William H. Shaw

Business ethics today: A survey

This essay surveys the state of business ethics in North America. It describes the distinctive features of business ethics as an academic sub-discipline and as a pedagogical topic, and compares and contrasts three rival models of business ethics current among philosophers.

‘They Stole Our Land’: Debating the Expropriation of White Farms in Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe today, Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF colleagues are busy expropriating white-owned farms, and claiming the moral high ground while they do so. Indeed, many observers, inside Zimbabwe and elsewhere, take it for granted that, whatever Mugabes excesses, there is justice in his cause. But is there ? This paper examines three moral arguments that Mugabe and his supporters advance to justify their land policies: that the peasants need the land, that the war of liberation was fought for the land, and that Zimbabweans are only taking back land that was originally stolen from them. The last of these arguments, which rests on an implicit entitlement theory ofjustice, is the strongest, and this essay therefore scrutinises it closely. It argues, however, that despite their emotive appeal, all three arguments are flawed beyond repair. Debunking them should help pave the way for a more sensible and more viable approach to the land question in Zimbabwe.

Towards the One-Party State in Zimbabwe: a Study in African Political Thought

Zimbabwe today is the site of a surprisingly vigorous debate over the one-party state. Some students of Africa might find the issue stale and the conclusion foregone, but Zimbabweans do not look at their political future that way. The first task of this article is to present the arguments of the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) in favour of one-party rule and the rebuttals this has provoked. Documenting this debate is worthwhile given various popular misconceptions about Zimbabwean political life; in addition, doing so sheds light on the character of political thinking in Africa. The arguments are also important enough and of sufficient interest to be assessed philosophically, and this is my second task. Since Z.A.N.U.(P.F.) officially embraces a Marxist ideology, I shall, in particular, scrutinise its case for one-party rule from within its own political-theoretical framework. I contend that Marxist theory does not dictate such a system of government, and that viewed from this perspective the arguments for it are flawed and the partys faith in it is problematic.

Utilitarianism and Recourse to War

Despite the enormous impact that war and the threat of war have had on human well-being, utilitarians have had surprisingly little to say about when, if ever, we may fight wars. Discussion of this question has been dominated by realism, pacifism and just war theory. This article takes some preliminary steps toward remedying this situation. I begin by spelling out what I call the Utilitarian War Principle (UWP). After presenting some considerations in its favour and answering some possible objections to it, I compare UWP with pacifism and with the principles of jus ad bellum found in the work of contemporary just war theorists. I argue that adherents of UWP should treat those principles as secondary moral principles, which, although subordinate to UWP, can and should guide its application and which, in turn, should be refined and revised with this goal in mind.

Costs and benefits of inflicting pain

Relax in your own way Physics is hard, and relaxation is crucial. Max Planck and Werner Heisenberg played the piano at near concert-level. They loved immersing themselves in music, not just for its beauty, but because it suggested the underlying truths that were still waiting to be discovered. Religion has been a deep source for many others — such as Abdus Salam and Faraday — and there are also a few who’ve taken the Schrödinger approach. Erwin Schrödinger had a tolerant wife, a charming manner and as many affairs as Wolfgang Pauli had tantrums. This presented problems in Anglo-Saxon countries. As the biographer Walter Moore put it: “It was bad enough [for Schrödinger] to have one wife at Oxford — to have two was unspeakable.” Most frequently, though, it’s simply conversation: honest, quick-firing conversation with the handful of friends who can lift you to a higher level. This insight is what William Cropper has provided, in a book that has such excellent biographical information, mixed in with fully accurate science, that it can serve both as a good guide for top secondary-school students or beginning university students, and as a wise collation of advice and experience for working physicists at all levels beyond. ■ David Bodanis (e-mail: davidbodanis@compuserve.com) taught the ‘Intellectual Toolkit’ course at the University of Oxford for many years. His most recent book is E4mc: A Biography of the World’s Most Famous Equation (Pan Macmillan).

Plekhanov on the role of the individual in history

This essay critically assesses Plekhanovs famous article on the role of the individual in history. Part I explicates his treatment of the problem of free will and determinism and argues that it is unsatisfactory. The whole issue, however, is held to be largely irrelevant to Marxism. Part II then turns to the question of the explanatory weight given to individual action by historical materialism. Plekhanovs discussion of this issue is more insightful, and the essay endeavors to distinguish between the strong and weak points of his analysis in order to lay the foundations for a more adequate handling of the subject.

Consequentialism, war, and national defense

What, if anything, grounds the right of national defense? This essay explicates and defends a consequentialist answer to that question. After explaining the relevance and importance of this project, I clarify the meaning of consequentialism and explain how consequentialists understand and justify rights, including the right of national defense. International law enshrines that right. After explaining why it is correct to do so and why that right should be upheld, I examine some issues that this right leaves unsettled and probe its moral limits. I then reply to several objections to a consequentialist approach to national defense, pursuing in particular the criticism that consequentialists cannot justify the Allies’ having taken up defensive arms against the Axis powers in World War II.

Moore’s Commitment to Consequentialism

Throughout his writings on ethics, Moore emphasized that judgments about good divide into two types: something may be judged good in itself or judged good as a means; that is, as a cause or necessary condition for the existence of something else that is good in itself. “The nature of these two species of universal ethical judgments is extremely different,” he states in Principia, “and a great part of the difficulties, which are met with in ordinary ethical speculation, are due to the failure to distinguish them clearly” (21, cf. 24). Clarity on this point, Moore contends, is absolutely crucial if one is to analyze and answer otherwise ambiguous questions like “What is our duty under these circumstances?”, “Is it right to act in this way?”, or “What ought we to aim at securing?” To answer such questions, “we must know both what degree of intrinsic value different things have, and how these different things may be obtained” (26).

Limits to Moral Knowledge

The previous two chapters examined Moore’s reasons for embracing this “supreme rule” of ethics; they reviewed his criticisms of some rival normative theories; and they explicated his consequentialist understanding of the basic structure of right and wrong, duty and virtue. From matters of fundamental principle, we now begin turning to questions that have a more immediate bearing on conduct. Although Moore enjoyed a long philosophical career, Chapter 5 of Principia Ethica, “Ethics in Relation to Conduct,” provides his only detailed statement of what his ethical perspective implies for our efforts to act rightly and live morally defensible lives. Chapter 5 is therefore our main guide as we attempt to spell out, in this chapter and the two that follow, the implications of Moore’s normative system for everyday moral conduct. The present chapter explores what Moore saw as the limits of our moral knowledge. Against this backdrop, the following chapter examines Moore’s effort to justify certain basic moral rules, while the final chapter probes how, in light of those rules, Moore thought individuals ought to comport themselves.

“Good” and the Things That are Good

The present study has as its focus Moore’s normative ethics; its aim is to elucidate and assess his account of the principles of right and wrong. It will be helpful, however, to begin with an exposition of Moore’s value theory. Accordingly, this first chapter presents Moore’s understanding of the meaning and nature of good and reviews his account of those things that are intrinsically valuable.