths shape and location relative to the sun and moon constrain the kinds of mechanisms that are generated to account for the day-night cycle. We hypothesized that in cultures where both folk cosmologies and the scientific cosmological model are accessible to children, aspects of folk models are likely to be incorporated in childrens cosmologies if they provide a psychologically easier way of satisfying first-order constraints. This hypothesis is supported by our findings with regard to universality and culture specificity in childrens cosmologies. Indian childrens cosmologies honor a variety of universal first-order constraints. These include constraints on the shape of the earth (e.g., support and flatness) and on the relative locations and motions of objects in the cosmology (e.g., continuity). However, many Indian children borrow the idea that the earth is supported by an ocean or a body of water from folk cosmology. This solution to the support constraint on the shape of the earth is not found in American childrens initial cosmologies.

Explanation in Scientists and Children

In this paper we provide a psychological account of the nature and development of explanation. We propose that an explanation is an account that provides a conceptual framework for a phenomenon that leads to a feeling of understanding in the reader/hearer. The explanatory conceptual framework goes beyond the original phenomenon, integrates diverse aspects of the world, and shows how the original phenomenon follows from the framework. We propose that explanations in everyday life are judged on the criteria of empirical accuracy, scope, consistency, simplicity, and plausibility. We conclude that explanations in science are evaluated by the same criteria, plus those of precision, formalisms, and fruitfulness. We discuss several types of explanation that are used in everyday life – causal/mechanical, functional, and intentional. We present evidence to show that young children produce explanations (often with different content from those of adults) that have the same essential form as those used by adults. We also provide evidence that children use the same evaluation criteria as adults, but may not apply those additional criteria for the evaluation of explanations that are used by scientists.

Schema Acquisition From a Single Example

This study compares Similarity-Based Learning (SBL) and Explanation-Based Learning (EBL) approaches to schema acquisition. In SBL approaches, concept formation is based on similarity across multiple examples. Howevr, these approaches seem to be appropriate when the learner cannot apply existing knowledge and when the concepts to be learned are nonexplanatory. EBL approaches assume that a schema can be acquired from even a single example by constructing an explanation of the example using background knowledge, and generalizing the resulting explanation

Models of Data: A Theory of How People Evaluate Data

This article reports the results of a study investigating how undergraduates evaluate realistic scientific data in the domains of geology and paleontology. The results are used to test several predictions of a theory of data evaluation, which we call models-of-data theory. Models-of-data theory assumes that when evaluating data, the individual constructs a particular kind of cognitive model that integrates many features of the data with a theoretical interpretation of the data. The individual evaluates the model by attempting to generate alternative causal explanations for the events in the model. We contrast models-of-data theory with other proposals for how data are cognitively represented and show that models-of-data theory gives a good account of the pattern of written evaluations of data produced by the undergraduates in the study. We discuss theoretical and instructional implications of the theory.

Discourse organization in the comprehension of temporal order in narrative texts

We investigated the role of global discourse organization on the comprehension of temporal order in narrative. We proposed three principles of discourse organization: (a) the immediate integration principle—a new event should be integrated immediately with old information, (b) the consistency principle—a new event should be attached to a consistent locus, and (c) the isomorphism principle— discourse structure should match event structure. Five passages varying in discourse structure were presented auditorily, and the comprehension of the underlying event order was tested. Subjects’ comprehension was best in the canonical passage. The backward, flashback, and embedded passages were significantly more difficult than the canonical passages. The flashforward passage was the most difficult. The results were interpreted as showing that the immediate integration principle is a strong component of comprehension of temporal order and that the isomorphism principle contributes to text comprehension, but to a lesser degree. The purpose of the present experiment is to investigate the role of global discourse organization on the comprehension of temporal order in narrative texts using experimental narratives in which discourse order and event order were not confounded. To study global discourse structure, we believe that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between the events in the underlying event world and the linguistic representation of these events in a narrative text. The organization of the events in the underlying event world will be referred to as the event structure (E-1, E-2, E-3, etc.), and the temporal arrangements of these events in the text will be referred to as the discourse structure (e-1, e-2, e-3, etc.). For example, given an underlying event sequence such as,

Reconstructive remembering of the scientific literature.

In this paper we investigate the role of reconstructive memory in citation errors that occur in the scientific literature. We focus on the case of de Groots (1946) studies of the memory for chess positions by chess experts. Previous work has shown that this research is very often cited incorrectly. In Experiment 1 we show that free recall of this work by research psychologists replicates most of the errors found in the published literature. Experiment 2 shows that undergraduates reading a correct account of the de Groot study also make the same set of errors in recall. We interpret these findings as showing that consistent errors in secondary accounts of experimental findings are frequently reconstructive memory errors due to source confusion and schema-based processes. Analysis of a number of other examples of scientific literature that have been frequently cited incorrectly add additional support to the reconstructive account. We conclude that scientists should be aware of the tendency of reconstructive memory errors to cause violations of the scientific norm of accurate reporting of the scientific literature.