William M. Leary

Aircraft and Anti-Communists: CAT in Action, 1949–52

“The United States Government,” President Harry S. Truman announced on 5 January 1950, “will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.” Historians generally agree that President Truman meant what he said. American policy after the summer of 1949, writes Tang Tsou, was “to avoid, as far as possible, any further involvement in the Chinese civil war and to allow events in China to unfold themselves.” The Truman administration ruled out the use of force to prevent the fall of Formosa; non-recognition of the Communist government was adopted as “a temporary measure,” due to Republican pressure and the hope of gaining concessions from Peking. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, observes Lyman P. Van Slyke, “brought to a sudden end the policy that the administration had followed for two years, and committed us once again to involvement in the Chinese civil war.” The United States assumed a protective role towards the remnants of the Nationalists on Formosa and became the implacable foe of Peking. This article, a study of a commercial airlines participation in a major diplomatic and legal controversy during the last phase of the Chinese civil war, will suggest that there is reason to doubt, or at least to modify, the traditional interpretation of American policy towards China between late 1949 and June 1950.

At the Dawn of Commercial Aviation: Inglis M. Uppercu and Aeromarine Airways

Only a few years before Juan Trippe of Pan American Airways successfully established an international commercial air carrier based upon the flying boat, Inglis M. Uppercu, with apparently ample financial and managerial resources, failed to do so. In telling why, Professor Leary demonstrates the overwhelming importance of timing and a knowledge of the exact nature of market opportunities in the entrepreneurial process.

EDWARD F. HAAS. DeLesseps S. Morrison and the Image of Reform: New Orleans Politics, 1946-1961. Pp. xii, 368. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974.

for the presidency. He argues that our constitutional system &dquo;must be insulated from the perils of an over-weaning Presidency&dquo; and that in addition, the President is in a much stronger bargaining position in dealing with the foreign countries if he has behind him the support of Congress. Specific points stand out in this discussion. It is clear, although this is well known, that the staffs of the members of Congress, and of the committees, are very influential in the development of public policy. He also makes the familiar point that the committee staffs are not as helpful as they might be because they do not include enough expertise. He also makes the point that individual Senators may count a great deal. For example, Senator Brooke took the lead and persistently argued the case involving the desirability of the MIRV missile system. He also points up the tremendous influence of Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. That determined and well-informed individuals make a difference is not an original discovery, but it is a point well worth making in view of the collegial character of the two Houses of the Con-