William M. Baum

Choice in Free-Ranging Wild Pigeons

A flock of free-ranging wild pigeons were trained to peck at buttons which, when operated, allowed brief access to grain. Although only one bird at a time could have access to the buttons, the pecks of the group were treated as an aggregate. When they chose between two buttons, each of which could occasionally produce grain, the ratios of pecks at the buttons approximately equaled the ratios of the grain presentations obtained from them. This accords with a relation well substantiated in the laboratory, the matching law. It suggests that the matching law may apply to the behavior of higher organisms in natural environments.

Choice in a continuous procedure

A pigeon lived in a situation in which all its food was obtained by pecking at two disks. The proportion of pecks allocated to either disk equalled the proportion of food obtained by pecks at the disk, confirming a well-known matching relation. The finding strengthens the view that the matching relation is an intrinsic property of the behavior of higher organisms.

Quantitative Prediction and Molar Description of the Environment

Molecular explanations of behavior, based on momentary events and variables that can be measured each time an event occurs, can be contrasted with molar explanations, based on aggregates of events and variables that can be measured only over substantial periods of time. Molecular analyses cannot suffice for quantitative accounts of behavior, because the historical variables that determine behavior are inevitably molar. When molecular explanations are attempted, they always depend on hypothetical constructs that stand as surrogates for molar environmental variables. These constructs allow no quantitative predictions when they are vague, and when they are made precise, they become superfluous, because they can be replaced with molar measures. In contrast to molecular accounts of phenomena like higher responding on ratio schedules than interval schedules and free-operant avoidance, molar accounts tend to be simple and straightforward. Molar theory incorporates the notion that behavior produces consequences that in turn affect the behavior, the notion that behavior and environment together constitute a feedback system. A feedback function specifies the dependence of consequences on behavior, thereby describing properties of the environment. Feedback functions can be derived for simple schedules, complex schedules, and natural resources. A complete theory of behavior requires describing the environment’s feedback functions and the organism’s functional relations. Molar thinking, both in the laboratory and in the field, can allow quantitative prediction, the mark of a mature science.

Behaviorism, Private Events, and the Molar View of Behavior

Viewing the science of behavior (behavior analysis) to be a natural science, radical behaviorism rejects any form of dualism, including subjective–objective or inner–outer dualism. Yet radical behaviorists often claim that treating private events as covert behavior and internal stimuli is necessary and important to behavior analysis. To the contrary, this paper argues that, compared with the rejection of dualism, private events constitute a trivial idea and are irrelevant to accounts of behavior. Viewed in the framework of evolutionary theory or for any practical purpose, behavior is commerce with the environment. By its very nature, behavior is extended in time. The temptation to posit private events arises when an activity is viewed in too small a time frame, obscuring what the activity does. When activities are viewed in an appropriately extended time frame, private events become irrelevant to the account. This insight provides the answer to many philosophical questions about thinking, sensing, and feeling. Confusion about private events arises in large part from failure to appreciate fully the radical implications of replacing mentalistic ideas about language with the concept of verbal behavior. Like other operant behavior, verbal behavior involves no agent and no hidden causes; like all natural events, it is caused by other natural events. In a science of behavior grounded in evolutionary theory, the same set of principles applies to verbal and nonverbal behavior and to human and nonhuman organisms.

Molar and molecular views of choice

The molar and molecular views of behavior are not different theories or levels of analysis; they are different paradigms. The molecular paradigm views behavior as composed of discrete units (responses) occurring at moments in time and strung together in chains to make up complex performances. The discrete pieces are held together as a result of association by contiguity. The molecular view has a long history both in early thought about reflexes and in associationism, and, although it was helpful to getting a science of behavior started, it has outlived its usefulness. The molar view stems from a conviction that behavior is continuous, as argued by John Dewey, Gestalt psychologists, Karl Lashley, and others. The molar paradigm views behavior as inherently extended in time and composed of activities that have integrated parts. In the molar paradigm, activities vary in their scale of organization--i.e., as to whether they are local or extended--and behavior may be controlled sometimes by short-term relations and sometimes by long-term relations. Applied to choice, the molar paradigm rests on two simple principles: (a) all behavior constitutes choice; and (b) all activities take time. Equivalence between choice and behavior occurs because every situation contains more than one alternative activity. The principle that behavior takes time refers not simply to any notion of response duration, but to the necessity that identifying one action or another requires a sample extended in time. The molecular paradigms momentary responses are inferred from extended samples in retrospect. In this sense, momentary responses constitute abstractions, whereas extended activities constitute concrete particulars. Explanations conceived within the molecular paradigm invariably involve hypothetical constructs, because they require causes to be contiguous with responses. Explanations conceived within the molar paradigm retain direct contact with observable variables.

Rules, culture, and fitness.

Behavior analysis risks intellectual isolation unless it integrates its explanations with evolutionary theory. Rule-governed behavior is an example of a topic that requires an evolutionary perspective for a full understanding. A rule may be defined as a verbal discriminative stimulus produced by the behavior of a speaker under the stimulus control of a long-term contingency between the behavior and fitness. As a discriminative stimulus, the rule strengthens listener behavior that is reinforced in the short run by socially mediated contingencies, but which also enters into the long-term contingency that enhances the listener’s fitness. The long-term contingency constitutes the global context for the speaker’s giving the rule. When a rule is said to be “internalized,” the listener’s behavior has switched from short- to long-term control. The fitness-enhancing consequences of long-term contingencies are health, resources, relationships, or reproduction. This view ties rules both to evolutionary theory and to culture. Stating a rule is a cultural practice. The practice strengthens, with short-term reinforcement, behavior that usually enhances fitness in the long run. The practice evolves because of its effect on fitness. The standard definition of a rule as a verbal statement that points to a contingency fails to distinguish between a rule and a bargain (“If you’ll do X, then I’ll do Y”), which signifies only a single short-term contingency that provides mutual reinforcement for speaker and listener. In contrast, the giving and following of a rule (“Dress warmly; it’s cold outside”) can be understood only by reference also to a contingency providing long-term enhancement of the listener’s fitness or the fitness of the listener’s genes. Such a perspective may change the way both behavior analysts and evolutionary biologists think about rule-governed behavior.

DYNAMICS OF CHOICE: A TUTORIAL

Choice may be defined as the allocation of behavior among activities. Since all activities take up time, choice is conveniently thought of as the allocation of time among activities, even if activities like pecking are most easily measured by counting. Since dynamics refers to change through time, the dynamics of choice refers to change of allocation through time. In the dynamics of choice, as in other dynamical systems that include feedback, change is away from perturbation and toward a steady state. Steady state or equilibrium is assessed on a longer time scale than change because change is only visible on a smaller time scale. When we compare laws of equilibrium, such as the matching law with laws of dynamics, two possibilities emerge. Self-similarity occurs when the same law can be seen across smaller time scales, with the result that the law at longer time scales may be understood as the expression of its application at smaller time scales. Reduction occurs when the dynamics at a small time scale are incommensurate with the dynamics at longer time scales. Then the process at the longer time scale is reduced to a qualitatively different process at the smaller time scale, as when choice is reduced to switching patterns. When reduction occurs, the dynamics at the longer time scale may be derived from the process at the smaller time scale, but not the other way around. Research at different time scales is facilitated by the molar view of behavior.

Dynamics of choice: relative rate and amount affect local preference at three different time scales.

To examine extended control over local choice, the present study investigated preference in transition as food-rate ratio provided by two levers changed across seven components within daily sessions, and food-amount ratio changed across phases. Phase 1 arranged a food-amount ratio of 4:1 (i.e., the left lever delivered four pellets and the right lever one pellet); Phase 2 reversed the food-amount ratio to 1:4, and in Phase 3 the food-amount ratio was 3:2. At a relatively extended time scale, preference was described well by a linear relation between log response ratio and log rate ratio (the generalized matching law). A small amount of carryover occurred from one rate ratio to the next but disappeared after four food deliveries. Estimates of sensitivity to food-amount ratio were around 1.0 and were independent of rate ratio. Analysis across food deliveries within rate-ratio components showed that the effect of a small amount was diminished by the presence of a large amount-that is, when a larger amount was present in the situation (three or four pellets), the value of a small amount (one or two pellets) became paltry. More local analysis of visits to the levers between food deliveries showed that postfood visits following a large amount were disproportionately longer than following a small amount. Continuing food deliveries from the same source tended to make visits less dependent on relative amount, but a discontinuation (i.e., food from the other lever) reinstated dependence on relative amount. Analysis at a still smaller time scale revealed preference pulses following food deliveries that confirmed the tendency toward dependence on absolute amount with continuing deliveries, and toward dependence on relative amount following discontinuations. A mathematical model based on a linear-operator equation accounts for many of the results. The larger and longer preference following a switch to a larger amount is consistent with the idea that local preference depends on relatively extended variables even on short time scales.

Random and Systematic Foraging, Experimental Studies of Depletion, and Schedules of Reinforcement

To say that an organism moves about randomly in space is to say that it fails to discriminate one location from any other. If it moves about systematically, then it does discriminate one location from another. In general, if an organism behaves randomly with respect to some dimension of the environment, it fails to discriminate among situations that differ only in that dimension, and to the extent that it does discriminate, it behaves systematically. Discrimination usually saves time and energy, because discrimination usually means that effort is allocated predominantly to situations in which it is most likely to produce favorable results. To be systematic, therefore, is to be efficient.

What Counts as Behavior? The Molar Multiscale View

Because the definition of behavior changes as our understanding of behavior changes, giving a final definition is impossible. One can, however, rule out some possibilities and propose some others based on what we currently know. Behavior is not simply movement, but must be defined by its function. Also, our understanding of behavior must agree with evolutionary theory. I suggest 4 basic principles: (a) only whole organisms behave; (b) behavior is purposive; (c) behavior takes time; and (d) behavior is choice. Saying that parts of an organism behave is nonsense, and, moreover, evolutionary theory explains the existence of organisms mainly through their adaptive behavior. Behavior is purposive in that behavior is shaped by its consequences, through an organism’s lifetime or through interactions with the environment across many generations of natural selection. Behavior takes time in that behavior is interaction with the environment that cannot take place at a moment. Moreover, at a moment in time, one cannot definitely identify the function of behavior. Identification of an activity requires a span of time. Behavior is choice in the sense that a suitable span of time always includes time spent in more than 1 activity. Activities include parts that are themselves activities on a smaller time scale and compete for time. Thus, behavior constitutes time allocation. An accounting problem arises whenever any behavior is attributed to multiple consequences. In the molar multiscale view, this raises the question of whether 2 activities can occur at the same time. The question remains open.