Network


Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.

Hotspot


Dive into the research topics where William Stephenson is active.

Publication


Featured researches published by William Stephenson.


Psychological Record | 1964

Application of Q-method to the measurement of public opinion

William Stephenson

A formal model is described for representing qualitative attributes of public opinion. These were the subject of a paper by George Carslake Thompson in 1886, which, though reprinted in recent years, has never been reduced to operations. The proposed method covers Thompson’s schema in all its parts, and offers a way to measure opinions as individual understandings, operant as Q-sorts in Q-methodology.


Psychological Record | 1983

Quantum Theory and Q-Methodology: Fictionalistic and Probabilistic Theories Conjoined

William Stephenson

The close parallels between quantum and factor theories (Q) are outlined. Both theories are largely statistical. That self-reference was rejected in the Scientific Revolution is now being reconsidered, as in the Big Bang theory of the universe’s origin. History suggests the same, that a full structure for science should include the simultaneous claims for certainty and for certitude—the age-long frameworks for which are the fictionalistic and probabilistic respectively. The former (hypotheses-testing) led to expulsion of self-reference from Newtonian science; the latter (probabilistic belief) accepted nature and self as conjoined, as is the case for the Q-methodological approach to subjectivity, and as now appears to be the case for quantum theory and relativity. The main application to general psychology is considered in terms of Charles Spearman’s attempt to provide it with laws and functions, clearly outmoded by the shift to quantum and relativity theories. What remains is interbehavioral psychology, the subjective approach to which is Q-methodology, quantumized by factor theory.


Psychological Record | 1963

Independency and operationism in Q-sorting

William Stephenson

Misgivings about the independency of items in Q-sorting are shown to be due to misunderstandings about what is operational and what is not, and to the fallacy of thinking of items in a Q-sample in logical instead of in psychological-situational terms. Q-samples are composed of balanced block designs for systematic, logical reasons. But Q-sorting has no such logical involvement; it concerns, instead, the subject’s understanding or apperception of a situation. What is independent, and what not, is therefore a matter of fact, not of definition. And because operations are inductive, Q-sortings are analyzed by inductive factor analysis rather than by variance analysis, though for some purposes the latter is of course in order.


Psychological Record | 1969

Foundations of Communication Theory

William Stephenson

There is a communication “explosion” in modern life but no acceptable theory for its understanding. This, in part, is because of the current emphasis on objective approaches. It is proposed here instead that communication can be studied best from a subjective standpoint, where the concern is with the bodies of verbal (or other) statements people make, or may make about any matter. One distinguishes, however, statements of fact (the concern of information theory) from statements of opinion. The latter are subjective and basically self-referent: a theory of communication is proposed for these. In this a person’s ‘position’ or ‘overview’ is modeled as a Q sort, and the communication domain by Q metatheory. The theory has the widest possible applicability, wherever subjectivity is at issue.


Psychological Record | 1972

Applications of Communication Theory I. The Substructure of Science

William Stephenson

The concern is with the nature of science. What is proposed is that subjective aspects of science have been seriously underestimated in the past and that it requires our communication theory concept of communication-pleasure for its understanding. Scientific thinking, it is proposed, is basically conversational—matters of opinion more than of fact. Methods are proposed for bringing this subjective substructure under a measure of objective control. A profound methodological axiom is asserted which is all that distinguishes objectivity from subjectivity.


Psychological Record | 1968

Perspectives in Psychology: XXVI Consciousness Out—Subjectivity In

William Stephenson

This brief, but profound note, indicates that science can deal operantly with subjective statements (of opinion and the like) without involvement in theories of consciousness, phenomenology, or similar psychisms. If the subjective reference is retained, only Q method models it directly.


Psychological Record | 1986

William James, Niels Bohr, and Complementarity: I—Concepts

William Stephenson

The concept of complementarity was introduced by William James in 1891, and by physicist Niels Bohr in 1927, the latter probably without knowledge of the former. The phenomena were experienced as “gaps” in thought, and by the experiential observation that thought is divisible into transitive and substantive parts, providing evidence of complementarity. The most obvious phenomenon of psychology, that of thought, therefore requires quantum-theoretical exploration. Bohr was fascinated by the principle of complementarity and of the possibility of a new epistemology based upon it.


Psychological Record | 1973

Applications of Communication Theory III-Intelligence and Multivalued Choice

William Stephenson

Communication theory provides the study of intelligence and intellect with a basis in which cognition and values are conjointly involved. In psychometry this is never achieved, and the outcome of decades of mental test theory and research is a taxonomy of tests, not a theory of intelligence. Nearer to the heart of intelligence, it is proposed, are multivalued choice situations in which there are no correct answers, only answers that matter in a given situation. The methodology for work on this basis is indicated, and arguments from game theory and intelligence simulation by computer programs are discounted.


Psychological Record | 1965

Perspectives in Psychology: XXIII Definition of Opinion, Attitude and Belief

William Stephenson

Redefinition of the terms opinion, attitude, and belief is recommended to fit operational possibilities. Opinions are synthetic self-referent statements which can be composed for a Q-sample; a Q-sort models a person’s attitude of mind about a situation. Factors are attitudes of mind held in common by many people. Their explanation reaches into latent belief-systems, requiring explanation in psychodynamic terms. Thus, there may be innumerable opinions, few attitudes of mind, and very few belief-systems. Attitudes of mind are immediate and concern self-psychology; beliefs are early internalizations and concern ego-psychology.


Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly | 1964

The Ludenic Theory of Newsreading

William Stephenson

Newspaper reading in its subjectivity seems to be play, pleasing ones self as in a childs game, the author says. His “ludenic theory” states that ludenic newsreading is communication-pleasure.

Collaboration


Dive into the William Stephenson's collaboration.

Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Researchain Logo
Decentralizing Knowledge