William Seager

Fodor's Theory of Content: Problems and Objections

Jerry Fodor has recently proposed a new entry into the list of information based approaches to semantic content aimed at explicating the general notion of representation for both mental states and linguistic tokens. The basic idea is that a token means what causes its production. The burden of the theory is to select the proper cause from the sea of causal influences which aid in generating any token while at the same time avoiding the absurdity of everythings being literally meaningful (since everything has a cause). I argue that a detailed examination of the theory reveals that neither burden can be successfully shouldered.

The logic of lost lingens

In this paper I aim for two targets. The first is to extend standard doxastic logic via the inclusion of multiple belief operators: there ought to be one such operator for each believer. The usefulness, indeed, the necessity of this extension is quite apparent for there is a clear need to express propositions concerning one person’s beliefs about another’s beliefs. In standard doxastic logics, the subscript on the belief operator is largely an unnecessary flourish faciliating an easy English reading of the symbolism. But it is not difficult to extend the standard doxastic logic to include multiple operators, where the subscript plays a genuine role. The second target is more nebulous and presents greater difficulties. It can be approached by considering an old puzzle about doxastic logic, raised first, I think, by Hector Neri Castafieda.’ The problem is particularly obvious once one begins to think of a doxastic logic with multiple operators over which identity substitutions are allowed. The problem is one about the iteration of belief operators; it shows that the general iteration principle:

Consciousness in the Brain

Jill is worried about the sincerity of Jack’s affection. Young, beautiful and the founder of a NASDAQ leading, multibillion dollar biotechnology firm she has developed a natural fear of predatory suitors. Too many times the semblance of true love has proven temporary sweet illusion.

Embracing the Mystery

Broadly speaking, there are only a few possible responses to the paradox of consciousness. I cannot say I have much confidence in any of them but permit myself some hope that the list of options considered in this chapter is complete, so that one of them will provide the escape route. Three of the four routes are familiar, the fourth, perhaps the most radical of them all, is more novel.

History of Philosophical Theories of Consciousness

Although hard to define precisely and encompassing a huge range of phenomena, the fundamentally troublesome feature of consciousness is its subjectivity: the curious fact that there is something it is like to be in a conscious mental state, something apparent only to the experiencer. The core problem of consciousness is to explain and define the nature of subjectivity. Philosophical theories of consciousness stem from the long history of the mind–body problem which this article traces from ancient times to the present, focusing on the ways Western philosophers have tried to find a place for consciousness in the natural world.

The reality of now

Abstract The apparent ‘flow’ of time is one of its most mysterious features, and one which discomforts both scientists and philosophers. One of the most striking assaults upon it is McTaggarts argument that the idea of temporal flow is demonstratively incoherent. In this paper I first urge that the idea of temporal flow is an important part of our intuitive understanding of time, underpinning several of our notions about rationality and time. Second, I try to undercut McTaggarts argument by showing that it is not temporal flow which is illusory but rather the vicious regress McTaggart saw in that idea. A steadfast clinging to the notion of now, along with an analysis of McTaggarts argument reveals that the regress halts after but two steps.

The Philosophical and Scientific Metaphysics of David Bohm

Although David Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics is sometimes thought to be a kind of regression towards classical thinking, it is in fact an extremely radical metaphysics of nature. The view goes far beyond the familiar but perennially peculiar non-locality and entanglement of quantum systems. In this paper, a philosophical exploration, I examine three core features of Bohm’s metaphysical views, which have been both supported by features of quantum mechanics and integrated into a comprehensive system. These are the holistic nature of the world, the role of a unique kind of information as the ontological basis of the world, and the integration of mentality into this basis as an essential and irreducible aspect of it.

Primas, Emergence, and Worlds

Hans Primas was first and foremost an esteemed scientist at the forefront of quantum chemistry. But he also had abiding and deep philosophical interests, both in the philosophy of science and speculative metaphysics. This paper discusses Primas’ philosophical views about the nature of emergence and ultimately the relation between mind and matter. His account of emergence has a deceptively natural link to the so-called many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. This link is explored and exposed as inadequate to Primas’ thought. Some more speculative remarks about the metaphysics of the mind- matter relation then conclude the paper.

Against Radical Emergence

Where should we look for evidence of radical or, as it is also called, ontological emergence? It might be thought that classical physics is not a very promising starting point. Yet there is a natural link between emergence and complexity. There is no doubt whatsoever that complexity engenders conservative, or epistemological, emergence. There is also an argument that the classical but peculiar phenomenon of chaos in dynamical systems implies that radical or ontological emergence may be a genuine feature of our world. I have my doubts, but the subject is intrinsically interesting and cannot fail to shed light on the general topic of emergence.

Emergence and Supervenience

The metaphysical relation of supervenience has seen most of its service in the fields of the philosophy of mind and ethics. Although not repaying all of the hopes some initially invested in it—the mind-body problem remains stubbornly unsolved, ethics and aesthetics not satisfactorily naturalized—the use of the notion of supervenience has certainly clarified the nature and the commitments of so-called non-reductive physicalism, especially with regard to the questions of whether explanations of supervenience relations are required and whether such explanations must amount to a kind of reduction (a good discussion of these issues can be found in Kim 2005).