William W. Lang

'Flight to quality' in banking and economic activity

Abstract Recent explanations of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy have emphasized that riskier, lower net worth borrowers are more dependent on bank lending than larger, less risky borrowers. Evidence from the Federal Reserves Survey on Terms of Bank Lending indicates that the proportion of relatively high quality new loans (% Safe ) moves countercyclically and Granger causes GDP and inventory investment. In the aftermath of a tightening of monetary policy, the % Safe variable increases, and in turn, policy tends to relax once % Safe has risen.

Do Bankers Sacrifice Value to Build Empires? Managerial Incentives, Industry Consolidation, and Financial Performance

Bank consolidation is a global phenomenon that may enhance stakeholders value if managers do not sacrifice value to build empires. We find strong evidence of managerial entrenchment at U.S. bank holding companies that have higher levels of managerial ownership, better growth opportunities, poorer financial performance, and smaller asset size. At banks without entrenched management, both asset acquisitions and sales are associated with improved performance. At banks with entrenched management, sales are related to smaller improvements while acquisitions are associated with worse performance. Consistent with scale economies, an increase in assets by internal growth is associated with better performance at most banks.

Analysis of proposals for a minimum subordinated debt requirement1

Abstract Increasing market discipline has emerged as a major policy issue for banking regulators. The most prominent proposals for increasing market discipline would require banks to issue subordinated debt to the public. This paper explores the fundamental rationale behind mandatory subordinated debt proposals and their advantages and disadvantages. Our analysis indicates that a subordinated debt requirement will only modestly increase the risk sensitivity of bank costs at most large banks; however, we argue that there are substantial benefits to using subordinated debt as a market-based trigger for regulatory action.

The Mortgage and Financial Crises: The Role of Credit Risk Management and Corporate Governance

This paper discusses the role of risk management and corporate governance as causal factors in the onset of the financial crisis. The boom and bust in the housing market precipitated serious strains in financial markets. These strains resulted in the onset of the financial crisis in August 2007 with the collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper market. This collapse occurred because the solvency of a number of large financial firms was threatened by huge losses in complex structured financial securities. Why did these firms have such high concentrations in mortgage-related securities? Given the information available to firms at the time, these high concentrations in mortgage-related securities violated basic principles of modern risk management. We argue that this failure to apply well-understood risk management principles was a result of principal-agent problems internal to the firms and to breakdowns of corporate governance systems designed to overcome these principal-agent problems.

Strategic Default on First and Second Lien Mortgages During the Financial Crisis

Strategic default behavior suggests that the default process is not only a matter of the inability to pay. Economic costs and benefits affect the incidence and timing of defaults. As with prior research, this article finds that people default strategically as their home value falls below the mortgage value (exercise the put option to default on their first mortgage). While some of these homeowners default on both first mortgages and second lien home equity lines, a large portion of the delinquent borrowers have kept their second lien current during the recent financial crisis. These second liens, which are current but stand behind a seriously delinquent first mortgage, are subject to a high risk of default. However, relatively few borrowers default on their second liens while remaining current on their first. This article explores the strategic factors that may affect borrower decisions to default on first vs. second lien mortgages. This study finds that borrowers are more likely to remain current on their second lien if it is a home equity line of credit (HELOC) rather than a closed-end home equity loan. Moreover, the size of the unused line of credit is an important factor. Interestingly, we find evidence that the various mortgage loss mitigation programs also play a role in providing incentives for homeowners to default on their first mortgages.

Competitive effects of Basel II on U.S. bank credit card lending

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on U.S. bank credit card lending. We find that Basel II is not likely to have a competitive effect on community banks and most regional banks. Bank issuers that operate under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers. JEL classification: G210, G280, D430

Foreclosure Delay and Consumer Credit Performance

Supersedes Working Paper 14-8. The deep housing market recession from 2008 through 2010 was characterized by a steep rise in the number of foreclosures and lengthening foreclosure timelines. The average length of time from the onset of delinquency through the end of the foreclosure process also expanded significantly, averaging up to three years in some states. Most individuals undergoing foreclosure were experiencing serious financial stress. However, the extended foreclosure timelines enabled mortgage defaulters to live in their homes without making mortgage payments until the end of the foreclosure process, thus providing temporary income and liquidity benefits from lower housing costs. This paper investigates the impact of extended foreclosure timelines on borrower performance with credit card debt. Our results indicate that a longer period of nonpayment of mortgage expenses results in higher cure rates on delinquent credit cards and reduced credit card balances. Foreclosure process delays may have mitigated the impact of the economic downturn on credit card default.

Risk Quantification of Retail Credit: Current Practices and Future Challenges

This paper analyzes current practices at U.S. banks for quantifying credit in retail portfolios and examines the challenges confronting banks and regulators in developing an internal ratings based (IRB) approach to setting capital requirements for retail exposures. The paper finds that approaches that directly estimate portfolio volatility are potentially a viable approach to estimating economic capital, but currrently these methods do not provide a reliable approach for setting regulatory requirements. Alternative approaches based on direct estimating of structural risk parameters (e.g. probabilty of default) are currently a more viable option for setting capital standards.

Potential Competitive Effects on U.S. Bank Credit Card Lending from the Proposed Bifurcated Application of Basel II

This paper analyzes the potential competitive effects of the proposed bifurcated application of Basel II capital regulations in the United States on bank credit card lending activities. For this purpose, the authors consider the Basel II regulations as stated in the June 2004 Basel Committee Framework Agreement. ; Also issued as Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 05-21 ; Superseded by Working Paper 07-09

Introduction: New directions in Information and Screening in Real Estate Finance

ConclusionThe evidence presented in this special issue supports the view that preexisting information held by mortgage lenders plays an important role in mortgage approvals. This argues for mortgage lending programs that make efficient use of lender information, and it supports the importance of local financial intermediaries for lending. It also suggests that mortgage finance is an important element in turning transitory shocks into persistent ones that shape macroeconomic and regional business cycles.This Journal has from its inception, with the publication of a seminal article on information and incentives on mortgage contract terms by Dunn and Spart (1988), pushed forward the frontier of knowledge on information issues in real estate finance. This special issue presents empirical evidence on the importance of this aspect of mortgages.