William P. Browne

Organized Interests and Their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism in a Policy Domain

Recent research suggests that patterns of interaction among organized American interests have important implications for pluralist theory. The research presented here confirms that competition for policy attention exists among multiple interests having divided policy goals. However, the findings challenge the view that a proliferation of organizations leads to actual competition between interest groups as issues are resolved. It does so by shifting the level of analysis from the domain level to the issue level in order to provide a common substantive context for elite/pluralist interpretations. The analysis argues, using transaction theory, that organized interests cultivate specific and recognizable identities. From these identities, they come to occupy issue niches where they only infrequently ally themselves with or become adversaries of other interests. Rather than do so, most interests accommodate one another by concentrating on very narrow issues. Only a few organizations, usually the least influential, focus on encompassing or sectorwide issues or become large scale coalition players. That is, most interest groups avoid conflict situations. The data base includes interviews with 238 interest representatives, tracing their involvement on 402 prioritized issues and 180 acts and regulations that were finally passed.

Variations in the Behavior and Style of State Lobbyists and Interest Groups

Interest group theory, through both implication and explanation, assumes that some central occupational norms of lobbying strategy cause lobbyists to seek and maintain regularized access and entry to policymakers. Little data exist to support the contention that lobbying behavior is generally directed toward cementing these relationships, however. This study of twenty-six aging interests in four states finds no such norm convergence. Some states, depending on institutional and cultural characteristics, lend themselves to access-oriented lobbying styles, while others give rise to other norms regarding lobbyist/policymaker interaction. Data on legislative outcomes are used to question the appropriateness of these norms in exercising political influence.

Politics by other Means: The Emergence of a New Politics of Food in the United States

A new politics of food has arrived. Interest groups are no longer required to rely on traditional legislative means to achieve their political objectives. Instead, changes in the political economy of the food system and the economic structure of the food system make it possible to practice politics by other means, including the use of the market to achieve political objectives. The increasing transaction costs of legislative decision making, the slow growth in the demand for food in developed country markets, the increasing demand for specific food product attributes, and the highly concentrated state of most food markets can make it advantageous for interest groups to pursue their political objectives through the market rather than through legislative channels. In the new politics of food, the market, the legislature, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary are all arenas within which the art of politics will be practiced.

Beyond the Domain: Recasting Network Politics in the Postreform Congress

The study of policy networks usually focuses on the most routine political interactions, rather than on the proliferation of new activists and issues. In studying Congress, that approach directs attention to committee and subcomittee influence. This analysis takes an alternate approach, one more compatible with increasing entrepreneurship and declining specialization in the postreform Congress. It examines individual members from throughout the Congress as issue initiators. In particular, the focus is on (1) expansive member involvement, (2) the inclination of members to react to and process primarily constituent demands, and (3) the importance of state congressional delegations in advising members on issue selection. The conclusions, based on an extensive survey of members and staff from 113 individual offices, suggest that a significant transformation in the dynamics and power relationships within both Congress and domain politics is taking place. In particular, this research challenges the view that exclusionary and specialized policy networks dominate decision making within a well-defined policy domain.

Municipal Managers and Policy: A Partial Test of the Svara Dichotomy-Duality Model

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1985), p. 179. 4. Survey response dated August 9, 1984, from Kent Rao, deputy secretary for budget, Governors Office, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 5. Survey response postmarked August 3, 1984, from Chris Krahn, director, Budget and Management Operations, Agency of Administration, Department of Budget and Management, State of Vermont. 6. Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism, A View from the States, 2nd ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), p. 227.

Policymaking in the American States Examining Institutional Variables from a Subsystems Perspective

This article examines the policymaking roles and interactions of governors, legislators, administrators, and lobbyists in state politics. It analyzes their policy involvement in terms of whether they fit a conceptual model of subsystem politics. These data are compared to various policy outcome measures of four state governments in the issue area of aging; Florida, Iowa, Michigan, and New Jersey. While the policy data from some states is suggestive of those results postulated in subsystem theory, the patterns of institutional involvement and interaction vary widely. All, however, suggest more clustered, rather than encompassing, patterns of influence and participation within this policy area.

Sponsorship and Enactment State Lawmakers and Aging Legislation, 1956-1978

Patterns of legislation are examined over a 24-year period and legislative outcomes are traced through the policy process of four states: Florida, Iowa, Michigan, and New Jersey. The findings indicate that legislators are drawn in large numbers to sponsor age-related bills. Legislative committees do most of the work in reducing these proposals to the eventual 10% to 27% that will pass. Floor action overturns an average of 3 % of all sponsored bills and governors veto over 4%. Gubernatorial vetoes are especially high when committees report out unusually high percentages of bills and resolutions. There is only slight evidence of state legislators who, as specialists, have a sustained interest in sponsoring and passing age-related legislation.

Farmers and the U.S. Congress: rethinking basic institutional assumptions about agricultural policy

An assumption shared by most agricultural economists is that, as farm numbers decline in a democratic government, farm policy attention from rule-makers will decline as well. This assumption - despite important work to the contrary in institutional economics - is often voiced in federated governing units, especially the U.S., where constituents are locally organized and the commitment of rule-makers to nationwide policy is limited. While significant theoretical literature challenges that majoritarian view from the perspective of interest-group theory, this is the first empirical test and explanation of the behavior of rule-makers. The findings of this analysis indicate that classic majoritarian expectations are not met in the U.S. Congress. Instead, unexpectedly large numbers of legislators seek favorable policy action for farmers as distinct minorities within their districts. However, these same legislators balance their attention to farmers by also taking policy action in agriculture on behalf of other types of constituents. Legislators explain these actions as the result of their own electoral needs to satisfy vocal minorities from their political districts plus the ease with which they can marginally adjust a large base of U.S. farm programs. Thus, a kind of neo-majoritarianism emerges. These results are especially important given the growing attention to federated governance in the European Union, East Europe, in North America through free trade agreements, and with the GATT. They indicate that farmers will continue, despite shrinking numbers, to be influential in those governing structures that have historically strong farm programs and the capacity to diversify from that policy base.

Interest Groups & Public within a State Legislative Setting

Regretably, systematic inquiry into the power and influence of interest groups is long on theory and short on data. Case studies indeed abound, but precious little information of a quantifiable nature exists indicating the presence or absence of group success. The reasons for such a paucity of data are both clear and understandable, and they need little elaboration here. Suffice it to say that it is (1) difficult to compare interest groups, (2) hard to measure what individual interests want, and (3) nearly impossible to find out if what was originally desired was achieved. It is little wonder that political scientists have taken to evaluating success based on intuitive perceptions of political participants, whether a groups old friends are still listening, or whether or not a very few major issues fall into a groups favor.

Bovine Growth Hormone and the politics of uncertainty: Fear and loathing in a transitional agriculture

Bovine Growth Hormone has been beset by controversy since before its public introduction. The reasons for this are numerous but all rooted in the economic and policy uncertainty surrounding a transitional agriculture. The major sources of the controversy are outlined in this paper as the author explains how little of the ensuing discussion has been based on positive knowledge of either bGH or its likely farm impact. The paper, as a result, raises important questions about the implications of addressing agriculture policy changes in the highly emotionally charged context of present American agriculture.