William M. Petrusic

Reading habits for both words and numbers contribute to the SNARC effect.

This study compared the spatial representation of numbers in three groups of adults: Canadians, who read both English words and Arabic numbers from left to right; Palestinians, who read Arabic words and Arabic-Indic numbers from right to left; and Israelis, who read Hebrew words from right to left but Arabic numbers from left to right. Canadians associated small numbers with left and large numbers with right space (the SNARC effect), Palestinians showed the reverse association, and Israelis had no reliable spatial association for numbers. These results suggest that reading habits for both words and numbers contribute to the spatial representation of numbers.

The calibration and resolution of confidence in perceptual judgments.

Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontariot Canada Confidence rating based calibration and resolution indices were obtained in two experiments requiring perceptual comparisons and in a third with visual gap detection. Four important results were obtained. First, as in the general knowledge domain, subjects were underconfident when judgments were easy and overconfident when they were difficult. Second, paralleling the clear dependence of calibration on decisional difficulty, resolution decreased with increases in decision difficulty arising either from decreases in discriminability or from increasing demands for speed at the expense of accuracy. Third, providing trial-by-trial response feedback on difficult tasks improved resolution but had no effect on calibration. Fourth, subjects can accurately reportsubjective errors (i.e., trials in which they have indicated that they made an error) with their confidence ratings. It is also shown that the properties of decision time, conditionalized on confidence category, impose a rigorous set of constraints on theories of confidence calibration.

Probing the locus of confidence judgments: experiments on the time to determine confidence.

Three experiments investigated the properties of the time to determine confidence to determine the processing locus for the judgment of confidence. Results suggest that when the primary decision is made under speed stress, confidence is determined postdecisionally and involves a memory-based, computational algorithm. This strategy frees the primary decision of processing time and permits the accurate diagnosis of decision errors. When the primary decision is made under accuracy stress, however, the determination of confidence is initiated, or can even be completed, during the primary decision process. This strategy permits confidence to be used in the adaptive regulation of the decisional parameters during the decision process but yields poorer diagnosticity of errors when they occur. The latter finding also implies that primary decision latencies include time to determine confidence, rendering such data difficult, if not impossible, to model empirically. Implications for contemporary decision models that provide a basis for confidence in human judgment are discussed.

Mental rotation validation of two spatial ability tests.

SummaryThree tests of spatial ability — speeded mental rotation and the Card Rotation and Revised Minnesota Form Board Tests — were examined with 32 college students. The slope of the linear function relating response time to angle of rotation in the mental rotation task was stimulus-dependent, increasing with stimulus symmetry. Males strongly dominated females on the Card Rotation Test and in speed of mental rotation, but not on the Minnesota Form Board Test or in the intercept of the judgment-time by angle-of-rotation plot. Practice with the simple forms used in the mental rotation task substantially improved scores with the many more complex forms used in the Card Rotation Test, but did not improve scores on the Minnesota Form Board Test. These results are not due to speed-accuracy tradeoff strategy differences. They suggest that “spatial ability” is not unitary and that test-based sex differences in spatial ability largely reflect differences in rotation speed or in a factor underlying rotation speed.

Presentation order effects in duration discrimination

Three separate experiments indicate that the second of a pair of durations tends to be overestimated relative to the first. These negative time-order errors are discussed as reliable perceptual phenomena, not explainable in terms of simple response biases, criterion biases, assimilation, or fading traces.

On the mental representation of negative numbers: Context-dependent SNARC effects with comparative judgments

In one condition, positive and negative number pairs were compared in separate blocks of trials. In another condition, the positive and the negative number pairs were intermixed. In the intermixed condition, comparisons involving negative numbers were faster with the left hand than with the right, and comparisons were faster with the right hand than with the left hand with the positive numbers; that is, a spatial numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect was obtained, in which the mental number line was extended leftward with the negative numbers. On the other hand, in the blocked condition, a reverse SNARC effect was obtained with the negative numbers; that is, negative number pairs have the same underlying spatial representation as the positive numbers in this context. Nongraded semantic congruity effects, obtained in both the blocked and the intermixed conditions, are consistent with the idea that magnitude information is extracted prior to the generation of discrete semantic codes.

Relational judgments with remembered stimuli

Two experiments investigating the effect of the direction of a relational judgment on the speed of the judgment are reported. In both experiments, college students required more time to select the smaller of a pair of large animals than to select the larger. Conversely, the smaller of a pair of small animals was selected more quickly than was the larger. The magnitude of this “cross-over effect” was fully graded, increasing regularly with extremity, but the variability of the response times in each direction was unrelated to extremity. Individual animals were classified as “small” or “large” with almost perfect consistency. This pattern of results is used to evaluate several models of relational judgment; of these, the congruency model is shown to be inconsistent with these data.

Realism of confidence in sensory discrimination

Is there a common and general basis for confidence in human judgment? Recently, we found that the properties of confidence judgments in the sensory domain mirror those previously established in the cognitive domain; notably, we found underconfidence on easy sensory judgments and overconfidence on hard sensory judgments. In contrast, data from the Uppsala laboratory in Sweden suggest that sensory judgments are unique; they found a pervasive underconfidence bias, with overconfidence being evident only on very hard sensory judgments. Olsson and Winman (1996) attempted to resolve the debate on the basis of methodological issues related to features of the stimulus display in a visual discrimination task. A reanalysis of the data reported in Baranski and Petrusic (1994), together with the findings of a new experiment that controlled stimulus display characteristics, supports the position that the difference between the Canadian and the Swedish data is real and, thus, may reflect cross-national differences in confidence in sensory discrimination.

Judging confidence influences decision processing in comparative judgments.

Current theories of confidence in human judgment assume that confidence and the decision it is based on are inextricably tied to the same process (decisional locus theories) or that confidence processing begins only once the primary decision has been completed (postdecisional locus theories). In the absence of auxiliary assumptions, however, neither class of theory permits the judgment of confidence to affect primary decision processing. In the present study, we examined the effect of rendering confidence judgments on the properties of the decision process in a sensory discrimination task. An examination of the properties of the time taken to determine confidence (i.e., the time taken to render the judgment of confidence) revealed clear evidence of postdecisional confidence processing. Concomitantly, the requirement of confidence judgments was found to substantially increase decisional response times, suggesting that some confidence processing occurs during the primary decision process. We discuss the implications of these findings for contemporary models of confidence in human judgment.

Semantic congruity effects and theories of the comparison process.

Two experiments requiring comparisons of point locations on the line demonstrate that the magnitude of the response-time-based congruity effect parallels the form of the macro and the micro speed-accuracy trade-off function. This is predicted from the evidence accrual class of theories but is contrary to either the propositionally based semantic coding theory or the expectancy view. Very large accuracy-based congruity effects with comparisons of point locations in the plane are evident. Congruity effects arise because the duration of each evidence accrual is increased and the quality of the information is reduced as the distance of the stimulus representations from the instruction-activated reference point increases. This evidence accrual view is extended to account for the properties of perceptual and symbolic comparisons.