William S. Robinson

Intrinsic qualities of experience : Surviving Harman's critique

Gilbert Harman (1990) seeks to defend psychophysical functionalism by articulating a representationalist view of the qualities of experience. The negative side of the present paper argues that the resources of this representationalist view are insufficient to ground the evident distinction between perception and (mere) thought. This failure makes the view unable to support the uses to which Harman wishes to put it. Several rescuing moves by other representationalists are considered, but none is found successful. Part of the difficulty in Harmans work is that he does not adequately specify the view he rejects. The positive aim of the present paper is to provide a robust intrinsic quality account of experience that offers advantages in comparison with Harmans view, and that plainly does not fall to any of the arguments he advances.

What Is it Like to Like

The liking of a sensation, e.g., a taste, is a conscious occurrent but does not consist in having the liked sensation accompanied by a “pleasure sensation”—for there is no such sensation. Several alternative accounts of liking, including Aydedes “feeling episode” theory and Schroeders representationalist theory are considered. The proposal that liking a sensation is having the non-sensory experience of liking directed upon it is explained and defended. The pleasure provided by thoughts, conversations, walks, etc., is analyzed and brought into relation to the account of liking ones sensations.

Mild realism, causation, and folk psychology

Abstract Daniel Dennett (1991) has advanced a mild realism in which beliefs are described as patterns “discernible in agents’ (observable) behavior” (p. 30). I clarify the conflict between this otherwise attractive theory and the strong realist view that beliefs are internal states that cause actions. Support for strong realism is sometimes derived from the assumption that the everyday psychology of the folk is committed to it. My main thesis here is that we have sufficient reason neither for strong realism nor for the supporting assumption about the commitments of folk psychology. Several generally implicit arguments in support of the latter assumption are considered. Explicit arguments for it by Ramsey et al. (1990) and Wellman (1990) are examined and judged unsuccessful. An explicit argument for strong realism by Cummins (in conversation) is also found inadequate. Consideration of this latter argument helps to explain why we cannot be satisfied with Dennetts own very brief discussion of causation by b...

Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense

In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers‘ argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers‘ relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view.

Brain symbols and computationalist explanation

Computationalist theories of mind require brain symbols, that is, neural events that represent kinds or instances of kinds. Standard models of computation require multiple inscriptions of symbols with the same representational content. The satisfaction of two conditions makes it easy to see how this requirement is met in computers, but we have no reason to think that these conditions are satisfied in the brain. Thus, if we wish to give computationalist explanations of human cognition, without committing ourselvesa priori to a strong and unsupported claim in neuroscience, we must first either explain how we can provide multiple brain symbols with the same content, or explain how we can abandon standard models of computation. It is argued that both of these alternatives require us to explain the execution of complex tasks that have a cognition-like structure. Circularity or regress are thus threatened, unless noncomputationalist principles can provide the required explanations. But in the latter case, we do not know that noncomputationalist principles might not bear most of the weight of explaining cognition. Four possible types of computationalist theory are discussed; none appears to provide a promising solution to the problem. Thus, despite known difficulties in noncomputationalist investigations, we have every reason to pursue the search for noncomputationalist principles in cognitive theory.

A Wake Up Call

Although I am going to argue that we need not accept the conclusion expressed in Philip Goff’s title, I am grateful for the opportunity to comment on his paper. For I believe he has raised an important challenge that property dualism, and some other views, must face up to.

Representation and Cognitive Explanation

Representations, it is argued, cannot have effects as representations; yet, even so, they are essential to some explanations in cognitive science. These apparently incompatible claims can be reconciled if we distinguish between explaining cognitive abilities and explaining cognition. Certain cognitive abilities can be seen to require representations for their explanation; but explanations of this type cannot explain how the required representations come to be available, or come to be appropriately connected. A clear understanding of the distinction between explaining cognitive abilities and explaining cognition suggests a certain approach to the latter project, and throws light on some recent controversies.